DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION
Oversight and Review Unit

Review of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Public Defender Agency

November 4, 2019
RESULTS IN BRIEF

We found it difficult to accurately determine the PDA’s attorneys’ caseloads because of numerous inconsistent reports from the PDA. However, we found the range of 145-154 weighted cases between FYs18-19 to be the most accurate. These weighted caseload numbers are within professional standards and those of other states across the nation. The PDA, therefore, is fulfilling its ethical and constitutional obligations within prevailing professional standards.

We found a substantial increase in cases being conflicted over to the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA), from 2,813 in FY17 to 4,224 in FY19. Between the Thunderbird Falls and Grunwald homicide cases, OPA represents 9 of the 10 defendants. If the PDA cannot find ways to substantially reduce the conflict rate, it risks undermining its core mission of being the primary agency providing constitutionally mandated, court-appointed legal representation for indigent clients.

We found the PDA counts cases differently than OPA or the Alaska Court System. For example, the PDA counted more than 16,080 petitions to revoke probation and parole violations as new cases from FYs17-19, but OPA does not count these as cases. The PDA also uses a weighting system for its cases, but OPA does not. The PDA takes 25% credit for all cases conflicted out to OPA. It is hard to tell whether the PDA over-weights cases; it is equally hard to tell whether the PDA underweights cases. It is difficult to use the PDA’s workload numbers in a way that’s effective for budgeting purposes.

The PDA has been budgeted for a sufficient number of attorneys for its caseload under prevailing professional standards, but faces significant recruitment and retention challenges. The PDA has experienced higher caseloads in offices where it has had staffing difficulties, particularly in regions outside of Anchorage.

However, the PDA has been intentionally holding open 4-7 vacancies for several years, drawing from its personal services funds to pay for other expenses, like contractor services. This has intensified its staffing challenges, particularly in regional offices.

In the past 2 fiscal years, the PDA has received $1,953,900 in additional appropriations, including 18 positions, most of which was funded under Governor Dunleavy. The PDA also has had a fairly consistent >8% vacancy rate, which is extra resource capacity it could use to handle cases in regional offices or to provide additional support staff to its attorneys. The PDA has been resourced with more budget and staff positions than it is using effectively.

The PDA would operate more efficiently if it hired more support staff to assist its attorneys and provided better training for those staff. This would reduce the felt-caseload burden on the PDA’s current attorneys by leveraging more effectively the skill of the paralegals and other support staff.

One way to improve the PDA’s effectiveness and reduce costs and conflicts sent to OPA is to create a silo within the PDA to handle conflict cases. We examine the way that would work, as well as arguments against this model. It also is possible the PDA may be representing clients who do not qualify as indigent due to the court system failing to properly inquire into the eligibility of defendants to receive PDA services.

Finally, we did not find evidence of anyone hampering public defenders’ efforts, or any undue interference with the independence of the PDA’s defense functions.

We made 17 recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the PDA. We will issue a Supplemental to this report once the analysis of our time study of the PDA is completed.
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INTRODUCTION

The State of Alaska is committed to both adequately fulfilling its obligation to provide public defense and making its Public Defender Agency (PDA) the primary defense agency in the State. The Department of Administration (DOA) Oversight & Review Unit (O&R) initiated this review with the former Public Defender, Quinlan Steiner. The objective of this review is to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the PDA’s management practices and operations by:

• Evaluating procedures to determine, manage, and track caseloads and operational costs;
• Identifying opportunities for increased efficiency and effectiveness in staffing cases and managing operations; and
• Assessing current PDA practices to determine what recommendations or changes can be suggested to improve the PDA’s case management and operations.

The findings and recommendations in this review may assist the Governor, Alaska Legislature, DOA Commissioner, and Public Defender in determining funding decisions for the PDA, creating a more efficient PDA, and ensuring the PDA is best serving the indigent defendants of Alaska.

Background

The State of Alaska has a duty to provide representation for defendants in criminal cases when they are unable to afford counsel. That duty derives from the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court held in *Gideon v. Wainwright* that defendants charged with a felony in state court were entitled to a lawyer at state expense if they were unable to afford counsel.1 Similarly, the Court held in *Argersinger v. Hamlin*, that indigent defendants have a right to counsel in misdemeanor cases resulting in a defendant’s loss of liberty.2 In Alaska, the right to counsel applies to defendants in misdemeanor cases if imprisonment is possible.

In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of counsel means the right to “reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing professional norms of practice.”3

The PDA was created in 1969, by Alaska Statute 18.85, to fulfill the State of Alaska’s constitutional responsibility to guarantee assistance of counsel in an indigent individual’s defense against criminal prosecution. Indigent defense is also required by the Alaska Rules of Court. Through the PDA, Alaska provides legal services to indigent citizens. The PDA is a unique State agency – while it is under the general supervision of the Commissioner of the DOA, it operates largely independently under the autonomous leadership

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of the Public Defender, who is appointed by the Governor and can be removed by the Governor only for good cause.\textsuperscript{4}

By statute, the Alaska Court System (ACS) is responsible for determining an individual’s eligibility for public defense services.\textsuperscript{5} After eligibility criteria have been met, an attorney is appointed either from the PDA or, when conflicts arise, from the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA). Since ACS determines eligibility, neither the PDA nor OPA have control over the number of cases each agency will be assigned.

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2020, the PDA has 13 offices statewide: Juneau, Ketchikan, Sitka, Utqiagvik, Kotzebue, Nome, Anchorage, Dillingham, Kenai, Kodiak, Palmer, Bethel and Fairbanks.\textsuperscript{6} In FY19, the PDA reported it was assigned 23,902 new indigent cases, while OPA received 4,522 cases from the PDA. State expenditures totaled approximately $27 million for the PDA and $28 million for OPA.

In FY19, the PDA had an authorized staff count of 181 professionals, consisting of 106 attorney positions and the rest being support staff. This represented approximately 15% of DOA’s FY19 authorized employees. Of its 106 attorneys, 65% of them were higher paid attorney positions: 3 were classified as Attorney VI positions (salary range: $143,592-$157,580); 18 were classified as Attorney V (salary range: $114,420-$182,976),\textsuperscript{7} and 48 were classified as Attorney IV: (salary range: $99,660-$114,221). The PDA’s budget breakdown for FY19 was as follows:

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Expenditure by Object} & \textbf{Budget Expenditure} \\
\hline
Personal Services & $22,667,100 \\
Travel & $389,600 \\
Contractual & $3,701,700 \\
Commodities & $219,700 \\
\hline
\textbf{Total Expenditures} & $26,978,100 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{The PDA’s FY19 Expenditures}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{4} AS 18.85.010-040.  \\
\textsuperscript{5} AS 18.85.120.  \\
\textsuperscript{6} http://doa.alaska.gov/pda/Offices.html.  \\
\textsuperscript{7} An Attorney V can make more than an Attorney VI if they have accrued many years working for the State of Alaska, or if they have a cost of living differential for working in a remote location.
Standards for Public Defense

Public defense attorneys must have adequate time and resources to assure competent representation for their clients. The Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct require:

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.\(^8\)

The fulfillment of Alaska’s legal requirements is heavily dependent on the PDA having adequate resources to provide “competent representation.” Although Alaska’s Supreme Court has been protective of defendants’ rights and of the rights of parents involved in child-in-need-of-aid (CINA) cases, no standard has been established in Alaska’s courts, or elsewhere in the United States (U.S.), to measure definitively when the overall funding provided to defense agencies fails to meet constitutional obligations.

National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals

In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (NAC) established numeric caseload standards for public defense agencies. The NAC recommended the following caseload limits per attorney:

**Figure 2. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Case</th>
<th>Number of Unweighted Cases per Attorney</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Felonies</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misdemeanors (excluding traffic)</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile court cases</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental health cases</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal cases</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the NAC’s quantitative recommendations for public defender attorneys are useful, they were based solely on the opinions of participants, and not on empirical data. There is value to using experienced professionals to develop caseload standards, but a best practice is to use professional opinion to inform and provide context to empirical data that was previously collected. Additionally, the NAC recommendations were developed over 40 years ago, making them outdated in a complex and rapidly changing criminal defense environment. Regardless, the former Public Defender often referred to the NAC standards when evaluating the PDA’s attorneys’ caseloads.

For FY19, the PDA worked on 23,902 cases. The PDA reported that this resulted in an average of 244 unweighted cases per attorney for FY19, with an average of 59 felonies per attorney and the other cases being less complex (e.g., parole revocation; petition to revoke probation (PTR), misdemeanors, etc.). This caseload is acceptable by the NAC standards.

**Common Practice and Legal Standards in Other States**

Across the United States, public defender offices take on more cases than the NAC standards. For example, in 2007, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) found that public defenders handled a median of more than 200 cases (70 felonies and 139 misdemeanors) in various states. In a 2007 report of State Public Defender Programs, BJS found 80% of reporting state programs exceeded the maximum recommended limit of felony or misdemeanor cases per attorney. BJS found that Rhode Island (391 cases per attorney) and Hawaii (384 cases per attorney) had two of the highest combined felony and misdemeanor caseloads per attorney in 2007.

While the NAC developed recommendations for caseloads for public defenders, the practice is that public defenders in the majority of state programs carry far greater caseloads than these recommended levels.

Several states have developed workload standards for public defenders. Figure 3 shows the standards used in 15 selected states, as reported by the DOJ Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). These standards represent the maximum annual number of cases an attorney should handle if that attorney handles only that type of case. For example, an attorney in Arizona should handle no more than 300 misdemeanors in a single year, if misdemeanors are the only type of case the attorney has.

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10 See Quinlan Steiner’s recorded testimony and accompanying PowerPoint presentation before the Senate Finance Subcommittee, March 19, 2019, http://www.akleg.gov/basis/Meeting/Detail?Meeting=SADM%202019-03-19%2011:15:00
11 http://www.jrsa.org/events/conference/presentations-10/Donald_Farole.pdf
12 https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf
**Figure 3. Case Standards in Selected States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Felony</th>
<th>Misdemeanor</th>
<th>Juvenile</th>
<th>Appeals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>80-241</td>
<td>310-598</td>
<td>305-310</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>100-120</td>
<td>250-400</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>40-180</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York (City)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>55-302</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) Resolution in Support of Public Defense**

ALEC is the U.S.’s largest nonpartisan, voluntary membership organization of state legislators dedicated to the principles of limited government, free markets and federalism. Comprised of nearly one-quarter of the country’s state legislators and stakeholders from across the policy spectrum, ALEC members represent more than 60 million Americans and provide jobs to more than 30 million people in the United States. On September 13, 2019, ALEC issued a Resolution in Support of Public Defense, resolving:
Access to Public Defense Services:
• That every person accused of a crime be afforded counsel in all cases in which incarceration can occur. States should strive to make counsel available as early as possible.

Effective Public Defense Delivery Systems:
• That whenever a jurisdiction’s population, needs, and caseload warrant it, a public defense delivery system includes a public defender office as well as meaningful participation of the private bar and provides representation consistent with the best practices in the legal community;
• That public defense delivery systems be adequately funded to ensure attorneys have reasonable workloads so as to allow them to provide ethical and competent representation pursuant to prevailing professional norms;
• That public defense providers regularly receive relevant training;
• That public defense providers have access to appropriate support services such as investigators, social workers, and experts; and
• That compensation for public defense providers is sufficient to ensure the recruitment and retention of qualified and skilled advocates taking into consideration for public defenders the rates being paid to other government employees performing similar functions, and for court-appointed counsel the overhead costs and prevailing attorneys’ fees for the jurisdiction.

Independence and Equality:
• That to ensure the defense may fulfill its role in the adversarial system, the defense should be insulated from undue influence, involvement, and control by actors whose interests are directly or indirectly adverse to the attorney-client relationship. Supervision of the public defense system by the judiciary should be no greater than that which is exercised over the private bar; and
• That in order to maintain a vibrant, healthy, and robust adversarial process the defense function be included as an equal and valued partner in the criminal justice system.

These standards are intended to apply uniformly to every public defense office/agency, such as the PDA. We used these standards to evaluate the PDA’s funding, staffing, recruitment and retention, and independence.

Office of Public Advocacy

The Alaska Legislature founded the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) in 1984. One of OPA’s primary functions is to serve as Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) for children in court cases. OPA

screens and trains staff and contract GALs before they are assigned cases. Before OPA was founded, the court system provided GAL services to children in the state.

OPA has staff offices in Anchorage, Juneau, Kenai, Bethel, Palmer, and Fairbanks. OPA has GALs in Anchorage, Fairbanks, Palmer, and Juneau. In areas of the state where there are no staff offices, OPA retains contract GALs to represent children.

OPA will also take criminal cases from the PDA when a conflict arises in the case. “Conflict of interest” rules ensure attorneys zealously advocate for their clients by preventing the attorney and anyone with whom they work from representing a client who has an interest adverse to a client they already have represented. For example, in a criminal defense case involving multiple co-defendants, the co-defendants will have adverse interests and so the same attorney cannot represent them. Similarly, in CINA proceedings, each parent is assigned different counsel because they have interests adverse to one another.

Attorneys working for the same law firm or public agency are generally considered to be a single unit for conflict purposes, although there are some limited exceptions for government lawyers. Conflict rules can also keep a lawyer from representing a person when the lawyer represents a co-defendant, co-parent or important witness in an entirely different proceeding. Because a client may provide a lawyer with confidential information that could later be used against them, conflict rules can keep a lawyer from representing a person when the lawyer has in the past represented a co-defendant, co-parent or important witness.

Currently, the PDA’s practice is to send any cases in which it has a conflict over to OPA. OPA is able to represent multiple co-defendants referred over from the PDA because of how it has structured its agency: OPA has created physical barriers between its sections and, as a result, implemented a “wall” that ethically separates OPA attorneys from each other, enabling multiple OPA attorneys to represent defendants in the same criminal case. For example, at the time of this report, four defendants in the Thunderbird Falls murder case are being represented by OPA. If a conflict arises in the OPA office, those cases must be contracted to private defense attorneys at either an hourly rate or a flat fee.

One of DOA’s concerns is that the conflict process has spilled too many cases (especially, too many complex, expensive cases) onto OPA and private counsel. Both the PDA and OPA estimate that currently, about 25% of the PDA’s most serious felony cases are sent to OPA, and about 18-20% of the PDA’s total cases are sent to OPA. The PDA informed us that historically, about 13-14% of its total cases were sent to OPA.

OPA employs a staff of 149 professionals consisting of 57 attorneys, and the rest being support staff. In addition, OPA has 29 staff positions that are on-call or non-permanent positions. OPA’s budget breakdown for FY19 is as follows:

http://doa.alaska.gov/opa/gal/gal_about_us.html.
**Figure 4. OPA’s FY19 Expenditures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure by Object</th>
<th>Budget Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Services</td>
<td>$18,288,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>$191,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Attorneys</td>
<td>$9,303,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodities</td>
<td>$165,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Expenditures</strong></td>
<td><strong>$27,948,600</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1998 Legislative Audit of the Alaska Public Defender Agency**

The last review of the PDA was conducted in 1998 at the request of the Alaska State Legislature. The audit examined whether the PDA management and operations were efficient and effective in providing representation of clients. The audit’s key findings included:

- The PDA would operate more efficiently with additional staff support, such as investigators, paralegals, and administrative assistants;
- Attorneys are performing tasks that should be done by paraprofessionals or clerical staff;
- Modernization of the PDA technology would improve its efficiency;
- The PDA operations would be improved by capturing data on workloads; and
- The PDA had insufficient manpower to handle increasing caseloads.

The audit recommendations included:

- The PDA should develop its budget requests, in part, using caseload data;
- The PDA should address inefficiencies related to technological equipment and staff configuration;
- The PDA management should implement a process to confirm and maintain the integrity of its attorney time estimates; and
- The Alaska Court System (ACS) should record its appointments of the PDA and OPA as public defense counsel in its case management information system and ensure its transmittal to the integrated criminal justice information system.

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Considering the 1998 Legislative Audit of the PDA was conducted over 20 years ago, it has little applicability to this review. However, it is important to note that in 2008, the PDA adopted a new case management system for tracking and evaluating workloads in order to make budgetary recommendations. The PDA upgraded its case management system in 2019.

Similar to the 1998 Audit, in this review, we found the PDA’s budget requests could be better supported with caseload data that has greater transparency and clarity. We also found the PDA would operate more efficiently with some changes to its technology and staffing strategy. In addition, we found the PDA would be improved by attorneys using timekeeping software to capture actual time worked on cases. This will confirm and maintain the integrity of attorney time estimates. Finally, we found continued inconsistencies in case recording between ACS and the PDA’s systems. We explore these findings and others in further detail, below.

Scope and Methodology

This review examines the PDA’s workload, case management process, and operations. We conducted interviews with attorneys and staff at the PDA and OPA, with former PDA attorneys, and with judges and staff in ACS. We compared the PDA’s workload and practices to those of OPA, which defends the exact same cases when the PDA conflicts out of them. In addition, we reviewed statutes, national standards, best practices, and comparative information from other state programs. We also examined the PDA’s standard operating procedures, financial data, and documentation. We reviewed ACS policies, procedures and charging documents.

In addition, we conducted a limited scope time survey of the PDA and OPA staff as well, gathering data on the number and types of cases worked by these attorneys to collect empirical support to determine adequate workload standards. However, we received results from the PDA late in the project timeline and were unable to include the results in this report. We will issue a Supplemental to this report once the analysis of the time study is completed.

We initiated this review in March 2019 at the direction of DOA Commissioner Kelly Tshibaka and in coordination with the former Public Defender, Quinlan Steiner. On April 2, 2019, Mr. Steiner resigned and an Interim Public Defender, Beth Goldstein, was appointed. In September 2019, Samantha (Sam) Cherot was appointed to be the next Public Defender.

The PDA is in the DOA.\textsuperscript{17} O&R’s authority derives from a February 26, 2019 memorandum from Governor Dunleavy to Commissioner Tshibaka stating his “intent and expectation that [her] expertise be utilized to review, investigate, and provide policy direction, not only as it relates to the Department of Administration, but as it applies statewide in the areas of management, audit, and government efficiency, as directed, on my behalf.” (Appendix A) Commissioner Tshibaka established O&R to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the programs and operations of the State of Alaska, and to detect and deter waste, fraud, and abuse.

\textsuperscript{17} AS 18.85.010.
This review was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation established by the federal Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

This report provides findings about the PDA’s imprecise caseload, referral of too many conflict cases to OPA, recruitment and retention challenges, and representation of non-indigent clients. It also includes findings that do not substantiate allegations of undue interference with the PDA’s independence. It includes recommendations for policy, process, or procedural revisions that will increase the efficiency of PDA operations and the efficacy of PDA services.

We are grateful for the cooperation of the PDA and OPA in accomplishing this review.
FINDINGS OF THE REVIEW

Caseload Assessment Issues and Inconsistencies

The DOA has been particularly concerned about assertions from the former Public Defender and others that the PDA has such a heavy workload that it cannot provide its indigent Alaskan clients with the representation required by the Constitution and professional ethics rules. DOA initiated this audit in large part to identify the extent of the PDA’s workload and what solutions were necessary to address any case overload.

Public Defender Gave Multiple Conflicting Statements Regarding the PDA’s Caseload

On January 14, 2019, the former Public Defender provided a draft *Original Application for Writ of Prohibition* to the DOA Commissioner stating the PDA lacked the capacity necessary to fulfill its ethical and constitutional obligations to its current clients if it were appointed to represent any additional indigent individuals. The draft writ requested permission from the Alaska Supreme Court to refuse new appointments in the PDA in order to ensure its current clients receive the representation to which they are entitled.

In the draft writ, the former Public Defender represented that in FY18, the PDA “had an average, unweighted caseload of 278 cases.” However, in the PDA’s FY18 end-of-year report, the PDA reported an average, unweighted caseload of 243 cases per attorney. In the draft writ, the former Public Defender also projected an average unweighted caseload of 271 cases in FY19.

The former Public Defender also made several presentations, using PowerPoint slides to legislators and committees in the 2019 Legislative session, testifying that:

- “Under more modern [caseload] standards that show how much work is associated with any given case type...by those standards we are short anywhere from 22 attorneys up to 61 attorneys just for our criminal trial division.”

- “For FY20, we’re going to need 11 additional attorney positions with support staff to handle the projected workload. Without those additional resources, we’ll simply be in a situation where we are not meeting our constitutional obligations. There will be a constitutional violation unless we get either the positions or a reduction in cases, essentially. ... When I request attorney positions, I also include the funding for the necessary support for that

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19 The former Public Defender assumed 150 felony cases per attorney is the maximum standard caseload.
attorney... So really, what I’m saying by needing 11 attorneys—I ultimately need 22 positions and the associated funding for that.”

In response to a request for data to support the former Public Defender’s representations regarding attorneys' caseloads, on February 7, 2019, the former Public Defender reported to the DOA Commissioner via e-mail that trial attorneys had been assigned an average unweighted caseload of 121 cases at that time. This came with an attachment showing the current open caseload broken down by case type. The number of open cases (11,899) divided by the number of PDA attorneys (98) at the time equaled 121 cases.

In a February 19, 2019 e-mail to the DOA Commissioner, in response to a list of cases worked by the PDA in FY18, the former Public Defender represented that the PDA worked 22,826 cases in FY18, staffed by 106 attorneys, which is an average of 215 unweighted cases per attorney. In a March 11, 2019 e-mail to the DOA Commissioner, the former Public Defender stated that the PDA’s projected weighted average trial caseload for FY19 was 166, and trial attorneys had been assigned 160 cases between March 2018 to March 2019.

Separately, the former Public Defender provided the Commissioner with an end-of-FY18 and end-of-FY19 report, showing that attorneys had a weighted average of 154 cases in FY18, and of 145 cases in FY19.

In analyzing the 23,902 total open cases reported in FY19, we found these included cases conflicted out to OPA, as well as all other cases/case-related actions that do not take the same time or effort as a full felony case, like routine PTRs, cases that were filled but then dismissed by the prosecution, parole violations, misdemeanors, etc. The PDA assigns a lower weight to these cases to reflect that they take less time and effort than full felony cases. Therefore, we found the weighted case numbers were a more accurate representation of the actual caseload PDA attorneys were handling than taking the total number of cases/case-related actions and dividing it by the total number of attorneys.

The figure below shows the different representations the former Public Defender or the PDA has made about PDA’s caseload in FY18 and FY19:

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20 This means the former Public Defender believed there would be 1,650 more felony cases in FY20.
Figure 5. The PDA’s Representations of Its Caseload in Various Communications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communications from the PDA to DOA Commissioner, Legislators, and Others</th>
<th>Unweighted Caseload Numbers</th>
<th>Weighted Caseload Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Draft Writ</td>
<td>2/7/19 Analysis</td>
<td>2/19/19 E-mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY18 represented caseload</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY19 represented caseload</td>
<td>≈271</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While it is difficult to determine which caseload number is accurate, we found the range of 145-154 cases between FY18 and FY19 to be accurate because that range of numbers came with data evidence to support them and they represented weighted caseloads. Using that range, the PDA’s caseload falls within constitutional and ethical limits under the NAC standards. Moreover, when examining the caseload standards across 15 states and BJA’s finding that public defenders nation-wide handle a median of more than 200 felony and misdemeanor cases, a mix of 145-154 cases is within the standards and practices of other state public defender offices (see Figure 3 above).

We also found that the PDA should confirm and maintain the integrity of its attorney caseloads by reporting numbers that are consistent. Capturing and reporting consistently accurate data on PDA workloads would strengthen the efficiency and effective management of PDA operations.

The PDA’s Weighting System is Imprecise

The former Public Defender said the PDA developed a weighting standard approximately 10 years ago to assign different levels of effort and complexity to different cases and tasks in the agency.\(^{21}\) He said the system was premised on standards adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA): an attorney should handle no more than 400 misdemeanors or 150 felonies in a given year.\(^ {22}\)

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\(^{21}\) Former Public Defender Quinlan Steiner Memorandum to Deputy Commissioner Dave Donley, Data Metric Reporting Information Request, February 26, 2019.

\(^{22}\) Interview of Quinlan Steiner, April 1, 2019, minute 23.
BJA compared two methods for developing caseload standards: the Case-Weighting and Delphi methods. BJA noted that of the two, the “time record-based case-weighting method,” is “most reliable.”\textsuperscript{23} According to BJA, the case-weighting method uses detailed time records kept by public defender attorneys over a timeframe of typically 7-13 weeks. The time records are used to translate the caseload (the number of cases) to the workload (the amount of effort, measured in units of time, for the lawyer to complete work on the caseload). Weights can then be given to the total annual caseload of a public defender’s office to compare to next year’s anticipated number of cases.

In contrast to the case-weighting method, the former Public Defender described the PDA’s caseload weighting system as “based loosely” on the Delphi method. The Delphi Method was introduced in 1962 by researchers at the Rand Corporation to gather expert opinion and generate a reliable consensus for determining standards.\textsuperscript{24} In determining public defender workloads, it uses a sample of attorneys across the community and gives them a variety of scenarios designed to reflect cases and clients regularly represented in public defenders’ workloads. The attorneys are asked to estimate the time involved in handling the various scenarios.\textsuperscript{25} The sample group goes through multiple rounds of evaluating the scenarios until they are refined down to a consensus about the relative time required to complete the tasks associated with each case.\textsuperscript{26}

The former Public Defender said the PDA developed its weighted case system by applying a multiplier to each case type to estimate the difficulty and reflect the amount of work, and thus time, the PDA expects it will have to expend on a case of that type. However, the PDA did not use a sample of attorneys across the community to arrive at the consensus; the former Public Defender said the PDA just developed the weights internally by convening a small committee to compare the relative casework against a felony to estimate how much work went into an average case.

According to the former Public Defender, the committee set the weights based on their estimation of the time to disposition of the case versus time to disposition of the cases the PDA kept.\textsuperscript{27} So, a weight of “5” means the case takes five times as long to complete as a standard.

\textsuperscript{23} Bureau of Justice Assistance, \textit{Keeping Defender Workloads Manageable}, pp. 8-9 (2001). The PDA noted the timekeeping method reflects what the attorneys have done on cases, but the Delphi method determines what should be done on the cases. However, BJA described the Delphi method as estimating the “time involved in handling the various scenarios,” resulting in “strong educated guesses about the relative time required to complete various tasks”—not a method that determines what should be done on cases.


\textsuperscript{27} In reviewing this report, the PDA added that it had some lawyers keep time and used those results to inform and adjust estimates and weights, but the former Public Defender did not include this in describing to us the process he used for developing the PDA’s case weighting system.
felony case. Conversely, a weight of “.25” means the case takes 25% as long to complete as a standard felony case.28

Because the PDA’s weighting system only approximates the Delphi estimation method, the weights do not compare case level of efforts to similar agencies elsewhere, nor do they generate consensus for the level of effort among a broad professional group.29 The Delphi method itself only provides estimates that do not fully reflect or explain the effort and cost required to manage caseloads.

In FY20, the PDA gives the following weights (credits towards a “full case”) for these tasks:

Figure 6. Sample of the PDA’s FY20 Weights for Activities/Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity/Case</th>
<th>Weight towards Full Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/U Felony</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felony</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misdemeanor</td>
<td>.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child in Need of Aid (CINA)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felony or Misdemeanor Merit</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict to OPA: Unclassified/A Felony</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict to OPA: B/C Felony</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict to OPA: CINA</td>
<td>.625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict to OPA: PCR</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer to Private Counsel</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28 Interview of Quinlan Steiner, April 1, 2019, at hour 1:20. The former Public Defender also said he consulted a book that he described as “the gold standard” for determining how to develop a weighting methodology for cases O&R made several requests for the book, but he never provided a copy of it or its name.

29 Because the PDA’s weighting system only approximates the Delphi estimation method, the statistics allow only a rough comparison to similar agencies elsewhere. The Delphi method itself only provides estimates that do not fully reflect or explain the effort and cost required to manage caseloads, or the ability of staff to juggle matters. For example, even within categories of open cases, many individual matters do not require significant attention for long periods of time.
Until around April 2019, the PDA weighted any case it transferred to private counsel as a full point (the same as a felony case). After this review began, the former Public Defender changed the weight for these referrals to “.25.” The PDA explained it transfers cases to private counsel when clients hire private attorneys for the case, ending the public defender’s representation. This can happen at any stage of the case, sometimes long after the case has begun. The PDA periodically evaluates the weight on cases, and it said it discounted the weight of these cases by 75% after comparing their average age-to-disposition against other cases.

The chart below provides the number of cases the PDA counted at full felony case credit that were transferred out to private counsel before their weight was changed to “.25.”

**Figure 7. PDA Cases 2017-2019 Transferred to Private Counsel that Were Counted as Full Case Credit**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Year</th>
<th>Number of Cases Transferred to Private Counsel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 (Jan-Mar)</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>601</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With respect to weighting cases referred to OPA and counting them towards the PDA’s caseload, the former Public Defender explained there is a substantial amount of work that goes into determining whether there is a case conflict. It takes attorney and support staff time to look at all the materials, determine who the PDA has represented before, and assess whether the PDA has adversity/conflict with a person and which person it can keep without conflict. Some weight is appropriate because the PDA works on the cases until they conflict out. The PDA makes every effort to keep a case rather than refer it over to OPA because of a conflict.

The PDA also noted that in cases where no conflict is identified at the outset of the case, but much later due to new discovery, and the information contained within, PDA attorneys must treat these cases like any other case. Their representation in these cases involves client meetings, court appearances, discovery review, investigation, and may involve motion work, evidentiary hearings, and trial preparation.

However, conflict review for B and C felonies does not uniformly take 25% of the case time. Sometimes it takes significantly more time, and sometimes it takes less. The same is true for all of the PDA’s conflict weights, which is why they are intended to represent the average time of 30.

Interview with Quinlan Steiner, April 1, 2019, hour 1:08.
WEIGHTING CASES CONFLICTED TO OPA

For Unclassified and A felony cases conflicted out to OPA, the PDA’s system assumes the conflict review process will take 25% of the total time that will be spent on the case, whether a conflict in the case is complex or easy to determine. Since Unclassified and A felony cases are weighted at 5 points, when cases are conflicted to OPA, the PDA discounts them 75% and weights them at 1.25 of a B/C felony.

Take the notorious Thunderbird Falls homicide case involving 6 co-defendants, 5 of whom are represented by the PDA and OPA at the time of this report. The PDA represents 1 defendant and conflicted out of representing the other 4 as co-defendants, sending them to OPA at the start of the case. The PDA’s weighted system adds 5 B/C felony “cases” to the PDA’s numbers for referring 4 Thunderbird Falls co-defendants to OPA (1.25% credit x 4 defendants = 5 felony cases under the weighted system).

When presenting caseloads to the Governor and Legislature, OPA would represent its Thunderbird Falls caseload as 4 cases. If the PDA were to use the same definition as OPA, it would represent its Thunderbird Falls caseload as 1 case. But the PDA often uses a weighted caseload in its reporting. In that scenario, it would represent its Thunderbird Falls weighted caseload as 10 cases: 5 points for its case, and 5 points for the cases referred to OPA.

disposition for the case compared to a felony case defended by the PDA. For example, the PDA does not assign any weight to felony appeals sent to OPA (in FY19 it sent 3 felony appeals to OPA). The PDA assigns 1.25 weight for Unclassified and A felonies; these crimes are weighted as “5” when kept within the PDA, so the PDA discounts them 75% when referring them to OPA. The PDA’s weighting system is intended to be tied to the average age of disposition for the case.

OPA Director James Stinson told us that some PDA cases are conflicted out with very little review (co-defendants in a felony charge), while other PDA cases are referred over to OPA because of a conflict 1-3 years into a case. Sometimes conflicts are not revealed until later when witnesses who create the conflict are identified. Late discovery of a conflict can cause case delays, which can add considerable expense on both the defense and the prosecutorial side. The bigger the case (for example, a murder case with multiple defendants and many witnesses), the bigger potential for discovering conflicts.

That is why, in contrast to the PDA, OPA does not use a case weighting system; OPA’s Director James Stinson believes it is difficult to assign a standard amount of work for any given case type. For example, Mr. Stinson pointed out that the PDA’s reasoning for giving a 25% credit to cases that are transferred to OPA is that sometimes some or substantial work can be done before it goes to OPA. While that could be true in certain instances, in other cases, little to no work is done by the PDA before it is transferred to OPA. In either case, the PDA gets 25% credit for the case.
Instead, OPA gets accurate individual case counts from attorneys to confirm whether a specific attorney, or unit, is overburdened. According to Mr. Stinson, this is a more intensive method, but it is more accurate and also necessary to maintain OPA’s “conflict walls.”

As currently applied, the PDA’s weighting system reports its workload statistics in a way that makes them difficult to use for effective budgeting and workload analysis purposes. It is hard to tell whether the PDA overweighted cases; it is equally hard to tell whether the PDA underweighted some cases. Since PDA and OPA both represent indigent clients in criminal defense cases, both report to the same Commissioner and same legislative finance committees, both are funded from the same source, and since both report their caseload numbers differently, this further contributes to the difficulty in using PDA’s workload numbers in a way that’s effective for budgeting purposes.

_The PDA Counted Some Cases by Counting Them as One Case Before Judgment and Another Case After Judgment_

An indigent criminal defendant is assigned a public defender attorney before trial. Rule 81(e)(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that an “attorney who has appeared for a party in an action or proceeding may be permitted to withdraw as counsel for such party only as follows:?

a) Where the party has other counsel ready to be substituted for the attorney who wishes to withdraw;

b) Where the party expressly consents in open court or in writing to the withdrawal of the party’s attorney...;

c) Where the party’s consent has not been obtained, the court may grant a motion to withdraw for good cause...; and

d) In accordance with the limitations set forth in any limited entry of appearance filed pursuant to Civil Rule 81(d)...

Rule 81(e)(2) then states, “an attorney shall be considered to have properly withdrawn as counsel for a party in an action or proceeding in which a period of _one year_ has elapsed since the filing of any paper or the issuance of any process in the action or proceeding...” (emphasis added).

In sum, under the rules, a public defender attorney can only withdraw from representing a client if s/he shows “good cause” or the client consents to the substitute in open court.

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31 Rule 50 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states that: “...The Rules of Civil Procedure relating to the withdrawal of an attorney for the party shall apply with equal force with respect to any attorney retained to represent the accused in criminal actions.”
Otherwise, the attorney functionally represents the client for 1 year after the final judgment has been entered and the time for filing an appeal has expired, or an appeal has been taken.

However, one Anchorage area judge, who asked to have his/her identity remain confidential, informed us that around 2006, the former Public Defender, Mr. Steiner, sought and received permission from a judge in Alaska’s Third Judicial District (the Anchorage area) to have representation of PDA clients terminate upon issuance of the judgment. If the client needed assistance with any issues related to the case post-judgment (restitution proceedings, etc.), the client was told the court could appoint a public defender again for the rest of the case. The judge explained that this practice of having the PDA end representation upon judgment and then have another attorney appointed post-judgment would result in having only one case, but two PDA appointments. In these cases, the case appeared as one case in the ACS system but as two cases in PDA records.

The judge also told us it was not clear whether the PDA had this exception in all four Judicial Districts, or if it was observed in all courthouses in the Districts. For example, the judge told us that by April 2008, the Palmer court refused to let the PDA terminate representation upon issuance of judgment; the PDA attorneys had to represent their clients for 1 year after the final judgment had been entered.

The judge also said some of the Anchorage-area judges and the court clerks thought it was wrong for the PDA to withdraw from representing clients without their consent. The judge indicated this practice was controversial because:

1) It created more work for the courts by making them go through the appointment process and indigency determination again;
2) Mr. Steiner was “campaigning for this venue by venue” (i.e., with each courthouse); and
3) “It was clear to many that this was being done to increase the statistics concerning the [PDA’s] caseload so that their funding would be increased.”

According to the judge, “if the Legislature gives the PDA funding based on its caseload, then this practice would have ‘statistically’ increased the caseload, even though there had been no actual increase in the caseload.”

O&R reviewed a letter drafted by former Palmer Superior Court judge Eric Smith to former Public Defender Quinlan Steiner that corroborated the notion that judges did not support the PDA withdrawing from representation before 1 year. The letter said, in part:

The judges believed that the appointment remains for one year after the case is closed pursuant to Civil Rule 8 (sic) unless a motion to withdraw is granted, there being no different Criminal Rule. When it became clear you, as head Public Defender, and we, the judges here in Palmer, would not be able to agree on the legal merits, we decided to go ahead and treat the appointment as having ended when the cases is closed anyway, even though we did not think we should.
In an interview with O&R, the former Public Defender confirmed that the practice of counting some cases as one case before judgment as and as a second case after judgment occurs at the discretion of judges. He said generally that the public defenders close cases subsequent to the disposition of trial once they receive a judgment or order. He said the PDA started this practice of closing the files right away to reduce the conflicts—as long as a file stays open, the risk of conflict is higher. He also said follow-up motions and post-trial relief motions generally are handled as the same case, unless the PDA receives a new appointment from the court, then the PDA will open it as a new case. He also stated that PTRs and parole violations are opened as separate cases (which is different from how these actions are handled in OPA).

The former Public Defender also indicated that PDA attorneys do not consistently observe the same practices in closing a case, when they treat the case as a same case or close it and start a new case, or how long they keep it open to continue assisting a client. We found that this, too, will lead to inconsistencies and inaccuracies in PDA case reporting data.

When we asked the PDA about this practice of closing the case at judgment, the PDA also explained that because closed criminal cases are “secured,” this means that they are less likely to create a conflict in a new case. If, however, the PDA remains in cases for a year after they close, then some portion of those clients will become involved in other clients’ cases, creating conflicts.

**The PDA’s Case Numbers Do Not Match OPA’s or ACS’s**

The former Public Defender reported opening 23,902 cases in FY19. However, the number of cases between the agencies do not match — such as the number of cases received from the PDA by OPA because of conflicts and the number of cases the court system assigned to the PDA.

The PDA did not have the same number as ACS for the number of PDA cases. That may be in part because of the practice of the PDA counting cases by representation post-judgment (two representations) (described above).

It also may be because of another way that the PDA counts cases. According to the PDA, it counts all “petitions to revoke probation” (PTR) as new cases, even though they are handled...

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32 Interview with Quinlan Steiner, April 1, 2019, hour 1:10.
33 Id. at 30.
34 Id. The PDA only counts PTRs and parole matters as new cases; other routine post-judgment motions are not handled as additional cases.
35 Interview with Quinlan Steiner, April 1, 2019, minute 30.
within the same case, given the same case number, and treated as the same case by ACS.\textsuperscript{36} Between FY17-FY19, the PDA reported 14,203 PTRs as new cases. OPA and ACS would have counted these PTR cases as part of ongoing cases, not as new cases. The PDA also counts all parole violations as new cases,\textsuperscript{37} but OPA does not. OPA opens PTRs and parole violations as a separate matter in its case management system to track the activity, but if it is related to an ongoing case, then OPA reports it all as one case to the Legislature, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), etc. OPA said it does not count PTRs as cases because PTRs have a lower standard of proof in court, require less trial preparation, and involve less evidence.\textsuperscript{38}

The table below captures all of the cases between FY17-FY19 that the PDA counted as new cases that would have been counted as part of the original, underlying case by ACS or OPA.

**Figure 8. FY17-FY19 Cases the PDA Counted as New Cases that Would Have Been Counted as Part of the Original Case by ACS or OPA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PDA Activity</th>
<th>FY17</th>
<th>FY18</th>
<th>FY19</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Felony PTR</td>
<td>3930</td>
<td>3444</td>
<td>2843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misdemeanor PTR</td>
<td>1673</td>
<td>1118</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile PTR</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parole Revocation</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,277</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,519</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,284</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adding together all actions from FY17-FY19, the PDA counted a combined 16,080 cases that neither ACS nor OPA would have counted as separate cases.

When the PDA was asked why it treats parole and PTR revocations as separate cases, the PDA explained that although they may share case numbers with the trial cases, these violations are based on alternate fact patterns and rarely have substantive relation to the conduct alleged in the original case; they can occur immediately after the conclusion of a case, but can also occur years after a trial case is concluded and prison term served; and they can include appointment to cases where the PDA did not handle the underlying trial case.

In an interview with a former PDA attorney, he told us PTRs take a short time to complete—they are a quick hearing with little preparation time, and 90% of them take less than 75 minutes of total work. The Director of OPA, Mr. Stinson, also said PTRs were very little work and never

\textsuperscript{36} ACS tracks PTRs in its annual report under superior court activity.

\textsuperscript{37} Interview with Quinlan Steiner, April 1, 2019, minute 30.

\textsuperscript{38} See, e.g., McDaniels v. State, A-12614: neither the Alaska Rules of Evidence nor the Confrontation Clause apply to probation revocation proceedings, but due process does.
amounted to one quarter the time of a B/C felony case. In our analysis of actual time the PDA attorneys spent on 97 PTRs started and completed during the time of this review, the average length of time spent on a PTR was 68 minutes. The PDA told us it tracks PTRs separately because it makes a statistical impact on attorneys’ workloads; they estimate PDA criminal attorneys have 25-30 felony PTRs to handle.

The PDA also did not have the same number as OPA for the number of cases the PDA conflicted over to OPA for OPA representation. O&R gathered FY19 data on cases that were sent from the PDA over to OPA for representation. As illustrated in the graph below, there is a difference between what OPA reports was received from the PDA and what the PDA reports was sent to OPA.

**Figure 9. Difference in FY19 Case Counts of PDA Referrals to OPA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Type</th>
<th>PDA-Reported Number of Cases Transferred</th>
<th>OPA-Reported Number of Cases Received</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Felony</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Felony</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Felony</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misdemeanors</td>
<td>1844</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After examining and resolving each case discrepancy with the PDA and OPA, O&R found the difference between the PDA’s and OPA’s case count numbers were attributed to the following reasons:

1) Closing codes at the PDA may account for some cases being closed as a conflict when they really were just closed at the PDA and not sent to OPA;
2) Cases closed or opened around the beginning and end of a fiscal year were not accurately captured because the PDA could close a case before July 1, but OPA opens the case after or on July 1, or the PDA closes it after the new FY year although it was sent over to OPA during the prior fiscal year; or

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39 We will complete the analysis of all PTRs worked on by attorneys during the time study and submit the results in a supplemental report.
40 Under previous criminal laws, technical PTRs were disposed under caps of 3 days for a 1st violation, 5 days for a 2nd violation and 10 days for a 3rd violation. The new criminal reform law, HB 49, did away with these caps. A defendant can now have all suspended time imposed for a first technical violation. For PDA attorneys, this means more litigation will ensue, including more bail hearings and more procedural hearings.
41 It should be noted, O&R did not track every discrepancy in the numbers, but an internal review of the tracking systems between the PDA and OPA should be conducted to make improvements.
3) Cases leaving the PDA classified at a lower level, but then being indicted at a higher level when they are in OPA.

The NAC has defined a case as “a single charge or set of charges concerning a defendant (or other client) in one court in one proceeding.” The BJA has noted that:

Whereas it is important for the indigent defense system (including public defenders, court-appointed attorneys, and contract defenders) in a given jurisdiction to count cases using a uniform definition, it is optimal when the courts and prosecution in the jurisdiction also use the same definition. This affords the greatest opportunity to develop and approve budget requests for the adjudication component of the criminal justice system accordingly on a systematic and balanced basis.\textsuperscript{42}

\textit{Using Caseloads to Develop Budget Requests}

The former Public Defender made annual requests for additional resources from the Legislature to address the PDA’s workload. For example, in FY19, the former Public Defender requested from the Senate Finance Subcommittee for DOA an additional 11 attorneys and 11 support staff positions in FY20 to handle the PDA’s expected caseload.\textsuperscript{43} The chart below shows how many attorneys for which the PDA received funding in its budget by Fiscal Year, according to the OMB budget reports:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Fiscal Year} & \textbf{Number of Attorneys} \\
\hline
FY 2018 & 102 \\
\hline
FY 2019 & 106 \\
\hline
FY 2020 & 110 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Number of Attorneys for which the PDA Received Funding}
\end{table}

In FY18, the PDA received a total budget of $26,433,100, including supplementals. In FY19, the PDA received a total budget of $27,222,800, including supplementals. In FY20, the PDA has received a total budget of $28,387,000 (5.2% increase over FY19 budget). In 2 fiscal years, the PDA has received $1,953,900 in additional appropriations, most of which was funded under Governor Dunleavy.


The PDA’s Referrals of Conflict Cases to OPA Has Significantly Increased

According to the PDA Conflicts of Interest Policy, issued April 2012, Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 prohibits the PDA from representing a client if:

1) The representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client, or
2) There is a substantial risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.

Determining whether the PDA can represent a client generally requires a case-by-case analysis. Nevertheless, the PDA does not concurrently represent two clients in the following circumstances due to the inherent adversity:

1) Co-defendants.
2) A client and the informant who provided information against the client.
3) A client and a witness in the client’s case who is asserting a Fifth Amendment claim.
4) A client and a potential witness in the client’s case if the client and potential witness have adverse interests.
5) A client who proposes to provide information to the state and a person implicated by that information.

Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9 prohibits the PDA from representing a client:

1) In the same or substantially related matter as a former client if the current client’s interests are materially adverse to the former client’s unless the former client provides informed consent in writing, or
2) If representing the client would require the attorney to:
   a. Use confidences or secrets to the disadvantage of a former client except as the RPC would permit or require, or when the information has become generally known.
   b. Reveal confidences and secrets except as the RPC would permit or require.

Determining whether the PDA can represent a client generally requires a case-by-case analysis.

According to PDA, its conflict rate has noticeably increased in the past 3 years, from 2,813 cases in FY17 to 4,224 cases in FY19.

Based on a review of memos supporting sending 3,528 cases to OPA in FY18 for conflicts, the PDA found that approximately 50% of its criminal cases are conflicted out due to past and present CINA cases, juvenile cases, and mental commitment cases. While the overall conflict rate has reached a high of 18%, the felony criminal rate has almost doubled in the last 9-10 years to 25%.

44 Memorandum from Acting Public Defender Beth Goldstein to DOA Commissioner Kelly Tshibaka, August 15, 2019.
45 Id.
For FY19, ACS appointed PDA counsel to approximately 80% of Alaska felony cases. Of those cases, the PDA determined that 4,224 (25%) had conflicts. By way of contrast, the Colorado State Public Defender averaged only a 7% conflict withdrawal rate from FY11 until FY18.\footnote{Colorado State Public Defender FY18 Budget Request.}

Once a conflict is discovered, the PDA transfers the case to OPA which must conduct its own conflict review. If OPA cannot handle the case due to conflict or because it does not have the resources to handle it, the case must be transferred to private counsel and the State has to pay for the associated costs. OPA generally finds private counsel to be more expensive than agency counsel. Because OPA is a small agency that can be overwhelmed by an unexpected number of conflicts or from particularly large conflict cases, OPA has at times had to seek supplemental appropriations to the work of its private contract counsel. In FY19, OPA received a supplemental of $900,000 to cover the costs of cases it contracted out as a result of the conflicts the PDA sent it.

The upward conflict trend within the PDA is concerning, considering the amount of cases being referred to OPA. The PDA continues to send cases to OPA because, according to the former Public Defender, “OPA was set up to handle all that. OPA is really the place for all that.”\footnote{O&R Interview of former Public Defender Quinlan Steiner and Public Advocate James Stinson, April 1, 2019. Minute 47.} However, the Director of OPA stated that OPA is not designed to receive such a large caseload of criminal defense work. To handle the increasing influx of PDA cases, OPA will be required to contract out more cases than they already do.

The rise in conflicts also jeopardizes the PDA’s role as the primary defense agency in the State of Alaska. The more cases the PDA can’t do, the more cases OPA and contract attorneys will do. Alaska has a non-growing population; only a subset of those people will encounter the criminal justice system, and even a smaller portion interact with the PDA. As the PDA is conflicted out of more and more cases, OPA and others will start to take the place as the primary defense provider.

Between the Thunderbird Falls and Grunwald homicide cases, OPA represents 9 of the 10 defendants. If the PDA cannot find ways to substantially reduce the conflict rate and keep more cases in-house, it risks undermining its core mission.

Take, for example, the Thunderbird Falls homicide case. Five of the defendants are receiving defense representation from the State; 1 from the PDA and 4 from OPA. Where the PDA is able to represent 1 defendant, OPA can represent 4. Similarly, in the Grunwald homicide case, the PDA was unable to represent any of the 5 defendants; all of them were conflicted over to OPA. Because of the multiple layers of conflict OPA had in representing all co-defendants, OPA had to hire expensive contractors to defend some defendants in this case.
If the PDA cannot find ways to substantially reduce the conflict rate and keep more cases in-house, it risks undermining its core mission. As OPA takes on more and more cases, it will foreseeably become the primary criminal indigent defense service agency for the State of Alaska. Already, OPA is handling a disproportionate amount of the most serious homicide cases in the State of Alaska. Just by virtue of taking on fewer cases, the PDA will become the putative overflow agency.

**Reasons for the Growth in Conflict Rate**

The growth in conflict rate appears to be attributable to several factors:

- **Improper conflict analysis at the PDA.** During this review, the PDA evaluated memos supporting sending 3,528 cases to OPA in FY18 for conflicts and found some improper conflict analysis within the PDA that has caused some cases to be sent to OPA. In his interview with O&R, the former Public Defender also said he had initiated a review of conflicts after this review began, and he found the PDA had conflicted out of too many cases. The PDA has put measures in place over the last 5 months to improve conflict review. Conflicts for “A” felonies and “Unclassified” felonies are now reviewed by both the supervisor of the attorney assigned to the case and one of the Deputy Directors. Conflicts for “B” and “C” felonies are also randomly reviewed by the Deputy Directors.

- **Lack of Siloes within the PDA.** The PDA operates as one completely integrated agency, overseen by the Public Defender. None of its geographic offices or practice areas are “silod off” from any others. While this integrated structure is not required by Alaska’s Public Defender Act, the former Public Defender explained he believed the PDA had to operate this way because, “we maintain oversight of the entire production of defense services...state-wide.” He also stated in his interview that with siloes in the PDA, defendants would get compromised service. However, this would mean that any defendants conflicted over to OPA would be receiving “compromised” defense service because OPA is siloed (defendants represented by OPA are not receiving compromised defense service). As a result of the PDA’s “un-siloed” structure, whenever any attorney in the PDA has represented someone, that client’s interests, and therefore conflicts, are imputed to all the attorneys in the rest of the agency, from Ketchikan to Utqiagvik, from Mental Commitments to Felonies.

- **Conflicting Out of Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) Cases.** In a PCR case, the client asserts that his/her PDA attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the PDA is structured as one whole agency, a PCR filed against one attorney is usually imputed to

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48 Memorandum from Acting Public Defender Beth Goldstein to DOA Commissioner Kelly Tshibaka, August 15, 2019.
49 Interview with Quinlan Steiner, April 1, 2019, minute 34-35.
50 Id. at minute 45.
51 Id. at 47.
the entire agency. Since it is a conflict of interest for an attorney to pursue an ineffective assistance of counsel case against themselves, it often is not possible for another PDA attorney to represent the client in a PCR case against the first PDA attorney. The PDA currently conflicts out of more than 50% of all PCR cases, hitting as high as 75% in FY16.

- **Limited Population.** As the number of new people relocating to the state reduces and the population becomes smaller or stagnant, more of the same people touch the criminal justice system in a myriad of ways. For instance, a parent in a current CINA case may now be the victim in a completely unrelated theft case assigned to the PDA. These instances may involve privileged or confidential information that the PDA holds, which would create a legitimate conflict under the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, preventing the PDA from remaining in the case. Without a large influx of population into the state, and the continued reduction or stagnation in the population, it is expected that the conflict rate for the PDA will continue to rise.

- **2-Parent CINA Cases.** Any CINA case involving 2 parents will result in a conflict for the PDA, sending one parent over to OPA for representation. However, the PDA does not count these dual-appointment CINA cases in the PDA’s weighting system when they conflict them over to OPA. The PDA represented 811 CINA cases in FY17; 732 CINA cases in FY18; and 806 CINA cases in FY19.

- **CINA Case Conflicts.** After the PDA represents one parent in a CINA case, a conflict may develop during the life of the case. In some cases, the PDA identifies the conflict early, but in other cases, the PDA spends significant resources before a conflict is identified due to new investigation or discovery produced later in a case, which is out of the PDA’s control. In this scenario, conflicts are counted at 25% when they are referred to OPA. Since CINA cases are weighted at 2.5 in PDA’s system, when they are counted at 25%, the PDA’s weighting system credits them at .625 of a felony case. There has been a 25% increase in CINA conflicts sent to OPA between FY17 and FY19.

It was the legislative intent in creating the PDA that it would be the primary indigent defense agency in the state. However, climbing conflict rates threaten to jeopardize that role for the PDA. The table below shows the number of conflict cases from the PDA to OPA from FY17-FY19:

\[\text{Figure 11. Number of Conflict Cases the PDA Sent to OPA}\]

52 In FY19, on average the PDA had CINA cases for 36% of the time of a full case’s average days of disposition before they conflicted from them.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th># Conflicted to OPA</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 17</td>
<td>21478</td>
<td>2813</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 18</td>
<td>22823</td>
<td>3548</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 19</td>
<td>23902</td>
<td>4224</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When we discussed the conflict rate with the former Public Defender, he said, “We’re taking steps to try to figure out...if we’ve been making mistakes in our conflict decisions. We’ve determined our documentation is insufficient to determine whether or not we’ve been making mistakes... I think the rate’s higher than it should be. ...I think the overall rate should be much lower...for properly done conflicts.” The PDA’s intent is to bring its overall conflict rate down to 15%, thereby reducing by 10% its overall conflict rate for all cases.

In an effort to drive down the number of cases transferred to OPA and thus potentially to private counsel, the former Public Defender reported that the PDA recently convened a group of experienced public defenders to dig deeply into potential conflict cases to determine the likelihood that a conflict would really arise. This experienced group decided that conflicts were unlikely to derail many of the cases initially flagged for conflicts, and thus those cases could in fact be retained by the PDA. Establishing this type of deep review process as a regular business practice within the PDA may reduce the number of cases transferred to OPA and private counsel.

The PDA further explained that there is no way to create a felony-specific conflict reduction plan. Conflicts are fact-specific and based on the percentage of conflicts compared to the number of case openings at the PDA. Conflicts are primarily caused by concurrent representation of clients (i.e., adverse clients), which the PDA cannot control. In these instances, the PDA strives to keep the most serious case requiring the greatest resources.

To the extent conflicts are caused by confidential information possessed by the PDA on current or former clients, the PDA cannot control when it possesses or the reason it possesses such confidential information. It can try to avoid conflicts of interest due to confidential information in its possession by modifying certain records retention and maintenance policies.

The PDA said that it can and will strive to reduce the percentage of cases it conflicts to OPA through trainings and the methods by which it analyzes potential conflicts of interest. The PDA anticipates these tactics will reduce the margin of error and conflict rate time period. The

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53 Interview with Quinlan Steiner, April 1, 2019, minute 35.
PDA also said it will implement a better tracking system to identify the specific cause of each conflict of interest for cases it conflicts to OPA.

**Silos Are a Potential Solution for Reducing Conflicts Sent to OPA**

DOA’s Administrative Services Director (ASD) for approximately 9 years informed us that OPA once faced significant budget overruns; it regularly overspent on contractors, travel, and commodities and had to cover that spending by pulling from personal services (foregoing hiring) or getting supplemental appropriations. She said OPA substantially reduced its costs when it created silos within the agency to handle cases. This reduced the amount of money it had to spend on contractors.

OPA handles the same kind of cases as the PDA. In overseeing criminal defense cases, the Public Advocate (Director of OPA) functions parallel to the Public Defender. We examined the possibility of creating silos within the PDA to reduce conflicts sent to OPA, reduce expenses for OPA and the PDA, and improve the long-term effectiveness of the PDA.

**Creating Geographic Silos Between PDA Offices Would Not Be Efficient for PDA Operations or Effectively Reduce Conflicts**

We found that creating siloes between all 13 geographic PDA offices, like there are silos between OPA offices, would not provide significant cost savings for the PDA. Instead, the costs associated with the need for additional space, additional travel, moving, lack of centralized training, lack of centralized coverage capability, and lack of centralized support services would ultimately cost the state more than it would potentially save, and it would diminish the PDA’s overall quality of representation.

For instance, it would cost the state more for the PDA to conflict out of a case in its Fairbanks office and re-assign it to its Anchorage office (with mechanisms in place to prevent a conflict) than it would be to send the case over to OPA. Here’s why:

- Travel costs associated with attorneys and investigators would be increased because the Anchorage attorney and investigator would need to travel to Fairbanks for hearings, investigation, to meet with the client, meet with witnesses and co-counsel, etc.
- The Anchorage attorney also has no home office during trial because it would be a conflict for the PDA Fairbanks office space to be used. If there are lengthy trials, the PDA would be required to spend significant amounts on lodging for the Anchorage attorney and staff needed for the trial, as well as for putting the attorney/staff up over weekends or bringing them home if it is a 4-6 week+ trial.
- OPA has two offices in Fairbanks and sending the conflict case to one of those two offices would be much more cost effective and efficient.

Creating siloes between geographic PDA offices also creates challenges for effective training. The PDA has historically been a training ground for new lawyers and can do so because of both its size and ability to centrally train its lawyers. Hiring new lawyers allows the PDA to hire lower
paid attorneys and then promote from within for retention. Good training not only saves the state money in retention dollars, but also in resolving cases appropriately and effectively so the state is not retrying overturned cases due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

Siloed geographic units would also preclude the PDA’s current use of centralized coverage and support staffing, which is much more efficient and cost effective than the operation of siloed units. For example, the PDA currently experiences about an 8.5% vacancy rate and has multiple vacancies in rural areas. The ability to have attorneys from any geographical office handle large numbers of cases to cover these vacancies is only possible because the PDA is not geographically siloed. For OPA, on the other hand, it is very difficult to have one office cover for another for a vacancy because the offices are already handling conflict cases from each other by design. At best, OPA can manage some piecemeal coverage, but it cannot efficiently handle large amounts of cases or long vacancies with its siloed offices.

The PDA’s central support staff also provide back up to handle staff shortage needs around the state. For instance, an investigator in Palmer can step in and help handle cases for Bethel or Anchorage because of the centralized nature of the agency. That could not happen if the offices were siloed because the Palmer office would be handling conflict cases from Anchorage or Bethel and therefore would be ethically prohibited from stepping in to help those offices, even on unrelated cases.

Creating a Separate PDA Unit in Anchorage for Certain Cases Would Be Efficient and Effective for PDA Operations

During this review, the PDA analyzed memos supporting sending 3,528 cases to OPA in FY18. In that analysis, the PDA found that “approximately 50% of the PDA criminal cases are conflicted out of due to past and present CINA cases, juvenile cases, and mental commitment cases. Additionally, the PDA currently conflicts out of approximately 50+% of all PCR cases, hitting a high of over a 70% conflict rate.”

Based upon that analysis, creating a separate Anchorage unit within the PDA that is walled off from the rest of the PDA (like the OPA model) that can handle Anchorage CINA, Anchorage Juvenile and Anchorage commitment cases (these are cases typically from all jurisdictions except Fairbanks and Ketchikan/Juneau) could significantly reduce conflicts sent to OPA. In addition, because of the high conflict rate for PCR cases due to the nature described above, it is proposed that this separate unit also house PCRs so that all PCRs statewide could be handled out of this unit. This would not need to be the only unit that handles CINA, Juvenile, and commitment cases; it could just be another option for handling cases rather than conflicting them out to OPA or to contract attorneys.

54 Memorandum from Acting Public Defender Beth Goldstein to DOA Commissioner Kelly Tshibaka, August 15, 2019. If the memo explaining why the case was conflicted out gave multiple reasons for the conflict and any were current criminal matters, then the PDA did not count them as conflicted for CINA, juvenile, or commitment cases.
The Public Defender could oversee this unit, just as the Public Advocate oversees all the sections of OPA without there being an inherent conflict. However, the attorneys in this new Anchorage unit would be walled off from the other PDA attorneys in order to reduce the number of conflicts sent to OPA.

If this separate unit existed, CINA and Juvenile cases would be less likely to present a conflict for criminal cases. It is the knowledge of the existence of these statutorily confidential cases themselves, as well as confidential and privileged information received in those current cases, that serve as a basis for conflict with the criminal cases. This unit would alleviate the conflicts associated with representing current clients with adversarial interests between these cases and current criminal cases. The inclusion of the mental commitment cases in this unit should also reduce the number of conflicts related to the knowledge of confidential information associated with the commitment filing of individuals, such as witnesses in criminal cases.

The inclusion of PCRs in this unit would further reduce the PCR conflict rate. The PDA trial and appellate cases in which a PCR has been filed and where the trial/appellate attorney is a current PDA employee, would no longer be a conflict for the PDA to handle. Sending the PCR to this new unit would be the equivalent of sending it to OPA.

Current OPA data shows that OPA had to contract out more than 87% of its PCR cases in FY18 and more than 84% of its PCR cases in FY19. Pursuant to the caps on amounts of money OPA is allowed to pay for each case it contracts, each felony PCR is currently paid at $5,000, unless the case cap is waived by the Director.\textsuperscript{55} It is anticipated that with a separate PDA Anchorage unit, the PCR conflict rate could be cut 50-75%. At OPA’s rate of contracting PCRs to contractors, the following savings, just for attorney time, could have been realized if the conflict rates had been reduced 50-75% by having a walled off Anchorage unit in place in the PDA to handle PCR cases.

\textbf{Figure 12. Estimated Savings in FY15-FY19 if the PDA Had a Siloed Anchorage Unit for Handling PCR Conflicts, Anticipating a 50-75% Possible Reduction in PCR Conflicts}

\textsuperscript{55} OPA case cap rates are as follows: Unclassified $16,250; A $6875; B $3750; C $3125. Because of the significant time and work that must go into Unclassified and A felonies, OPA has moved away from the hourly/case cap model on these contracted cases and moved towards a flat fee per case model, which is typically above the cap because contractors were refusing to take the cases. OPA has been working to keep Unclassified and A felonies in-house and contract out more of the lower level B and C felonies over the last year.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>50% Cut Conflict Rate Savings</th>
<th>75% Cut Conflict Rate Savings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 15*</td>
<td>If only 22 instead of 45 went and 17 were contracted out: $85,000 instead of $180,000 = $95,000 savings</td>
<td>If only 12 went and 10 were contracted out: $50,000 instead of $180,000 = $130,000 savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 16*</td>
<td>If 38 instead of 76 went: $150,000 instead of $305,000 = $155,000 savings</td>
<td>If 19 instead of 76 went: $75,000 instead of $305,000 = $230,000 savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 17</td>
<td>If 35 instead of 69 went: $140,000 instead of $275,000 = $131,000 savings</td>
<td>If 17 instead of 69 went: $70,000 instead of $275,000 = $205,000 savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 18</td>
<td>If 23 instead of 46 went: $100,000 instead of $200,000 = $100,000 savings</td>
<td>If 12 instead of 46 went: $55,000 instead of $200,000 = $145,000 savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 19</td>
<td>If 19 instead of 38 went: $80,000 instead of $160,000 = $80,000 savings</td>
<td>If 9 instead of 38 went: $40,000 instead of $160,000 = $120,000 savings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*FY15 and FY16 and FY17 are calculated at a conservative 80% rate of contract, since the OPA actual rates are not known. FY18 and FY19 are calculated at the actual contract % rates known.

The savings listed above related to reducing the PCR conflict rate would ultimately reduce OPA’s contract expenditures. An additional attorney may be needed at the PDA to handle the additional caseload experienced in the new Anchorage unit; however, the ultimate savings long-term could be seen by reducing this conflict rate in conjunction with the overall felony conflict rate. OPA’s in-house attorneys can handle significantly more cases at a lower rate than contracting out the cases. Additionally, the PCR cap of $5,000 has not been increased in decades, and it will likely be increased going forward, leading to additional savings downstream at OPA. All these factors, combined, mean that reducing the conflict rate will lead to substantial savings within OPA.

We interviewed an attorney who has worked both in OPA, where silos function well, and the PDA, where there are no silos. He supported implementing silos within the PDA:

*We often see co-defendant cases coming in where the PDA will have one and OPA will have the remainder, spread across their various sections. If the Anchorage PDA was divided into multiple sections, they would be more adept at dealing with*
Neither the current nor former Public Defender support creating a walled off unit within the PDA for the following reasons:

- **The PDA:** The Public Defender Act does not allow the PDA to have silos because it is set up as one firm: “There is created in the Department of Administration a Public Defender Agency to serve the needs of indigent defendants. The agency is administered by the public defender... Each person appointed to a subordinate position established by the public defender is under the supervision and control of the public defender.” (AS 18.85.010, 020, 090)
  - **O&R:** However, the Act does not preclude the PDA from establishing silos. OPA also operates as a single agency administered by a single director, the Public Advocate, who supervises all subordinate positions. OPA functions effectively with many silos, handling criminal cases like the PDA. OPA’s structure is discussed further, below.
  - **O&R:** Montana, which has about 325,000 more people than Alaska, uses a siloed public defender system. In that model, the Chief Public Defender manages all the staff and silos; establishes processes and procedures for information technology and caseload management systems; ensures that public defenders are assigned cases according to experience, training, and manageable caseloads; establishes and supervises a training and performance evaluation program; establishes procedures to handle complaints about public defender performance; and actively seeks gifts, grants, and donations that may be available through the federal government or other sources to help fund the system. MCA 47-1-202. These duties, performed in a siloed structure, seem to adequately describe “administering” the agency, consistent with AS 18.85.020’s requirement for the Public Defender of the PDA.
  - **O&R:** We were unable to identify case law finding it unconstitutional for a public defender agency to function with silos.
  - **O&R:** Law firms operate as single entities with effective ethical walls, information barriers, and confidentiality management programs, software, and structures.\(^\text{56}\)

- **The PDA:** The PDA is not convinced the data supports that it would be beneficial to create a walled off unit for Anchorage CINA, juvenile, or mental commitment cases. The PDA reviewed every conflict memorandum prepared in 2 months in 2019 and found that 15% were caused by CINA cases, 2% of which were in Anchorage. Another 2% of the conflicts resulted from a commitment case. Additionally, the PDA began tracking conflicts in its case management system in September 2019. From September to mid-

\(^{56}\) See, e.g., Abacus, Compliguard Protect 6.
October 2019, 10% of its conflicts were because of CINA, juvenile, or mental commitments.

- **O&R:** While an analysis of all of FY18 conflict memos is a more accurate and comprehensive assessment than an analysis of 3½ months in 2019, the new methodology the PDA has in place for tracking conflicts will provide valuable insight on where the conflicts are occurring and where silos would offer the greatest return on investment.

- **PDA:** Because the Public Defender oversees all of the work of the PDA attorneys, it is impractical to create a firewall between attorneys in the PDA if they all ultimately report to the Public Defender.

- **O&R:** The Public Advocate is able to oversee all work of the OPA attorneys effectively, even when there are firewalls between them because they are performing criminal defense work for multiple co-defendants conflicted over to them from the PDA.

- **PDA:** Commitment cases arise all over the state. For example, a client might be taken into custody in Kotzebue and be held at the Manilaq Health Center. Or, a case could arise in Kenai and a respondent would be held at Central Peninsula Hospital. Many cases handled ultimately by the Anchorage Civil Division are cases originating in other communities. Sometimes Anchorage attorneys need to consult with, and obtain the assistance of, the local attorney. Creating a wall between the Civil Deputy and outlying offices would diminish the effectiveness of training, mentoring, and consultation.

- **O&R:** As discussed in further detail, below, OPA accomplishes this by not disclosing confidential information or using case specifics. It is possible to have the Anchorage Civil Division and an additional separate siloed unit to handle overflow cases.

- **PDA:** The Civil Deputy organizes statewide meetings and trainings to share information and improve advocacy. These meetings necessarily involve communication about existing cases and clients. It would be far less effective to provide training and mentoring if actual cases could not be freely discussed.

- **O&R:** As discussed further below, OPA has found a way to make these trainings and mentoring opportunities effective, while also gaining the benefit of having silos.

- **PDA:** Statewide coordination reduces costs due to improvements in the education and efficiency of attorneys. Also, attorneys share information about experts and other strategies that improve effectiveness.

- **O&R:** The costs saved from statewide coordination in these areas are extraordinarily less than those incurred by: 1) threatening the PDA’s core mission of being the primary agency providing constitutionally mandated legal representation to indigent clients appointed by the court, and 2) outsourcing
increasing amounts of casework to contract attorneys (OPA’s supplemental in FY19 was $900,000).

- **PDA:** Expert hiring is often coordinated among several offices which saves overall costs to the Agency. This would not be possible under the silo model.
  - **O&R:** OPA is able to coordinate many experts among its silos (see below), although some of it cannot because the experts would be conflicted out. The PDA would not face this issue, anyway, because it does not have any clients with interests adverse to one another, so its experts cannot have interests adverse to another client.

- **PDA:** Attorneys from Anchorage go to outlying offices to provide mentoring and assistance, particularly for new attorneys. For example, an attorney went to Juneau to assist a new attorney with a complex termination trial.
  - **O&R:** OPA is able to do this with attorneys between silos, as well.

- **PDA:** The Anchorage Civil Unit is currently handling many cases for communities outside of Anchorage. In particular, the Anchorage office has currently absorbed CINA cases from Kodiak and Kenai and continues to represent clients in Dillingham, Kotzebue, and Nome. The Civil Division also currently functions as a safety valve to relieve pressure in offices that find themselves short staffed. Many clients have contemporaneous criminal cases—sometimes in different jurisdictions. A silo model would create greater inefficiency in the delivery of legal services to these clients.
  - **O&R:** The PDA could creatively structure its silos to work for its unique needs (e.g., maintain the Civil Unit and create a separate internal unit for certain overflow cases).

- **PDA:** CINA parents often move around the state and venue of cases changes with some regularity. Transaction costs for the delivery of services would likely increase if cases had to be moved between offices. Because Anchorage is a medical hub, a CINA case may arise in Anchorage when a family is in town due to the birth of a child or for other medical care. A CINA case filed in Anchorage often transfers back out to the home community upon resolution of the immediate issues in the case. Costs would increase if cases were maintained in an Anchorage Civil silo due to the fact that people travel around the state.
  - **O&R:** The PDA could use an internal silo structure as a “1st stop” alternative to sending something to OPA. If it is more effective to keep a CINA case in the Civil Division, then the PDA should do so. But before conflicting a case to OPA, the PDA can send it to its siloed unit.

- **PDA:** The Civil Division operated for a time with essentially one designated appellate attorney. This model was abandoned in part due to workload issues (all CINA cases are on an expedited timeline). As with other functions, a centralized Appellate Unit provides
the best quality and most cost-effective statewide delivery of services in appellate cases. A centralized appellate unit can more effectively triage and manage the overall workload of the Agency. Having one designated appellate attorney in a civil silo could result in a situation where an attorney is isolated and potentially either over-worked or under-worked. This attorney would also have no back-up.

- **O&R:** This seems like a small problem to face, and resolve, compared to the larger problem currently faced by increasing numbers of conflicts going to OPA, several of the most serious criminal defense cases going to OPA, the PDA losing its relevance as the primary criminal defense agency, and the high costs incurred by the State of cases going to contractors.

- **PDA:** Currently, the Anchorage CINA and mental commitment attorneys consult regularly with PDA appellate attorneys so they cannot be siloed off from them.
  - **O&R:** To resolve this, there could be one or more designated appellate attorneys who exclusively handle cases exclusively for the new unit.

- **PDA:** The Anchorage CINA Deputy leads training statewide, and an argument could be made that placing the Deputy in a siloed unit would preclude him/her from leading that training.
  - **O&R:** However, the CINA Deputy’s training duties are not supervisory in nature; they are consultative. Training and consultation could be done without the use of open, existing cases. To the extent there are conflict concerns, hypotheticals could be used to seek advice without using client names or case details. Moreover, the cost of not being able to use the Anchorage CINA Deputy at a more in-depth level for training does not outweigh the benefit of having a siloed Anchorage CINA/Juvenile/Mental commitments/PCR unit that would make PDA and OPA more efficient and cost-effective.

If OPA can effectively and ethically provide criminal defense services to indigent Alaskans using a siloed structure, then so can the PDA. The Public Advocate (Director of OPA) oversees all of OPA just like the Public Defender oversees all of the PDA.

According to the Public Advocate, he regularly performs conflict analysis and discusses cases with various attorneys. However, he has no direct access to the case database system, so he cannot pull actual case information. In OPA, case-related expense requests are anonymized and sent without the defendant’s name. In the event the Public Advocate is learning something that could be confidential, he does not share it with other units. In his words: “I’m an administrator. I’m not handling trial cases.”

Moreover, the Public Advocate said OPA attorneys consult each other all the time. They just cannot cover conflicted cases or give out confidential client or case information to other units. Attorneys also talk in hypotheticals to get case guidance. OPA also holds OPA-wide training; it
does so without giving out confidential information. OPA attorneys talk to each other, discuss trial tactics, and collaborate on motions, and work across siloes.

The Public Advocate explained that he can have an attorney from one unit assist another attorney on a specific trial case as long as there is not an actual conflict. For example, Emma assisted Michael with a manslaughter trial and there was no ethical issue because Emma did not have any conflict with Michael’s client. Neither Emma nor Michael have access to any information for each other’s cases—they are walled off completely from each other in the case database. He clarified that what OPA attorneys cannot do is chat about confidential information given to them by co-defendants that they represent who are adverse to one another.

The Public Advocate also said he is able to coordinate experts across silos, unless an expert will render an opinion adverse to a co-defendant. In his experience, though, an expert can be used for different cases across multiple OPA units.

DOA’s former ASD explained that OPA once faced the same budget challenges the PDA is facing: unable to staff fully because they chronically used funds for attorney positions to pay for other operating expenses (this is discussed further in the next section). However, OPA was able to solve the problem by creating silos.

While creating silos will not allow the PDA the same potential of transferring supervisors anywhere around the state, the model as implemented in OPA has demonstrated this would be a small cost compared to the benefits gained: 1) significantly less conflicts out to OPA, 2) reduced contract services expenses, 3) reduced costs within the PDA, and 4) the PDA maintains its role as the primary public defense agency in the state.

**The PDA Has Been Budgeted for a Sufficient Number of Attorneys for Its Caseload Under Prevailing Professional Standards, but Faces Significant Recruitment and Retention Challenges**

As discussed above, between FY18-FY20, the PDA has had 102-110 budgeted attorney positions. In FYs18-19, the PDA reported the weighted average of caseload per attorney as 154 and 145, respectively. The PDA calculates the weighted average by taking the total number of each type of case (e.g., 81 B Felonies, 197 CINAs, etc.) and multiplying by its assigned weight (e.g., .25, .375, 1, 5, etc.), and then adding all the sums together.

If the PDA’s annual weighted case numbers in FYs18-19 were adjusted to: 1) reflect .25 credit instead of full credit for those cases transferred to private counsel, and 2) remove the cases that would not be counted by ACS or OPA as separate cases, then the PDA’s caseload per attorney in FY18-19 would be adjusted as follows:
In October 2018, the former Public Defender provided O&R a Public Defender Caseload Fact Sheet that described developments in the application of caseload standards across the nation. It noted that the ABA standard for an attorney is a maximum caseload of 150 felonies or 400 misdemeanors per year (although a lesser/smaller caseload could still be excessive depending on the complexity of the cases). It also noted class action lawsuits in Washington that resulted in its supreme court adopting new standards in 2012, directing a maximum of 150 felony cases, with cases to be weighted based on complexity.

The Public Defender Caseload Fact Sheet also stated, “In 1998, the legislature’s Division of Legislative Audit conducted a workload study of the Alaska Public Defender Agency; the recommended maximum ethical caseload at 60 hours per week is a weighted average of 59 cases.” However, the 1998 Alaska Legislative Audit did not make any findings with respect to the PDA’s recommended caseload. Rather, the audit found the PDA is understaffed, but that its staffing shortage may be covered, in part, with the addition of lower paid positions, such as investigators, paralegals, legal secretaries, and other clerical positions. It also concluded that bringing the PDA up-to-date technologically would add efficiencies that would further address understaffing issues. We make similar recommendations at the end of this report.

Finally, the 1998 audit determined that the PDA needed to capture more reliable and accurate case statistics: “It is crucial that the estimated time it takes a PDA attorney to handle certain

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57 PTRs and Parole Revocations are weighted at .25. FY18 had 5,519 PTRs and Parole Revocations. (5,519)(.25)=1,379.25. FY19 had 4,284 PTRs and Parole Revocations. (4,284)(.25)=1,071. These totals were then divided by the same number of staffed attorney positions used in the PDAs reporting (94 for FY18 and 98 for FY19): 1,379.25/94=14.67; 4,284/98=44.42.

58 Cases sent to private counsel were weighted at full felony case credit until around April 2019, when the former Public Defender believed this was erroneously weighted high and corrected it to weight them at .25. Data for cases sent to private counsel were provided in calendar year form, not fiscal year, but 2017 and 2018 had 267 and 257 cases, respectively. So we used an average of 262 to represent FY18 (July 1 2017-June 30 2018). The PDA reported sending 187 cases to private counsel in FY19 between July 1, 2018 and March 31, 2019. These case numbers were multiplied by .75 and then divided by the same number of staffed attorney positions used in the PDA’s reporting. FY18: (262)(.75)/94=2. FY19: (187)(.75)/98=1.
types of cases be accurate. To promote accuracy, time estimates should be periodically reviewed and updated. Doing so protects the integrity of the caseload statistics and promotes confidence in using such statistics as a basis for management and budgetary decisions.”

More than 20 years later, O&R found that the PDA still does not provide accurate case statistics (see Figure 5 above).

O&R analyzed the standards for caseloads provided in the BJA report *Keeping Defender Workloads Manageable* (2001), presented above in Figure 3. Using the lowest value given when a range was used for felony cases, the average maximum caseload standard was 141. So, a public defender could handle up to 141 felony cases per year (the most difficult cases). An attorney could handle many more cases if s/he were working a mix of cases. For example, the NAC standards say an attorney could handle up to 400 misdemeanor cases. Thus, the PDA’s FY19 weighted average of 145 cases per attorney, which include both felony and non-felony cases, are below the BJA, ABA, and NAC standards (BJA: 141 felony average; ABA: 150 felony average; NAC: 150 felony average). When we removed from the 145 cases those cases that would not be counted by the ACS or OPA, the PDA’s attorneys’ FY19 average caseloads (133 cases) were even farther below the BJA, ABA, and NAC standards.

Moreover, the PDA calculated its weighted averages using the number of attorneys on board rather than the number of attorneys it was authorized and budgeted to hire. For example, in FY19, it calculated its averages using 98 attorneys, but the PDA was authorized and budgeted to hire 8 more attorneys. Similarly, in FY18, the PDA calculated its averages using 94 attorneys, but it was authorized and budgeted to hire 8 more positions. If the PDA hired to its full complement, its attorneys’ average caseloads would be significantly less than 145, or 133, cases (depending on how you count the PDA’s FY19 caseload number).

Therefore, we found the PDA is adequately funded to ensure attorneys have reasonable workloads so as to allow them to provide ethical and competent representation pursuant to prevailing professional norms.

However, the PDA has experienced higher caseloads in offices where it has had staffing difficulties. For instance, in Bethel the office is normally staffed at six attorneys, but the PDA reported that it has been down approximately three attorneys on average (sometimes more). This requires the attorneys in that office to handle up to twice the normal caseload, when the PDA said this office already has one of the PDA’s highest caseloads in the state.

Similarly, one of the former PDA attorneys in Kenai told us that he left the PDA because: 1) his average unweighted caseload was around 180 cases, including about 160 felony cases per year, and 2) he worked an average of 9-10 hour days, Monday through Friday. While he was aware that a public defender job would require this level of work when he accepted the position, he left for a job that offered more money and less hours. He also said he was frustrated that, in his

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opinion, the PDA had backed off on its recruiting efforts for the Kenai PDA office, which unnecessarily increased his workload burden. He said that, in the past, Kenai did not have staffing issues because the PDA was more focused on recruitment efforts. He said he was interested in returning to the PDA in a supervisor position in the future, if he were paid more.

Another former PDA regional office attorney described her workload as “crushing;” she said she worked 45-50 hours per week and handled over 200 misdemeanors per year (the NAC and ABA maximums are 400 misdemeanors). Likewise, an attorney from another regional office told us he left because his heavy caseload required him to work 10-12 hours a day and every weekend. He had approximately 180 cases per year, 165 of which were felonies. He said in his opinion, his supervisors were unsupportive of recruitment efforts.

The PDA said it tries to relieve some of the workload burden from the attorneys in these regional offices by farming out cases to larger offices, like Anchorage. When that happens, the PDA must pay the travel costs for the Anchorage attorneys to fly out regularly to handle the regional office caseload. This also stretches the Anchorage office thin because its attorneys are handling cases in other regions.

It is important to note that the American Council of Chief Defenders (ACCD) has stated, “In many jurisdictions, maximum caseload levels should be lower than those suggested by the NAC.” The ACCD goes on to explain that new practice areas have emerged for public defenders, which have “made even more clear that a ‘felony’ does not always simply require the work of one felony case.” The ACCD also recommends, “that defenders, contract and assigned counsel, and bar association leaders in each state review local practice conditions and consider developing standards that adjust attorney caseloads when the types and nature of the cases handled warrant it. The increased complexity of practice in many areas will require lower caseload ceilings.” It is for that reason that the ACCD advocates public defender agencies use case weighting systems, like the one the PDA uses, to determine the number of cases an attorney can actually handle.

While the PDA’s regional office resources are strained, the PDA’s weighted and non-weighted caseload numbers are within NAC standards and those of other states across the nation. It therefore is fulfilling its ethical and constitutional obligations within prevailing professional standards.

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60 By comparison, Florida’s 14th Judicial Circuit Public Defender’s Office reported an average of more than 800 cases assigned to each attorney in FY16, and the Miami-Dad public defender’s office reported that average assistant public defenders were handling 400 felony cases at a time, and experienced attorneys were juggling 50 third-degree felony trials a week. Zack McDonald, Panama City News Herald, In Court, Majority Seek Public Defenders Regardless of Income, March 4, 2018.

61 American Council of Chief Defenders Statement on Caseloads and Workloads, Resolution, p. 6 (August 24, 2007)

62 Id. at 7.

63 Id. at 2.

64 Id. at 7.
That said, just because the PDA’s caseloads are within constitutional and ethical standards does not mean that the PDA attorneys are functioning under optimal workload conditions or that the PDA is operating as efficiently as possible with its resources. The PDA’s recruitment and retention problems present significant management challenges for the agency. The table below illustrates the number of PDA attorney hires and separations by Fiscal Year, as reported by the PDA:

![Figure 14. FY18-FY20 PDA Attorney Hires and Separations](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY18</th>
<th>FY19</th>
<th>FY20 (as of 10/16/19)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atty Hires</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atty Separations</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-24</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NET TOTAL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The PDA has had a fairly consistent 8% vacancy rate, which is extra resource capacity it could use to handle cases in regional offices or to provide additional support staff to its attorneys. According to PDA reporting, it has operated at a more than 8% vacancy rate since FY17. In fact, in FY17, its vacancy rate was 11.5%.

The PDA stated it is required by OMB to account for 4-7% vacancy rate, so it holds 4-7 of its 110 attorney positions open. OMB’s guidelines for a division/component with more than 51 full-time employees is to account for a vacancy rate between 4% and 7% so it does not overspend its budget. However, that does not mean the PDA should never fill 4-7 attorney positions.

For an organization of the PDA’s size (193 employees), it should be assumed that the agency will experience at least 93 months (4%) of vacancy time across its positions just through normal turnover. In other words, an agency will experience about 3½ months of vacancy between the time someone departs a position and the time the new person starts. For the PDA, if 26 staff members (attorneys and support staff) transition in a year with an average of 3½ months between departure and new hire, that will achieve the targeted 4% vacancy rate. The PDA would not need to hold any attorney positions open; it could fill all its attorney vacancies.

A discussion with DOA’s current and former ASDs and a closer examination of the PDA’s budget shows that the PDA has been using funds from its personal services line (vacancies) to pay for other expenses like contractors (more than $3.7 million FYs17-20), commodities, travel, and facilities).

For example, in FY20, the PDA has budgeted for a 4.44% vacancy rate. The PDA will experience this in the natural course of business, given its turnover rate; it does not need to intentionally
sit on 4-7 attorney vacancies, needlessly raising the caseload burden on its other attorneys. However, the PDA spent $677,600 more in non-personal services costs at the same time last year than what it has budgeted this year. If all costs remain the same from last year to this year, the PDA will need to raise its vacancy factor to 7% (intentionally keeping attorney positions vacant) so it can pull from its personal services funds to pay for travel, commodities and other service expenses like contractors.

Keeping vacancy rates high so the PDA can use personnel funds to pay for other expenses is not a sustainable or efficient use of the PDA’s resources. The PDA either needs to request an increment in its budget to pay for its other expenses, or it needs to reduce its spending for these other expenses so that it can maximize use of the attorney positions that it has been authorized and budgeted to hire.

Recruitment Is Becoming More Difficult

Historically, the PDA said it has been able to attract a significant number of new hire candidates, both experienced and entry-level—it had a stack of resumes from which to select. It has been able to do so by paying public defenders at the equivalent pay rates as state prosecutors, paying competitive salaries that have attracted more experienced practitioners to Alaska from other states, and offering a robust summer internship program.

The PDA’s summer internship program recruits between 24-30 second-year law school students and places them in its 13 statewide offices. Under the Alaska Bar Rules, with proper supervision by a licensed attorney, these interns are permitted to participate in court proceedings. While the internships themselves are unpaid, the PDA has been able to compete with more prestigious, paid internship programs by offering both a robust, hands-on experience and paid roundtrip airfare for the students. Over 30% of the PDA’s current attorneys started as interns in the internship program.

Over the last year however, the PDA said recruitment has become more difficult, and there are not as many resumes from which to select. According to the PDA, many factors have contributed to this difficulty, including:

- The economy has become stronger in other states, providing an abundance of legal jobs, including more public defender jobs.

- Many states have increased their public defender salaries over the last few years and those salaries are now comparable to Alaska salaries in areas of the country where the cost of living is significantly lower, making it much more difficult to attract skilled attorneys to the PDA.

- Currently, there is also a plethora of legal jobs in Alaska. A review of the Alaska Bar Association employment board lists an abundance of both state and private attorney positions. Many of these positions are for jobs that do not carry the caseload that the
PDA carries, and many of the private jobs offer a compensation package that cannot be matched by the PDA. Many experienced PDA attorneys are leaving for these other positions because they either offer a better caseload/work-life balance, better compensation, or both.

- Finally, under a new Dunleavy Administration policy, all new hires above range 18 (including all attorneys) must receive additional approval from: 1) OMB and then 2) the Chief of Staff. Altogether, these 2 additional approvals were adding up to 2½ weeks onto the PDA’s standard hiring timeframe. In that time, the PDA lost a couple highly qualified applicants who took other offers. This not only added to the PDA’s recruitment problems, but also ended up wasting the PDA’s time and resources conducting multiple interviews and reference checks only to start the recruitment process from the beginning.

The DOA Commissioner requested an analysis in the delay in approvals and found the requests had been delayed in OMB up to 2 weeks. So, in early September 2019, the DOA Commissioner received an exemption from OMB approval of PDA hires. Now the PDA hires only receive Chief of Staff approval. Since then, the turnaround time for Chief of Staff has added 2-9 days (including weekends). The approvals that took closer to 9 days occurred when the Chief of Staff was traveling. Since the exemption from OMB approval was obtained, only one of the PDA’s selected candidates has withdrawn from consideration.

The full process from the PDA selecting a candidate to making an offer to the candidate is as follows:
- The PDA selects a candidate, the request then
- Routes to DOA Department of Administrative Services
- Routes to Division of Personnel and Labor Relations
- Routes to Commissioner’s Office
- Routes to Chief of Staff
- Routes back to Commissioner’s Office
- Returns to the PDA to make official offer

Sometimes the whole process can move in a matter of days; other times it can take 3 weeks. While the PDA’s process is not different from other offices or agencies hiring staff above range 18, the length of time the process takes poses a significant risk to the PDA’s recruitment efforts, given the challenges the PDA is facing.

O&R also compared the salaries the PDA offered with comparable salaries at a public defender’s office in another location with a high cost of living: Los Angeles, California. The

65 The standard timeframe includes coordination with Human Resources and the Division of Personnel and Labor Relations, and approval from the DOA Commissioner’s Office. That process existed prior to changes implemented by the Dunleavy Administration.
federal government has a standard pay schedule for its employees, and then offers a locality payment increase based on the assessed cost of living for different areas. Alaska’s cost of living increase is 28.89%; Los Angeles’s is 31.47%. Therefore, federal employees in the same grade and step in Los Angeles make more than those in Alaska.

During this study, the Los Angeles (LA) County Public Defender’s Office posted the salaries for its Public Defender positions. The chart below shows how they compare to annual salaries currently earned at the PDA:

### Figure 15. LA County Public Defender and Alaska PDA Salary Comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>LA County</th>
<th>Alaska PDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entry Level Attorney</td>
<td>$67,884-$89,040</td>
<td>$66,600-$106,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Level Attorney</td>
<td>$92,404-$135,075</td>
<td>$78,492-$119,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Attorney</td>
<td>$132,108-$193,128</td>
<td>$114,420-$182,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Public Defender</td>
<td>$174,972-$264,840</td>
<td>$118,524-$157,580</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The PDA is offering competitive salaries at entry level positions compared to a public defender office in an area with a 2.5% greater cost of living. However, the PDA’s salaries are not competitive for mid- and higher-level attorney positions.

We also compared the PDA’s salaries to an area with a much lower cost of living: Omaha, Nebraska. The federal government’s cost of living increase for Alaska employees is 28.89%; for Omaha it is 15.87%. In a 2016 report, attorneys in Omaha’s Douglas County Public Defender’s Office made between $71,760-$156,635; they likely are earning higher salaries now. The PDA’s entry level salaries in urban offices (like Anchorage) were less than Omaha’s starting salaries.

We believe the PDA is offering salaries competitive with other urban areas’ public defender offices for entry level positions. However, Alaska salaries may struggle to compete for mid- and high-level attorneys, and they also may struggle to compete with legal positions in areas of the

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67 Deputy Public Defender I
68 During the time of this review, PDA offered entry level attorneys $66,600-$106,908, depending on whether they were located in urban offices or rural, hard-to-fill locations. PDA also offered $2,500 towards moving expenses.
69 Deputy Public Defender II. The PDA said Deputy Public Defender II positions handles cases of average difficulty, equivalent to an Attorney III in the PDA.
70 The PDA said LA’s position is equivalent to an Attorney III position in the PDA.
71 The PDA said LA’s position is equivalent to an Attorney V in the PDA.
country where the cost of living is significantly lower. This may explain part of the reason the PDA experiences 12%-22% vacancy annually.

*The PDA’s Recruitment Methods*

The PDA posts its job announcements as vacancies occur on its State website, in its mailing list, through the Alaska Bar Association, and through three national organizations. It also has recently started posting permanent attorney positions, rather than just summer internship positions, on individual law school websites. The PDA received approximately 77 applications in 2017, 119 applications in 2018, and 83 applications in 2019. Applications are often applied to multiple locations based on the applicant’s preference.

For the past 17 years, the PDA also has attended the Equal Justice Works public interest career fair in the Washington, D.C.-area that is very effective at generating many high-quality recruits for the agency. The event attracts upwards of 1,400 law school students and offers a very high return on investment in the form of providing the ability to recruit, interview and hire both interns and entry level attorneys. Attendance at this event has been critical for the PDA’s recruitment efforts.

The PDA also recruits heavily from its internship program. Approximately 31% of the PDA’s current attorneys came through its internship program. In 2018, the PDA hired 22 of its student interns; in 2017, the PDA hired 16 of its student interns. Many of the internship offers are made at the Equal Justice Works annual career fair. The PDA recently made offers to at least 8 candidates interviewed at the fair this year.

*The PDA Struggles to Retain Attorneys*

The PDA lost 47 attorneys between July 1, 2017 and October 16, 2019. In FY19, PDA’s attorney attrition rate was approximately 23%. The PDA has not historically conducted exit interviews, but it began conducting them in the summer of 2019. Attorneys leaving the PDA reported the following reasons contributed to their decisions to leave:

- The PDA caseloads are more demanding than in other legal positions;
- They can no longer handle the stress;
- They feel they cannot handle cases competently; and
- They feel completely overwhelmed.

O&R also conducted several interviews of attorneys who previously worked for the PDA and now work for OPA or the Department of Law. These attorneys reported the following reasons contributed to their decisions to leave:

- Worked 9-10 hour days in regional offices;
- Needed more family time;
• Supervisors did not support recruitment efforts;
• Caseload was too heavy;
• Supervisor resigned and was replaced with one who “did not care;”
• Supervisors were not supportive;
• Lack of recruitment;
• Needed more training and support; and
• Needed additional administrative staff.

As attorneys leave, it exacerbates the caseload burden for the rest of the attorneys in the PDA—they are left to assume the departing attorneys’ cases. Vacated positions are not filled right away. Even when they are, it takes a while for new attorneys to get up to speed and effectively able to assume a full caseload. The high turnover rate in the PDA creates a significant burden on the PDA’s attorneys.

The PDA faces more critical vacancy challenges in offices outside of Anchorage. In some situations, the PDA said it has had no applicants for advertised vacancies in these offices. As vacancies remain unfilled in these offices, more lawyers leave because the heightened caseloads drive them out, which creates even higher caseloads for the lawyers who stay. The cycle is then perpetuated, and attrition gets worse.

**Judge Threatened to Hold the PDA in Contempt and Fine the Agency**

In the summer of 2019, the PDA had a high-level attorney resign 3 weeks before her client was scheduled to be tried on murder charges. Her resignation was precipitated by the loss of 2 high-level attorneys in the Kenai office, one due to retirement and the other due to a high caseload and other office issues. The loss of those attorneys caused many of their cases to shift to the remaining high-level attorneys, while the vacancies remained. The PDA told O&R that the attorney who resigned became so overwhelmed and emotionally exhausted by her double-sized caseload that she felt she needed to resign before she committed ineffective assistance of counsel on her cases.

In July 2019, Judge MacDonald in Fairbanks threatened to hold the PDA in contempt and monetarily fine the agency for its failure to meet its constitutional obligations due to its inability to effectively represent clients. Judge MacDonald also initially considered ordering the PDA to pay the Department of Law’s costs associated with the last-minute continuance. Finally, the court asserted that the PDA should be required to have two high-level attorneys on each unclassified trial case to prevent issues like this from happening in the future. However, with an attorney vacancy rate of 8.49% and its attrition challenges, the PDA does not have enough attorneys to provide two high-level attorneys on each unclassified case.\(^{73}\)

If the PDA remains unable to improve its recruitment and retention going forward, in the future, it may face contempt citations and monetary fines from courts around the state.

\(^{73}\) The PDA had 214 unclassified felonies in FY19.
Recruitment and Retention Challenges Threaten the PDA’s Ability to Fulfill Its Constitutional Obligations to Its Clients

The PDA has sufficient funding to hire attorneys to handle its total caseload. Under the NAC standards and standards set by other states, however, it does not have sufficient attorneys in several of its regional offices. The PDA’s highest weighted average caseloads in FY19 were in 3 of those regional offices: Ketchikan (181), Kodiak (202), and Dillingham (264).

These regional recruitment and retention issues present critical management challenges for the PDA. The PDA’s challenge in fully staffing its positions and retaining attorneys within the agency threaten its ability to fulfill its constitutional obligations to effectively represent indigent defendants. Although the PDA has had funding to hire 8%-11.5% more attorneys in the 4 years examined by O&R (FY17-FY20), it has not hired to full complement in that time.

Under AS 18.85.090, the Public Defender has independent authority to appoint and remove staff members as necessary to enable the PDA to carry out its responsibilities, subject to existing appropriations. We identified no interference with the Public Defender’s ability to structure the PDA, recruit for positions, determine how to staff positions (attorneys or support staff), and hire candidates. The Public Defender has full authority to determine how to use appropriations to hire staff, when to hire staff, what positions they will fill, and what duties they will perform.

Resolving the recruitment and retention issues is a significant management challenge for the PDA to address. Below, we offer recommendations for the current Public Defender’s consideration that could assist with ameliorating the PDA’s retention and recruitment challenges.

The PDA Would Operate More Efficiently with Fully Utilized Support Staff and with Technology Upgrades

The 1998 Legislative Audit of the PDA found that 56% of PDA attorneys responded that someone with less training could do more than 10% of the tasks they perform. The audit found the PDA’s ratio of administrative support staff to total staff and attorneys was 1 to 15. Sample responses from PDA attorneys included:

1) *We are understaffed badly as to investigators and paralegals. Attorneys are ending up doing work that could be done more effectively by investigators and paralegals.*

2) *We have a legal secretary who is so intelligent and has so much ability; it is a shame we can’t use her as a paralegal or litigation assistant. A position of that sort could take 20-25% of the workload from my weary shoulders.*

3) *My main complaint, and one that echoed throughout the smaller offices, was the lack of support staff (paralegal and investigators).*
4) The ‘legal secretary’, obligated to serve four attorneys and an investigator, was simply buried in an avalanche of details and administrative tasks. The investigator worked half time for five attorneys. This is a very poor situation.

The 1998 Legislative Audit recommended the PDA add paraprofessional and clerical positions to its staff to increase efficiencies in its office. The audit found the ratio of support staff to total staff in the PDA was 1 to 15, while the ratio of support staff to total staff of the Criminal Division in the Department of Law was 1 to 5.74

The BJA identified that the optimal ratio of support staff to attorneys should be as follows:75

- **Paralegal**
  - Felony, 1:4
  - Misdemeanor, 1:5
  - Juvenile, 1:4
  - Mental Health, 1:2
- **Investigator**
  - Felony, 1:4
  - Misdemeanor, 1:6
  - Juvenile, 1:6
- **Law Clerk Appeal**
  - 1:2
- **Secretary**
  - Felony, 1:4
  - Misdemeanor, 1:6
  - Juvenile, 1:5

The BJA also noted that public defender offices that do not maintain these support staff ratios will need to reduce attorneys’ annual caseloads (e.g., a maximum of 100-150 felonies, 300 misdemeanors, etc.).76

The PDA does not divide its support staff by felony, misdemeanor, juvenile, and mental health cases. In FY19, the PDA had the following ratio of support staff to attorneys:77

- **Paralegal**
  - Anchorage Felony/Misdemeanor, 1:7
  - Southcentral Felony/Misdemeanor, 1:5
  - Southeast Felony/Misdemeanor, 1:5

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74 The Department of Law Deputy Attorney General stated the ratio of support staff to total staff in the Criminal Division now is about 1 to 3. However, the Department of Law said it would operate at optimum efficiency if it could get that ratio down to 1 support staff for every 2 attorneys.


76 Id.

77 PDA FY19 Case Statistics Final (October 6, 2019). We received updated FY19 staff count numbers on Nov. 3, 2019 that showed 2.5 more staff members than the October 6 report had. It is not clear why the PDA did not have one consistent number for staff onboard as of June 30, 2019. This analysis uses the October 6, 2019 numbers.
Using BJA’s optimal support staff ratios as a general guideline for the PDA staffing, it appears the PDA will operate more efficiently and reduce its caseload burdens on attorneys if the PDA uses its vacancies to hire more support staff rather than attorneys in the near-term, particularly in offices with higher staff to attorney ratios, like in Anchorage and in the Northern region.

The PDA’s Support Staff are Not Sufficiently Trained or Utilized

Our interviews with the PDA attorneys more than 20 years after the 1998 Legislative Audit have revealed that the same issues persist in the PDA attorneys’ experience as did during the 1998 audit. One attorney estimated he spends about 10-20% of his time performing administrative work. Other attorneys and staff said only attorneys review evidence for cases, perform legal research and prepare case exhibits, but that paralegals or LOAs could help perform these duties. All interviewees said training for paralegals and LOAs needs to be improved.

The PDA paralegal’s job description includes tasks that are currently only being performed by the PDA attorneys (Appendix B). Interviewees told us generally, paralegals are not trained or
given the opportunity to assist the attorneys beyond clerical functions. After reviewing actual job functions at the PDA, we found that paralegals are not performing all the of the job duties described in their job descriptions. Paralegals are being underutilized but have the capacity to significantly impact attorney workloads for the better.

Paralegals often perform work that, if performed without the supervision of an attorney, would constitute the unauthorized practice of law. According to the State of Alaska position description for paralegals (Appendix B) and the National Association of Legal Assistants’ (NALA) Model Standards and Guidelines for Utilization of Paralegals, these functions may include, but are not limited to the following:

- Conduct client interviews and maintain general contact with the client after the establishment of the attorney-client relationship, so long as the client is aware of the status and function of the paralegal, and the client contact is under the supervision of the attorney.
- Identification and investigation of potential defense expert witnesses, coordinating expert communications, contracts, and testimony.
- Conduct investigations and statistical and documentary research for review by the attorney.
- Conduct legal research and draft legal documents for review by the attorney.
- Draft correspondence and pleadings for review by and signature of the attorney.
- Summarize depositions, discovery responses and testimony for review by the attorney.
- Attend depositions, court or administrative hearings and trials with the attorney.
- Author and sign letters providing the paralegal’s status is clearly indicated and the correspondence does not contain independent legal opinions or legal advice.

All the LOAs and paralegals we interviewed stated they believed their positions could be better utilized to assist attorneys in a more meaningful manner. Specifically, the paralegals believed they could help perform the substantive work (i.e., drafting motions, legal research, and summarizing depositions, etc.) and alleviate some of the workload on the attorneys. The Associate Attorney (Senior Paralegal) from the civil division, however, stated she performed these tasks. She also supervised one LOA and one paralegal.

We also found that the training for paralegals and support staff is sporadic and not as effective as it could be. One interviewee suggested the training include cross-training within a unit so that individuals can share institutional knowledge allowing the units to function cohesively, regardless of who leaves. Interviewees also believed that the training policy and procedures needed to be updated and refined to better assist administration of their job duties. The Associate Attorney, however, stated that she actively trains the staff that she supervises. If paralegals and assistants are trained consistently to perform more substantive duties, we believe this would help alleviate some of the demanding workload on the PDA attorneys.

With greater training and full utilization of LOAs and paralegals, attorney workload demands will be reduced so they can offer higher quality representation to their clients.

_The PDA Would Operate More Efficiently with Technology Upgrades_

The 1998 Legislative Audit recommended that the PDA upgrade the computerization of its offices to increase efficiencies. In interviews with staff members, we also found areas in which the PDA could further advance the efficiency of its operation through upgraded technologies.

For example, PDA attorneys currently place a personal call to each client to remind them of upcoming court dates. Not only is this function not entrusted to support staff, but it could be handled by an automatic SMS notification system, which could increase case updates given to clients while also reducing time burdens on attorneys.

In addition, we found that the PDA does not use voicemail transcription technology, which would allow public defenders to read their voicemail messages, enabling them to quickly respond to urgent situations in environments where they otherwise cannot listen to a voicemail.

Finally, we found that some public defenders do not have their own state-issued mobile phone, but only have a desk phone and their personal mobile phone. If all attorneys had a state-issued mobile phone, they would have the capability to transcribe voice messages into text built into the phone. They also would have other benefits that come from having a work-issued mobile device, such as being able to have communication with their clients over an office number while they are in-between meetings and court appointments.

_The PDA May Be Representing Clients Who Do Not Qualify as Indigent_

Determining who can and who cannot afford private counsel is a critical step for ACS. Ensuring only the indigent receive services from the PDA raises the quality of defense services by limiting resources to those who truly need them. It also guards against criticism that public resources are used to represent wealthy defendants.79

_The Law and Procedures for Establishing Indigency in Alaska_

In the state of Alaska, Alaska Administrative Rule 12, Procedure for Counsel and Guardian Ad Litem Appointments at Public Expense, and the Alaska Rules of Court Rules of Criminal Procedure govern the procedures for appointment of counsel at public expense. Alaska Administrative Rule 12 provides, in pertinent part:

The court shall appoint counsel or guardian _ad litem_ only when the court specifically determines that the appointment is clearly authorized by law or rule,

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and that the person for whom the appointment is made is financially eligible for an appointment at public expense.

For purposes of public defender appointments, Alaska Statute 18.85.170(4) defines an “indigent person” as a person who:

...at the time need is determined, does not have sufficient assets, credit, or other means to provide for payment of an attorney and all other necessary expenses of representation without depriving the party or the party’s dependents of food, clothing, or shelter and who has not disposed of any assets since the commission of the offense with the intent or for the purpose of establishing eligibility for assistance.

The procedure for evaluating indigency is set forth in Rule 39 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure. In evaluating indigency, the Alaska state court or its designee (e.g. pretrial services) is required to calculate the defendant’s total financial resources by adding up his/her income, cash, assets readily convertible to cash (including property minus a Homestead Exception, which is currently $72,900) and available credit. The court then subtracts allowable household expenses and then compares that final number to the likely cost of obtaining private representation. The court has discretion to adjust the expected cost of representation upward for complex cases, or if it determines the actual cost of hiring a local attorney in that area is higher.

The court may appoint counsel without further inquiry, if: (1) the defendant currently receives public assistance benefits through a state or federal program for indigent persons defined in Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 39.1; (2) counsel was appointed for the defendant within the past 12 months, based on an examination of the defendant’s financial circumstances, and the defendant’s financial condition has not significantly improved; or (3) the gross annual income available to the defendant is less than the adjusted federal poverty guidelines amount for the defendant’s household size, and other financial resources (cash, assets, and credit) available to the defendant are worth less than 50 percent of the likely cost of private representation through trial.

If the court does not find that the defendant is presumptively eligible, it must conduct an inquiry sufficient to determine whether the defendant is eligible for court-appointed counsel under the aforementioned standard. The court may make this determination based on the information then-available or, when appropriate, may: 1) require the defendant to submit a completed financial resources affidavit, with supporting documentation of income; 2) require the defendant to submit information or documentation concerning particular assets or expenses; 3) require the defendant to appear at a representation hearing or a pretrial services

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80 Exception: the court may determine that a defendant is ineligible for court-appointed counsel under AS 18.85.170(4) if the defendant has disposed of assets in order to qualify for appointed counsel
interview; or 4) require the defendant to make reasonable efforts to retain private counsel and to report these efforts to the court orally or in writing.

The court can review the defendant’s finances at any point during the trial and may terminate the appointment of PDA counsel, if it determines the defendant is no longer indigent. The PDA attorneys also are responsible for advising the court if they learn of a change in the defendant’s financial status that would render him/her financially ineligible for appointed counsel.\textsuperscript{81}

The court also can enter a judgment for the cost of counsel from the date of appointment through the date of termination, if it is found that the defendant never was eligible in the first place.\textsuperscript{82}

\textit{The Practice for Establishing Indigency and Appointing PDA Counsel in Alaska}

Alaska Pre-Trial Services (APS), located in the Anchorage courthouse, provides indigent screening of defendants for Alaska criminal court judges when indigency is deemed in question. Defendants are sent to APS for an additional screening and interview process. Defendants are required to prepare and submit the following documentation:

1. Request for Appointed Attorney. Defendants must agree to provide APS all requested financial information and are informed that they can be prosecuted for perjury under AS 11.56.200, if false information is provided. The request also authorizes anyone to release to ACS all information concerning assets, liabilities, account balances and income sources for the previous 3 years. This request includes, but is not limited to, all current and past employers, banks, credit and depository institutions, accountants, brokers and credit bureaus.

2. Financial Statement. This form requires a detailed disclosure of income, number of household members, monthly household expenses, adjustment to expenses, cash and assets. It also asks for a listing of all credit cards, including limits and balances owed. There is a warning on the form that states: “Making False Statements Under Oath is a Crime.

However, APS does not verify defendants’ asset or income information, other than by conducting interviews of defendants and accepting the information they provide at face value. Even though APS has defendants’ permission to access and verify all their financial information, it does not do so. Defendants are then appointed PDA counsel, based on their request for a court-appointed attorney and representations they make in their interview and on their financial statements.

\textsuperscript{81} Alaska Administrative Rule 12(f).
\textsuperscript{82} Id.
The former Public Defender confirmed the court system often fails to do a proper inquiry into the eligibility of defendants to receive PDA services, but he stated that the PDA does not investigate its own clients.83 We also interviewed several assistant public defenders who stated they had prior concerns about the indigency qualifications of some of their clients. For example, one PDA attorney said he has represented “a few [defendants] who quite clearly did not” qualify for court-appointed counsel, including a client who had a “$600k plus Hillside home.”

The former Public Defender said he did not know if the PDA was getting more appointments than it was supposed to as a result of the court system’s failure to do proper inquiries.84

Other Practices for Determining Indigency and Appointing Legal Counsel

At the federal level, the Federal Poverty Guidelines are used to make determinations of eligibility for uncompensated services.85 The majority of states use these guidelines, or a modified version of them, as a baseline for determining if someone will receive public defense

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CASE STUDY

In conducting a review of the application of Alaska indigency standards, we found some concerning cases. In 2018, John Doe was charged with Operating While Under the Influence. He was not employed at the time the case was arraigned, but his spouse made approximately $40,000/year. They own a house valued at approximately $530,000. The mortgage on the house was $456,000. They owned the house since 2013, and the equity in the house was over $100,000. The full value of the property ($530,000) would be considered an asset readily convertible to cash, minus the homestead exception ($72,900). The minimum monthly payment on the loan would be considered an “allowable expense” which could be subtracted from their total resources.

John Doe was required to fill out a qualification form through Pre-Trial Services to disclose his income, assets and debts, although we were unable to obtain a copy of it. Subsequently, public records indicated that in January of 2019 John Doe obtained employment earning over $100,000/year. Defendants are required to update the court if there is a material change in their financial condition, but we found no evidence to verify John Doe updated the court or the PDA regarding his new job. We also found no evidence his PDA attorney knew about the new job.

Following the Alaska Courts own estimates, the likely cost of private representation through trial for this misdemeanor case was $2,000.

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83 Interview of Quinlan Steiner, April 1, 2019, hour 1:00.
84 Id. at 1:01.
representation in court.\textsuperscript{86} Many states also consider public assistance as a qualifier for public defender assistance. As the cost of providing indigent defense services has risen, states have attempted to contain those costs by reducing the number of defendants who are financially eligible for court-appointed counsel.

For example, in early 2019, North Carolina implemented a 3-part plan to better screen and verify indigency.\textsuperscript{87} Specifically, it:

1) Revised and simplified the affidavit of indigency to capture relevant information in a format that is understandable for defendants;
2) Created an informational bench card to provide a standard set of factors for judges to review as they make an indigency determination;\textsuperscript{88} and
3) Provided training and technical assistance to court personnel to increase the entry of information related to appointed counsel into the court database system.

From 2001-2005 Lancaster County, Nebraska, piloted a screening and verifying program to establish indigency for defendants. Prior to the implementation of the program, it was left to a judge’s discretion as to whether a defendant qualified as indigent and was eligible for a court-appointed attorney. The pilot program increased the efficiency in indigency appointments by collecting information outside of the hearing and reducing in-court time. However, the County found “no indication that the program was impacting (reducing) the number of defendants receiving court-appointed attorneys, and there was no indication of a cost savings from verification.” Recommendations to improve the program included: a) establishing a small application fee to request a court appointed attorney, and b) staff a pretrial service position with an employee who has investigative skills and whose responsibility is solely to screen and verify financial information.\textsuperscript{89}

According to the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, in Florida, a “partially indigent” person is unable to pay more than a portion of the fee charged by an attorney, including costs of investigation, without substantial hardship to the person or the person’s family. Ohio defines “marginally indigent” defendants as those with a “total monthly gross income that is less than 187.5 percent of the current federally established poverty levels, pursuant to the Federal Poverty Guidelines.” In Kansas, a defendant is partially indigent “if the defendant’s combined household income and liquid assets are greater than the defendant’s reasonable and necessary living expenses but less than the sum of the defendant’s reasonable living expenses but less than the sum of the defendant’s reasonable

\textsuperscript{86} National Assn of Criminal Defense Lawyers, \textit{Gideon at 50: A Three-Part Examination of Indigent Defense in America}, March 2014 (p. 8).\
\textsuperscript{87} 2018 Report on Indigency Standards (March 2018), https://www.ncleg.gov/documents/sites/committees/JLOCJPS/2017-18%20Interim/6-March%202015,%20202018_NIC_AOC_IDS/06_AOC_Indigency_Standards-2018_03_15.pdf.\
\textsuperscript{88} The factors include: 1) income and expenses, 2) assets and debts, 3) case factors and costs associated with securing an attorney, 4) current federal and poverty guidelines and county-based living wage information, 5) receipt of need-based government benefits, 6) has-or recently had-appointed counsel in another case, 7) resides in a corrections or mental health facility, and 8) is unable to post bail or bond.\
and necessary living expenses plus the anticipated cost of private legal representation.” Massachusetts categorizes defendants who have an income greater than 125 percent but less than 250 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines as “indigent but able to contribute.”

Eligibility screening programs appear to discourage applicants who are not eligible for court-appointed counsel from pursuing their requests any further. Also, other states’ experience suggests that eligibility screeners operating with a set of uniform guidelines applied in a systematic fashion will produce fewer and more accurate findings of indigency than when eligibility decisions are made based on defendants’ representations alone or a judge’s discretion.

The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law offers six guidelines for “best practices” in determining indigency:

1. Screen people seeking the appointment of counsel to ensure that they are financially eligible.
2. Apply screening criteria and processes uniformly and commit them to writing.
3. Ensure that screening is performed by someone who does not have a conflict of interest.
4. Ensure that counsel is provided to those unable to afford it.
5. Streamline screening to speed up the process and save money.
6. Ensure that required procedural protections are in place.

While eligibility screening may result in public defense services representing fewer defendants, the use of uniform guidelines ensures those services will be available for clients who are truly indigent. Where clear guidelines are provided for making the eligibility determination (such as presumptive tests for defendants on public assistance), the cost of conducting screening should be minimal.

Allegations of Undue Interference with the Independence of the Defense Function

In the course of this review, O&R received allegations from the Sixth Amendment Center (6AC) that it had been reported to 6AC that public defense providers in Alaska are experiencing “undue interference with the independence of the defense function.” 6AC did not provide further specificity regarding the allegations.

At the 2019 annual conference of the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN), former Alaska Attorney General Jahna Lindemuth said Alaska’s public defenders are hampered by both rising

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violent crime and felony rates, as well as reduced funding.\textsuperscript{92} She also said a large part of this can be laid at the feet of the Dunleavy administration.\textsuperscript{93}

However, O&R found the PDA has received increased funding and financial support FYs17-20. We also did not find evidence of anyone hampering public defenders’ efforts or any undue interference with the independence of their defense functions. Specifically, the evidence shows:

- The PDA received $1.4 million more in the FY20 budget under Governor Dunleavy than it did in the FY19 budget under Governor Walker. This was more than a 5% increase in its budget;
- As stated above, the PDA has sufficient vacancies authorized and budgeted for its current caseload, but has not filled its vacancies, leaving a vacancy rate of 8% or more across the agency. PDA Deputy Public Defender commented at AFN that the PDA’s criminal section is 20% vacant.\textsuperscript{94} But these vacancies are not the fault of the Dunleavy administration, nor are they evidence of undue interference with the PDA. Rather, they are evidence that the PDA has been resourced with more budget and staff positions than it is using effectively;
- By being located in DOA, the PDA has a Commissioner-advocate at the level of the Attorney General to insulate the PDA from undue influence, involvement, and control by those whose interests are directly or indirectly adverse to the PDA’s attorney-client relationship;
- The DOA Commissioner has announced efforts to find funding to cover all PDA attorneys’ $660 annual bar dues (this will be the first time ever PDA attorneys’ bar dues are covered);
- The circumstances surrounding the transition of the former Public Defender were in accordance with the process set forth in the Public Defender Act;\textsuperscript{95}
- The person appointed Acting Public Defender was not politically affiliated with the Governor, and she had excellent qualifications for the position, including former experience as an assistant public defender;
- The DOA Commissioner has petitioned the judiciary at the request of PDA attorneys for policy changes at the courthouse;
- The Governor’s office has approved an exemption from OMB approval for PDA hiring requests;
- The judiciary has no supervision of the PDA;
- Initially, the former Public Defender was held to the same travel limitations as all other state officials. Within those limitations, he was granted permission to travel in person to speak with legislators about the PDA’s budget needs. He also was given permission to travel again when the judicial council funded his travel. Later, at the request of the

\textsuperscript{92} Michael Lockett, \textit{As Alaska public defenders offices are foundering, Juneau holds steady}, Juneau Empire (October 27, 2019).
\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{95} AS 18.85.050
Legislature, he was given an exception to the travel restriction and traveled in person again to meet with legislators about his budget; and

- The PDA is included as an equal and valued partner in the criminal justice system: the DOA Commissioner is considered a core member of the HB49 Crime Bill team, DOA is invited to the public safety events promoted by the Governor’s office because it is the PDA’s parent agency; and DOA is included in discussions about the public safety mission.
RECOMMENDATIONS

To improve the efficiency of PDA operations and the efficacy of PDA services, we make the following recommendations:

1. **Improve Accuracy of Caseload Reporting.** The PDA should review and improve its methods for tracking cases so it can report consistently and accurately on its number of cases (weighted and unweighted), every case that is transferred to OPA for representation, how its weighted cases combine with OPA’s cases to present an accurate picture of the agencies’ combined workload, and what the average weighted caseload is compared to the PDA’s authorized attorney complement. Protecting the integrity of caseload statistics promotes the confidence of using such statistics as the basis for management and budgeting decisions. The PDA’s budget requests to the Governor and Legislature could be better supported with caseload data that has greater transparency and clarity.

2. **Develop a Uniform Definition of “Case.”** Per the recommendation of the BJA, we recommend the PDA and OPA develop a uniform definition for counting cases. It would be optimal if the Department of Law Criminal Division used the same definition. This would afford the greatest clarity and transparency in understanding the comparative performance, operations, and budget needs of these agencies.

3. **Require Timekeeping for the PDA.** The PDA should begin regularly tracking attorneys’ time on case matters using timekeeping software. Timekeeping software with a mobile app component would be particularly efficient for the PDA. Time keeping is the best way to discover true costs, and it is far more accurate than a case weighting or Delphi system for approximating time spent on cases. Tracking actual time spent on cases and other activities will allow the Legislature and any other interested party to see exactly how public defenders spend their time. This will protect the integrity of the PDA’s data reporting and promote confidence about the PDA’s caseloads and budgetary needs without the need for estimates or speculation.

The timekeeping aspect of this review revealed the PDA needs better software for timekeeping, adequate time for training and adaptation to timekeeping, and assistance from support staff to implement timekeeping statewide. Additional findings and recommendations regarding timekeeping will be included in the Supplemental report we will issue regarding the time study.

4. **The PDA Should Validate and Refine Its Weighting System.** After collecting consistent, accurate, and analyzable timekeeping data for at least one year, we recommend the PDA use the results of attorneys’ timekeeping to adjust weights given to cases to reflect actual practice conditions and the time necessary to handle cases.
5. **Improve Quality Control on Review of Potential Conflicts Before Transferring Them to OPA or Private Counsel.** Conflicts increase expenses. The PDA must thoroughly evaluate each case for conflict before referring them to OPA. We recommend the PDA permanently institute a more robust quality control process for conflict review like it piloted in early 2019 to ensure that only properly conflicted cases are sent outside of the PDA to OPA. Given the Deputies’ other duties and individual caseloads, this may best be accomplished by the creation of a separate, designated conflict attorney position. This position could supervise the conflict paralegals and review their work to ensure it is accurate and thorough. This position also could provide training to attorneys and staff throughout the PDA on conflicts of interest to ensure they are making appropriate referrals and closing conflicts timely for accurate reporting.

6. **Create a Separate Silo in PDA’s Anchorage Office.** We recommend the PDA consider creating a separate unit in its Anchorage office, walled off from the other practice areas, to handle some CINA, juvenile, mental commitments, and PCR cases. With less cases being conflicted out to OPA, there may be a need for additional staff to deal with the anticipated additional caseload if the separate unit is created. Additionally, the PDA will need to budget for costs associated with creating the physical barriers required to create the walled off unit, as well as costs associated with some database reconfiguration to meet the ethical requirements of having this separate unit within the PDA. The upfront costs should be viewed in light of the long-term savings to the state for reducing the conflict rate.

7. **Charge a Small Fee to File a CINA Appeal.** A large percentage of parents appeal adverse CINA rulings, even though statistics show that a very small number of these rulings are overturned. These types of appeals are extremely time-consuming (and thus expensive) for the public appellate lawyers on both sides of the case. This is because these types of cases are very fact dependent and because the multitude of facts occur over many years of family life. Lawyers on both sides must comb through a huge number of records to prepare their cases. Several years ago, the agencies involved in the CINA process examined the possibility of charging parents a small fee to pursue an appeal. The charging of a fee would be constitutional if set at a reasonable sum. A small fee would encourage parents to evaluate whether they were just pursuing an appeal because it was free, or because they had a reasonable chance of winning. We recommend the PDA pursue the necessary legislative or court policy changes necessary to implement this change in the fee schedule.

8. **Automate and Synchronize Case Management Systems.** We recommend the PDA work to develop an interface between ACS’s Court View and the PDA’s case management to enable more automation for case information and court dates. We also recommend the PDA work to create an interface between the PDA’s and the Department of Law’s case management systems for seamless transfer of discovery information.
9. **Maximize Hiring to Full Complement.** We recommend the PDA either request an increment in its budget to pay for its other expenses or find ways to reduce its spending in other expense categories so it does not need to maintain a high vacancy rate to balance its budget. We also recommend the PDA plan to hire all positions, understanding that staff turnover will create a natural vacancy rate that meet’s OMB’s standards. The total months of vacancy should be assessed halfway through the fiscal year to determine whether any positions vacant at the time should be delayed before they are advertised and/or filled to in order to stay within the PDA’s budget.

10. **Improve PDA Retention and Recruitment.** While there is nothing that can be done regarding the number of legal jobs available to potential PDA applicants, there are some things that could help PDA recruit and retain attorneys:
   a. **The PDA benefits greatly from participation in the annual Equal Justice Works Career Fair.** We recommend funding be included in the PDA’s budget for 2 attorneys to attend this fair each year, as long as the PDA continues to successfully recruit significant numbers of interns or new hires from the fair.
   b. **The PDA’s travel budget should include roundtrip airfare for up to 30 interns each year,** as this is one of the strongest recruitment tools the agency has. Although the interns are unpaid, offering free roundtrip airfare incentivizes them to accept PDA internships, thereby providing the PDA valuable caseload assistance and the opportunity to screen candidates on-the-job for 8-10 weeks before deciding whether to make a hiring offer.
   c. **The PDA’s budget should continue to include a stipend for moving expenses to new hires.** While this amount covers only a portion of a new hire’s moving expenses, it allows the PDA to offer a valuable incentive to candidates, which gives the PDA some competitive advantage over other public interest job opportunities.
   d. **The PDA should develop and implement a plan for managing its predictive vacancy cycle so the agency can be filled to 95%+ of its staffing complement at all times.**
   e. **Improve Efficiency of Hiring Process.** We recommend the DOA Commissioner, ASD, and Public Defender work together to find ways to make the selection-to-offer process more efficient for PDA candidates.

11. **Hire More Support Staff.** Using BJA’s optimal support staff ratios as a general guideline for PDA staffing, it appears the PDA will operate more efficiently if the PDA uses its vacancies to hire more support staff rather than attorneys in the near-term, particularly in offices with higher staff to attorney ratios, like in Anchorage and in the Northern region. We recommend the PDA higher a greater percentage of support staff to attorneys for the next 2 years to increase the number of support staff available per attorney. This will improve the efficiency of the PDA and reduce the “felt caseload” of each attorney as more of the administrative work associated with their cases is handled by support staff rather than themselves.
12. **Improve Paralegal and Support Staff Recruitment and Training.** The PDA should implement a new strategy to recruit and hire more paralegals and support staff, improve their training, and engage them in more substantive duties. The PDA also should consider establishing a paralegal manager position who oversees training and manages all paralegals at the PDA. This position would ensure paralegals are operating according to their job descriptions and are able to substantively assist the attorneys. In addition, the PDA should consider recruiting paralegal interns from the University of Alaska (UA) system. The PDA would be able to use this internship program to recruit permanent top-quality paralegal hires. Increasing support staff positions would help attorneys handle their voluminous clerical work.

13. **Improve Training.** The PDA will benefit greatly from having an annual training conference to enable more effective utilization of current staff, both attorneys and support staff. The PDA also should develop specific training plans for employees as part of the annual performance evaluation system process. The PDA should provide formal orientation when employees start their jobs about their roles, responsibilities, expectations, and how to use the systems and technologies within the PDA.

14. **Improve Technology.** We recommend the PDA invest in purchasing State-issued mobile phones for all their attorneys. All attorneys would then be equipped with technology that transcribes their voice messages into text, and they could accomplish tasks while in the courtroom or at meetings outside the office.

15. **Establish a Pro Bono Program.** The PDA should consider establishing a pro bono program to enlist the assistance of attorneys from outside the agency. A program like this could help augment strained resources at the PDA, especially at a time when recruitment and retention remain a challenge.

Pro bono programs have been implemented by public defender and civil legal aid agencies across the country. At the Legal Aid Society, the largest provider of indigent defense services in New York City, the Criminal Defense Pro Bono Project provides opportunities for volunteer attorneys to serve as full-time externs or donate a third of their time over a 9-month period. These attorneys often handle misdemeanor cases and work arraignments, but they can also serve as co-counsel on complex felonies or assist with appellate work. Similarly, through the Ensuring Equal Justice Initiative, the Miami-Dade Public Defender has received pro bono assistance (usually direct representation in misdemeanor cases) from more than 100 private attorneys since the program’s inception.

The Alaska Bar Association also could partner with the PDA in supporting this program by offering reduced bar fees for those who volunteer a certain number of pro bono hours with the PDA. Additionally, the PDA could develop partnerships with private firms that would count their attorneys’ volunteer time against the billable hours expected of them by the firm.
16. **Implement a Rigorous Indigent Screening Process.** We recommend ACS implement a detailed vetting process to ensure that public defenders are not being assigned to non-indigent persons. Alaska Pre-Trial Services could perform more rigorous screening of all criminal defendants appointed counsel from the list it receives from the courts daily. Defendants who claim to be indigent should be appointed provisional public counsel pending further screening and verification. Follow-up screening and asset verification could be performed by Pre-Trial Services once the information is submitted. APS could be allowed full access to online informational databases for verification purposes including the PFD, Department of Labor data (for current employment and income), Alaska Real Property, and DMV (for current vehicle/boat registrations) before court appointed counsel is approved. A few minutes of screening and verification could save significant time for PDA attorneys and better ensure our limited public defender resources are reserved for those Alaskans who are truly in need.

17. **Evaluate Crime Trends and Resource the PDA Accordingly.** As implementation of HB49 progresses, the effect on the PDA’s caseload should be closely monitored. The PDA is a critical part of Alaska’s public safety system, and its caseload could grow substantially with the State’s intentional increase in law enforcement efforts. We recommend the Governor and Legislature consider current and comprehensive data regarding the PDA’s caseload in making future PDA budget decisions to ensure the PDA is adequately funded to achieve its mission. As part of this data analysis, criminal cases conflicted over to OPA also must be considered so OPA is resourced adequately as well.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Commissioner Kelly Tshibaka

FROM: Michael J. Dunleavy
Governor

DATE: February 26, 2019

SUBJECT: Mission and Direction

This memorandum provides direction, as we have previously discussed, that in addition to your role as the Commissioner of the Department of Administration, it is my intent and expectation that your expertise be utilized to review, investigate, and provide policy direction, not only as it relates to the Department of Administration, but as it applies statewide in the areas of management, audit, and government efficiency, as directed, on my behalf.
APPENDIX B

Public Defender Agency: Paralegal I/II Job Description

The duties of the position may include, but are not limited to the following:

- Identifying, investigating, researching, and analyzing potential conflicts of interest in Agency cases. Making recommendations for further investigation, interviews and actions based on their conflict of interest analyses.
- Advanced case management; to include identifying discovery to be requested, and preparation of documents, evidence and exhibits for trial and contested adjudications. Assisting in managing large caseloads using an internal case management system for reporting and ensuring accuracy in caseload data for individual attorneys or offices.
- Utilization of the internal case management system for drafting letters and pleadings.
- Provide support in the implementation and administration of the Agency case management system.
- Provide project management support for statewide Agency initiatives, management projects, and efficiency reviews.
- Identification and investigation of potential defense expert witnesses, coordinating expert communications, contracts, and testimony.
- Disposition mitigation by assisting clients with case plan compliance and accessing social services and treatment programs.
- Professional communications with the Court system, opposing counsel, clients, Department of Corrections, Office of Children’s Services, Division of Juvenile Justice and local community resource organizations.
- Coordinate and conduct meetings with clients. Participate in administrative meetings with the Office of Children’s Services and other case participants on behalf of clients in parent defense cases.
- Assist in the collection of information, documentation and evidence to be used in formal and informal post-conviction relief.
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION

PUBLIC DEFENDER AGENCY

RESPONSE TO

THE NOVEMBER 4, 2019 REVIEW OF THE EFFICIENCY & EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER AGENCY

December 23, 2019
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IX. The Agency's Response to the Review's Recommendations
I. Introduction

The Alaska Legislature created the Public Defender Agency in 1969 to fulfill the state’s constitutional obligation to provide counsel to indigent defendants. Over the past 50 years, as Alaska’s population and the right to counsel have expanded, the Agency has also expanded: in the last fiscal year, the Agency represented indigent litigants in over 20,000 matters ranging from criminal prosecutions and appeals to civil commitment proceedings to child-in-need-of-aid proceedings. The Agency is committed to its clients and its role in protecting the rights of indigent Alaskans in the justice system.

In November 2019, the Department of Administration’s Oversight and Review Unit issued its “Review of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Public Defender Agency” (Review). This Review analyzed the Agency’s caseload, staffing, and infrastructure, and it made 17 recommendations regarding the Agency’s operation.

The Agency largely agrees with the Review’s findings and recommendations, especially those relating to the challenges the Agency faces with recruitment and retention and the Review’s emphasis on training for the Agency’s lawyers and staff. There are some aspects of the Review—the sections related to the Agency’s caseload and conflict rates—that require some further explanation and discussion from the Agency’s perspective.

The Agency provides this response to explain the Agency’s role in Alaska’s justice system, to clarify Agency operations, and to provide context regarding the provision of public defense services in the modern justice environment. As this response explains, the Agency is tasked with providing a broad array of indigent defense services, and the increased need for the Agency’s services is outpacing its available resources and may be compromising its ability to provide those services consistent with its ethical and constitutional obligations in every case to which it is assigned.

If the Agency is not able to fulfill its obligations to its indigent clients, the State of Alaska is not fulfilling its obligation to all Alaskans. The Agency is committed to working with the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, along with other stakeholders in Alaska’s justice system, to address the challenges facing the Agency.
II. The Right to Counsel and the History of the Alaska Public Defender Agency

The Agency’s Obligation to Indigent Litigants Is Broad.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides criminal defendants with the right to the assistance of counsel.1 In 1963, the United States Supreme Court held that this right required states to furnish defense counsel for indigent defendants facing felony charges in state courts.2 The federal right to counsel is discussed in the Review.3 The Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel for indigent defendants in state courts extends to all misdemeanor prosecutions where a defendant faces a term of imprisonment, including a suspended term of imprisonment, 4 all proceedings to adjudicate a child delinquent,5 and all direct appeals provided as a matter of right.6

The Alaska Constitution separately guarantees counsel to indigent litigants.7 The right to counsel under the Alaska Constitution is broader than that provided by the federal constitution, requiring Alaska to appoint counsel for indigent litigants in a number of proceedings for which there is no federal right to counsel. The Alaska Constitution requires the appointment of counsel in any case in which an indigent individual is charged with an offense that carries a potential penalty of imprisonment, the loss of a valuable license, or a fine so large as to connote criminality.8 Alaska also requires the appointment of counsel for indigent litigants in probation and parole revocation proceedings,9 first petitions for postconviction relief,10 and proceedings where parental rights are at stake.11

Until the establishment of the Public Defender Agency, Alaska met its constitutional obligations to provide counsel to indigent defendants through the assignment of private counsel.12 This system was

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1 United States Const. amend VI.
2 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also United States Const. amend XIV.
3 See Review of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Public Defender Agency, Oversight & Review Unit, Dep’t of Admin., at 1 (Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter REVIEW].
5 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
6 Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The federal constitution does not require a state to provide appellate review of a conviction, but where a state provides a right to a direct appeal, the state must appoint counsel to represent indigent defendants. Halbert, 545 U.S. at 610.
7 See Alaska Const. art. I, §§ 1, 7, and 11.
9 See, e.g., Hollinan v. State, 404 P.2d 644 (Alaska 1965) (construing statutory right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings to require appointment of counsel for indigent defendants to avoid rendering statute unconstitutional as violation of equal protection).
inadequate to address the need, and in 1969, the Alaska Legislature enacted AS 18.85, which established the Agency. Since its creation, the Alaska Public Defender Agency has been the primary source of counsel for indigent litigants facing a loss of liberty in state-initiated criminal and civil proceedings.

III. The Agency Must Provide Quality Representation to Its Clients.

The Review recognizes that the Sixth Amendment requires not just the assistance of counsel but the effective assistance of counsel and that the Agency’s lawyers are bound by the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct’s directive that all lawyers provide competent representation. The following is an in-depth review of those obligations.

Agency Lawyers Must Comply with the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct.

Alaska’s Rules of Professional Conduct govern a lawyer’s relationship with her client. They direct the lawyer to provide competent representation, which requires not only that a lawyer inquire into the particular factual and legal elements presented by the client’s case and that a lawyer adequately prepare but also that a lawyer maintain current knowledge of the law and its practice. The rules direct a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, which requires that the lawyer’s workload be managed to ensure competent representation because delay can often adversely affect a client’s interests.

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See id. at 11 (explaining that “the inadequacies of the assigned counsel system as it was structured in the 1960’s was acknowledged by the Alaska Bar Association, the Alaska Judicial Council, the Alaska Court System and the Alaska Legislative Council, not to mention the growing public awareness”).

See REVIEW, supra note 3, at 1, 3 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.1).

Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.1(a) (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”).

See Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.1(a) cmt., which provides, in part:

Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problems, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation.

To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.

Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”).

See Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.3 cmt. (“A lawyer’s work-load must be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently. . . . A client’s interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions[].”).
And the rules direct the lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed, so as to allow the client to make informed decisions about the representation; this includes a requirement that a lawyer promptly respond to reasonable requests for information from the client. The rules specifically direct a lawyer to promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance that requires the client’s informed consent.

The Federal and State Constitutions Guarantee Indigent Litigants Effective and Quality Representation That Meets Prevailing Professional Norms and Standards of Practice.

Alaska’s ethical rules govern the representation of all lawyers; there is no exception for a criminal defense or parent’s lawyer, generally, or a public defender, specifically. A criminal defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel is constitutionally guaranteed. “That a person who happens

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1 Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.4(a) (“A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter undertaken on the client’s behalf and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”).

20 See Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.4 cmt., which provides, in part:

Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation.

. . . A lawyer’s regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a) requires prompt compliance with the request. If a prompt response is not feasible, the lawyer or a member of the lawyer’s staff should acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected.

21 Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.4(b) (“A lawyer shall promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance that requires the client’s informed consent, unless the client has already made an informed decision on the matter in previous discussion.”); see also Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.4 cmt., which provides, in part:

For example, a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or reject the offer.

22 See Alaska R. Prof. Conduct, scope (“The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping a lawyer’s role. That context includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers, and substantive procedural law in general.”); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-1.2(e) (Am. Bar. Ass’n 2015) [hereinafter ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS] (“Defense counsel, in common with all members of the bar, is subject to the standards of conduct stated in statutes, rules, decisions of courts, and codes, canons, or other standards of professional conduct.”).

23 See Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 6.2 cmt. (“An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to the client as retained counsel, including the obligations of loyalty and confidentiality, and is subject to the same limitations on the client-lawyer relationship, such as the obligation to refrain from assisting the client in violation of the Rules.”); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981) (“Held to the same standards of competence and integrity as a private lawyer, see Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970), a public defender works under canons of professional responsibility that mandate his exercise of independent judgment on behalf of the client.”); State ex rel. Missouri Public Defender Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Mo. 2012) (“No exception exists to the ethics rules for lawyers who represent indigent persons.”); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006) (“The [Model] Rules of Professional Conduct provide no exception for lawyers who represent indigent persons charged with crimes.”).

24 UNITED STATES CONST. amend. VI; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused . . . is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command.\footnote{3} Rather, effective assistance of counsel requires performance at a level displayed by one of ordinary training and skill in the criminal law;\footnote{26} this includes the time and resources necessary to deploy this training and skill.\footnote{27}

The question whether an individual defender provided effective assistance of counsel is necessarily a retrospective determination to be made in the context of the individual case.\footnote{28} Prospectively, a public defense organization has a duty to provide quality representation.\footnote{29} Both the American Bar Association (ABA) and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) have developed standards guiding the provision of defense services.\footnote{30} These organizations are subject matter experts in the provision of legal services and, for the latter, in the provision of indigent criminal defense legal services. Both standards provide guidelines for all aspects of representation,\footnote{31} including interviewing counsel.\footnote{24}; \textit{Risher v. State}, 523 P.2d 421, 423 (Alaska 1974) ("The mere fact that counsel represents an accused does not assure this constitutionally-guaranteed assistance. The assistance must be ‘effective’ to be of any value.").

\textit{Strickland v. Washington}, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also \textit{Kure v. Luzerne County}, 146 A.3d 715, 735-36 (Pa. 2016) ("The Court’s eloquent descriptions in \textit{Johnson} and \textit{Gideon} of the essential nature of the right to a lawyer would ring hollow, and would amount to empty rhetoric, if appointment of counsel for indigent defendants is but a mere formality. It is the defense itself, not the lawyers as such, that animates \textit{Gideon’s} mandate. If the latter cannot provide the former, the promise of the Sixth Amendment is broken.").

\textit{See Risher}, 523 P.2d at 424 ("Lawyers may display a wide spectrum of ability and still have their performance fall within the range of competence displayed by one of ordinary training and skill in the criminal law. It is only when the ability is below the nadir of that range that we would hold it to constitute a deprivation of effective assistance of counsel.").

\textit{In re Edward S.}, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 725, 740 (Cal. App. 2009) ("Under [the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel], the defendant can reasonably expect that in the course of representation his counsel will undertake only those actions a reasonably competent attorney would undertake. But he can also reasonably expect that before counsel undertakes any action at all he will make a rational and informed decision on strategy and tactics founded on adequate investigation and preparation."); \textit{State v. Peart}, 621 So.2d 780, 789 (La. 1993) ("We take reasonably effective assistance of counsel to mean that the lawyer not only possesses adequate skill and knowledge, but also that he has the time and resources to apply his skill and knowledge to the tasks of defending each of his individual clients.").

\textit{See, e.g., Luckey v. Harris}, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988).

\textit{See Providing Defense Services} § 5-1.1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1992) ("The objective in providing counsel should be to assure that quality legal representation is afforded to all persons eligible for counsel pursuant to this chapter."); \textit{see also Luckey}, 860 F.2d at 1017 ("The third amendment protects rights that do not affect the outcome of a trial. Thus, deficiencies that do not meet the ‘ineffectiveness’ standard may nonetheless violate a defendant’s rights under the third amendment. In the post-trial context, such errors may be deemed harmless because they did not affect the outcome of a trial. Whether an accused has been prejudiced by the denial of a right is an issue that relates to relief - whether the defendant is entitled to have his or her conviction overturned - rather than to the question of whether such a right exists and can be protected reasonably.").

\textit{See ABA Defense Function Standards}, \textit{supra} note 22; \textit{Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation} (Nat’l Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n 2006) [hereinafter NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES]; \textit{see also ABA Defense Function Standards}, \textit{supra} note 22, § 4-1.1 ("The standards are intended to be used as a guide to professional conduct and performance.").

\textit{See Padilla v. Kentucky}, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010) ("We have long recognized that prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like are guides to determining what is reasonable. Although they are only guides and not inexorable commands, these standards may be valuable measures of the prevailing professional norms of effective representation," (internal brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted)).
the client, case investigation, pretrial motion work, plea negotiations, trial, sentencing, and post-conviction proceedings. Both standards address the capacity of a defender to meet these responsibilities in every case to which she is assigned, directing defenders to avoid unnecessary delay in disposition of cases and specifically addressing workload.

Like indigent criminal defendants, indigent parents also have a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. And as it has for criminal defense lawyers, the ABA has issued standards guiding practice for lawyers representing parents in abuse and neglect cases. These standards govern all aspects of representation, including the relationship with the client, investigation and discovery, preparation for court and participation in hearings, and post-hearing matters. Like the

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ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 22, § 4-3.2; NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 2.2.

ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 22, § 4-4.1; NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 4.1.

ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 22, § 4-3.6; NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 30, §§ 5.1 - 5.3.

ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 22, §§ 4-6.1 - 4-6.2; NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 30, §§ 6.1 - 6.3.

ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 22, §§ 4-7.1 - 4-7.9; NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 30, §§ 7.1 - 7.7.

ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 22, § 4-8.1; NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINE, supra note 30, §§ 8.1 - 8.7.

ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 22, §§ 4-8.2 - 4-8.6; NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 30, §§ 9.2 - 9.6.

ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 22, § 4-1.3(b). ("Defense counsel should avoid unnecessary delay in the disposition of cases.").

ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 22, § 4-1.3(c) ("Defense counsel should not carry a workload that, by reason of its excessive size, interferes with the rendering of quality representation, endangers the client’s interest in the speedy disposition of charges, or may lead to the breach of professional obligations."); NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 1.3(a) ("Before agreeing to act as counsel or accepting appointment by a court, counsel has an obligation to make sure that counsel has available sufficient time, resources, knowledge and experience to offer quality representation to a defendant in a particular matter. If it later appears that counsel is unable to offer quality representation in the case, counsel should move to withdraw.").

V.F. v. State, 666 P.2d 42, 47-48 (Alaska 1983) ("We hold that the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution guarantees indigent parents a right to effective assistance of counsel in proceedings brought to terminate their parental rights.").

See STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING PARENTS IN ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES (Am. Bar Ass’n 2006).

Id. at 3-7.
ABA’s standards for criminal defense, the ABA’s parent representation standards also address delay and workload.\(^4\)

It is the Agency’s goal to provide representation consistent with these standards in each case to which it is appointed.

### IV. The Agency’s Conflict Rate

**The Agency Is Committed to Providing Representation in As Many Cases As It Can While Meeting Its Ethical and Constitutional Obligations.**

The Agency is committed to ensuring it provides ethical and constitutional representation in the cases in which it is appointed. This necessarily requires the Agency withdraw from cases in which it has identified a disqualifying conflict of interest, and it also requires the Agency to diligently engage in a conflict review process that ensures the Agency accurately applies the ethical rules in each case.

The Review examines the increase in the number of disqualifying conflicts identified between Fiscal Year FY17 and FY19.\(^5\) As the Review also notes, the Agency does not elect to send cases to OPA but rather is forced to withdraw as counsel pursuant to ethical and constitutional guidelines in any case in which it identifies a conflict of interest.\(^6\) When the Agency withdraws, the court system is required to appoint the Office of Public Advocacy.\(^7\) This system reflects the legislature’s intent that the Office of Public Advocacy be appointed in every case in which the Public Defender Agency identifies a conflict of interest requiring its withdrawal.\(^8\) The legislature did not envision that the Agency would consider the effect of withdrawal on the Office of Public Advocacy when complying with its obligation to provide conflict-free counsel to indigent litigants.

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\(^4\) See id. at 11 (“Delaying a case often increases the time a family is separated, and can reduce the likelihood of reunification. . . . If a hearing is continued and the case is delayed, the parent may lose momentum in addressing the issues that led to the child’s removal or the parent may lose the opportunity to prove compliance with case plan goals. Additionally, the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) timelines continue to run despite continuances.”).

\(^5\) Id. at 32 (“An attorney manager should determine reasonable caseloads for parents’ attorneys . . . and monitor them to ensure the maximum is not exceeded. . . . When assessing the appropriate number of cases, remember to account for all attorney obligations, case difficulty, time required to prepare a case thoroughly, support staff assistance, travel time, experience level of attorneys, and available time (excluding vacation, holidays, sick leave, training and other non-case-related activity).”); see also id. (“High caseload is considered a major barrier to quality representation and a source of high attorney turnover. It is essential to decide what a reasonable caseload is in your jurisdiction. How attorneys define cases and attorney obligations vary from place-to-place, but having a manageable caseload is crucial. The standards drafting committee recommended a caseload of no more than 50-100 cases depending on what the attorney can handle competently and fulfill these standards.”).

\(^6\) Review, supra note 3, at 24.

\(^7\) See Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.7, 1.9; see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (holding that multiple representations that result in actual conflict of interest violate Sixth Amendment).

\(^8\) Alaska R. Administration 12(b)(1)(A).

\(^9\) See AS 44.21.410(a)(4) (stating that Office of Public Advocacy “shall . . . provide legal representation . . . in cases involving indigent persons who are entitled to representation under AS 18.85.100 and who cannot be represented by the public defender agency because of a conflict of interests”).
Although the Agency’s conflict rate has increased over the past three fiscal years, the rate is historically variable.\textsuperscript{20} The Review states the Agency’s intent is to reduce its “[felony] conflict rate down to 15\%, thereby reducing by 10\% its overall conflict rate for all cases.” (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{30} The Agency assumes the Review meant a 15\% reduction in its conflict rate. Given the historic variability in the Agency’s conflict rate, and given that conflicts cannot be reduced arbitrarily but must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, the Agency believes it can reduce its overall conflict rate with increased training and internal review; for this reason, its goal is to reduce its overall conflict rate, not its felony conflict rate, to 15\%. The Agency also commits to use its data to evaluate and improve the accuracy and effectiveness of its application of conflict rules and policy.

The Agency has a duty to withdraw upon identification of a disqualifying conflict irrespective of the effect on the Agency’s conflict rates. The Agency is confident in the steps it is taking to address the increase in its overall FY19 conflict rate and to monitor the cause of the conflicts requiring its withdrawal. The Agency does not believe its conflict rate threatens its role as the primary indigent defense agency in Alaska but appreciates that the Review’s concern is based on a recognition of this role and motivated by a desire to preserve it.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{The Agency Is Working to Ensure Accurate Conflict Review.}

Of the 23,902 cases to which the Agency was appointed in FY19, the Agency identified a disqualifying conflict of interest requiring its withdrawal in 4,224; this represents an overall conflict rate of 17.7\%. This is an increase over the FY18 conflict rate of 15.5\%.\textsuperscript{25} Over the past decade, the Agency’s conflict rate has fluctuated between approximately 13\% and 18\%.

The Agency has taken steps to determine whether incorrect conflict analysis was a cause of the FY19 conflict rate increase. The Agency’s conflict policy requires the assigned lawyer to review information generated from its case management system highlighting potential conflicts in a new case. When a potential conflict is factually complicated or there are a number of potential conflicts, the assigned lawyer can refer the case to a paralegal for assistance. Whether based on her own analysis or with assistance from a paralegal, the assigned lawyer decides whether there is a conflict that requires the Agency to withdraw from the case.

To ensure the Agency is not improperly withdrawing from cases, office supervisors must approve every conflict identified by the office’s lawyers,\textsuperscript{23} and additionally, every conflict identified in an unclassified or A felony must be approved by a deputy public defender. The Agency is also

\begin{footnotes}
\item[20] See \textit{infra} page 9. Given this historic variability, there is insufficient data to support the Review’s conclusion that the Agency’s conflict rate is increasing in a linear fashion. \textit{See REVIEW, supra} note 3, at 25 (discussing Agency’s “upward conflict trend”).
\item[21] \textit{See REVIEW, supra} note 3, at 28.
\item[22] The Review cites the “Thunderbird Falls” and “Grunwald” homicide cases as evidence that the Agency’s current structure and processes as they relate to conflicts risk undermining its core mission. \textit{See, e.g., id. at 25.} These two, high-profile, multiple-defendant first-degree murder case examples are not sufficient to justify the major changes to the Agency’s structure the Review considers. \textit{See also infra Part V.}
\item[23] \textit{See infra} note 3, at 28.
\item[24] A deputy public defender must approve conflicts identified in an office supervisor’s cases.
\end{footnotes}
randomly auditing other cases in which conflicts requiring withdrawal have been identified to ensure that the Agency’s policy is being complied with across the state.

Accurate conflict analysis requires training. Every new lawyer hired by the Agency is trained on the conflict policy at their new hire orientation, but the Agency believes its lawyers need annual conflict training to ensure the Agency accurately identifies disqualifying conflicts. Although the Agency has periodically offered conflict training to both lawyers and staff via video conferencing, in-person training is more effective. Historically, the Agency offered annual conflict training as part of a three-day conference for lawyers, investigators, and paralegals, but it has been unable to conduct an annual, in-person conference since 2011 due to budgetary constraints.

The Historical Variability in the Agency’s Conflict Rates.

In FY19, the Agency was appointed to 5,818 felony cases, and it identified conflicts requiring its withdrawal in 1,548 of those cases, a conflict rate of 26.6%. The Review discusses the concern that the “felony criminal [conflict] rate has almost doubled in the last 9-10 years to 25%.” The Agency’s data shows that, ten years ago, the Agency’s felony conflict rate was 32% and that there has been variability over the last ten years. Specifically, years where the conflict rate has increased have been followed by decreases in the conflict rate; this variability reflects the Agency’s effort to analyze its data to minimize unnecessary withdrawals. The Agency’s historical annual variability comports with the case-specific nature of conflict analysis. Historical data and yearly changes are relevant, as they can suggest a breakdown in the Agency’s training and conflict review analysis.

The Review quotes a prior Public Defender as having identified that in FY18, “approximately 50% of [the Agency’s] criminal cases [were] conflicted out due to past and present CINA cases, juvenile cases, and civil commitment cases.” It is unclear from the memorandum authored by the prior Public Defender how this data was compiled. Internal analysis conducted by the Agency is inconsistent with that number. Over an eight-week period in FY19, child-in-need-of-aid and civil commitment cases formed the basis of the Agency’s withdrawal due to a conflict of interest in only 17% of cases.

Moreover, in September 2019, the Agency began tracking the cause of a disqualifying conflict of interest within its case management system; once fully implemented, this will allow the Agency to monitor the causes of disqualifying conflicts requiring the Agency’s withdrawal. As of November 30, 2019, the Agency’s data shows that only 13% of the criminal cases in which the Agency withdrew

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5 This represents a slight increase from the Agency’s FY18 felony conflict rate. In FY18, the Agency identified 1,412 conflicts requiring withdrawal in 5,711 felony cases, resulting in a felony conflict rate of 24.7%.


5 Id. at 24 (citing “Memorandum from Acting Public Defender Beth Goldstein to DOA Commissioner Kelly Tshibaka, August 15, 2019”).

The Agency implemented this change in September 2019. The Agency’s review of the data obtained since September 2019 suggests that its system is not yet capturing the cause of the conflict in all cases in which the Agency withdraws; rather, in the first three months of implementation, the Agency has identified the cause of the conflict in approximately 75% of cases in which it has withdrawn due to a disqualifying conflict of interest. The Agency is evaluating its processes and will take the necessary steps to ensure its system captures the cause of the conflict in all cases in which it withdraws.

See supra note 58.
due to a disqualifying conflict of interest were the result of the Agency’s current and former representation in statutorily-confidential cases across the entire state.6

The Review contrasts the Agency’s felony conflict rate with the Colorado Office of the State Public Defender’s (OSPD) conflict rate. However, this comparison is of the Agency’s felony conflict rate with Colorado’s overall conflict rate.61 Although, the Agency’s overall conflict rate is still higher than OSPD’s,62 OSPD does not appear to provide the breadth of representation the Agency is statutorily obligated to provide its clients.63

The Review highlights the conflict rate associated with petitions for postconviction relief (PCR), stating that the Agency “currently conflicts out of more than 50% of all PCR cases, hitting as high as 75% in FY16.”64 When a person files a petition for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel against a current Agency lawyer, the Agency is required to withdraw.65 This direct adversity between a petitioner and the Agency results in higher conflict rates.66 The short limitations period for filing PCRs means that clients will often file them while the trial attorneys are still employed by the Agency.

In FY19, the Agency withdrew because of a disqualifying conflict in 51.4% of postconviction relief cases to which it was appointed, but it only withdrew from 40.9% in FY18. The Agency is appointed in a relatively small number of PCRs each year,67 and a PCR conflict rate above the overall conflict rate is consistent with the other case categories in which the Agency receives fewer appointments.68 In the first quarter of FY20, the Agency’s PCR conflict rate was 25%.

Given the Agency’s commitment to increased training to ensure accurate conflict analysis, its limited review of FY19 conflict cases, and information on the Agency’s FY20 conflict cases, the Agency

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6 Statutorily-confidential cases include child-in-need-of-aid, civil commitment, and juvenile delinquency proceedings. This analysis found that the Agency’s Anchorage civil section was the source for only 3% of the Agency’s disqualifying conflicts of interest in a criminal case. See infra Part V.
61 See Office of the State Public Defender, Fiscal Year 2019-20 Budget Request, Narrative at 19 (Nov. 1, 2018) (depicting OSPD overall conflict rate from FY13 through FY18 and stating “OSPD averages a 7% withdrawal rate on new cases due to a conflict of interest”).
62 Since FY09, the Agency’s conflict rate has fluctuated between approximately 13% and 18%, averaging 15%; the Colorado Office of the State Public Defender averages a 7% conflict rate. Id.
63 Compare id. at 23 (explaining OSPD “is required to provide criminal defense representation to indigent persons charged with crimes where incarceration is a possibility except where there is a conflict of interest”) with Part II.
6 REVIEW, supra note 3, at 27.
6 The lawyer who allegedly provided ineffective assistance of counsel cannot represent the petitioner, and that lawyer’s conflict is imputed to all Agency lawyers. Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a)(2) and 1.10(a). The Agency, however, does not have a conflict when the petitioner alleges a former Agency lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
6 Some PCRs are based on claims other than ineffective assistance of counsel, and absent another disqualifying conflict of interest, the Agency provides representation in these PCRs.
67 The Agency opened 74 PCRs in FY19 and 115 in FY18.
68 A smaller sample size may increase variability year-to-year.
believes that ongoing monitoring of the conflict rate and implementation of internal controls will enable the Agency to manage conflicts appropriately.

V. The Agency’s Structure as One Law Firm Allows the Agency to Efficiently and Effectively Meet Its Ethical and Constitutional Obligations.

The Review considers a proposal made by a former Public Defender that the Agency “creat[e] a separate Anchorage unit within the PDA that is walled off from the rest of the PDA (like the OPA model) that can handle Anchorage CINA, Anchorage Juvenile, and Anchorage commitment cases;” it also proposes this unit include statewide PCRs. The Review considers whether this proposal “could significantly reduce conflicts sent to OPA,” and it states that “[t]he Public Defender could oversee this unit, just as the Public Advocate oversees all sections of OPA without there being an inherent conflict.”

Although the Agency recognizes the importance of savings for OPA and ultimately the State of Alaska and that the silo proposal explored in the Review is intended to “lead to substantial savings within OPA,” the Agency must prioritize its statutory, ethical, and constitutional obligations.

The Review Considers Whether a Silo Structure Would Reduce the Agency’s Conflict Rate.

The Review concludes that “with a separate PDA Anchorage unit, the PCR conflict rate could be cut 50-75%,” but beyond PCR cases, there would be minimal impact from the proposal in reducing the overall conflict rate. As the Review explains, the Agency faces the “problem . . . of . . . several of the most serious criminal defense cases going to OPA” as a result of conflicts in co-defendant appointments.

Using the Thunderbird Falls case as an example, the Review correctly observes that the Agency represents only one of six co-defendants. The creation of a separate unit to handle Anchorage civil matters and PCRs would not change the outcome of a case like Thunderbird Falls – the Agency would continue to represent one defendant, and it would withdraw from the remaining co-defendants’ cases. The Office of Public Advocacy would remain responsible for the five co-defendants’ defenses.

Another example is the Grunwald homicide, where the Review correctly notes that “the PDA was unable to represent any of the 5 defendants.” Assuming the Agency’s conflict in these cases was
the result of a case that would have been handled by the proposed Anchorage civil conflict unit, the proposed silo structure would only have permitted the Agency to represent one of the five defendants. Just as in the Thunderbird Falls case, the risk that the Agency’s obligation to that client would materially limit its representation of the co-defendants would require the Agency to withdraw from the remaining four cases.

The Review and the Agency Agree There Are Valid Objections to a Silo Structure.

Although the Review recognizes the Agency’s objections to creating a separate Anchorage civil unit, the existence of OPA’s silo structure suggests that it may be a viable, if not ideal, option for the Agency. However, there are distinctions between the two agencies’ enabling statutes that should be considered.

When the legislature created OPA, it structured OPA differently than the Agency. The Agency is administered by the Public Defender, who serves a fixed term of years following nomination by the Alaska Judicial Council, selection by the governor, and confirmation by the legislature. The Public Defender has exclusive control over the hiring of staff, subject to existing appropriations, and each person hired “is under the supervision and control of the public defender.” The Agency’s sole obligation is to provide legal representation to indigent individuals in specified proceedings.

By contrast, the Office of Public Advocacy’s enabling statute obligates it to provide a number of services other than indigent legal defense. OPA’s enabling statute does not require that the office be administered by a director. And OPA’s enabling statute does not provide that the office’s employees are “under the supervision and control” of the director. All these differences suggest the legislature intended OPA to operate differently than the Agency.

These distinctions between the two enabling statutes, when read in conjunction with the history of the Public Defender Act, suggest that the Agency is precluded from implementing the silo structure OPA has implemented. As originally enacted, the Public Defender Act provided that the court could appoint a substitute defender for good cause. This substitute defender was considered “quite distinct” from the subordinate lawyers the Public Defender appointed who, by statute, were under

The Grunwald homicide case arose in the Matanuska-Susitna Valley; thus, to the extent the Agency’s conflicts were the result of representation in a statutorily confidential case, it is likely that the representation causing the disqualifying conflict occurred outside Anchorage, such that the existence of a separate Anchorage civil conflict unit would not have “cured” the conflict requiring the Agency’s withdrawal from the five cases.

7 See REVIEW, supra note 3, at 33-36.
8 AS 18.85.020.
9 AS 18.85.030.
10 AS 18.85.090.
11 AS 18.85.100.
12 See AS 44.21.410(a).
13 OPA’s enabling statute provides that the commissioner of administration may adopt regulations she considers necessary for the implementation of the office. AS 421.410(b).
14 See former AS 18.85.130(a) (1969).
the Public Defender’s “supervision and control.” Substitute counsel were primarily appointed when the Agency identified a disqualifying conflict of interest, and it was understood that there were “strong policy arguments” for “ensuring the substitute defender [was] not supervised, controlled, or limited by the Public Defender.”

The Public Defender Act’s original structure thus reflects the legislative intent that the Public Defender not supervise or control any lawyer assigned to a case in which the Agency has a disqualifying conflict of interest. The “substitute defender” provision of the Public Defender Act was repealed when the legislature created the Office of Public Advocacy in 1984. But the transfer of substitute defender responsibilities from assigned counsel to the Office of Public Advocacy did not confer on the Public Defender the authority to supervise or control a lawyer assigned to a case in which the Agency has a disqualifying conflict of interest.

As such, while “OPA . . . operates as a single agency administered by a single director, the Public Advocate, who supervises all subordinate positions,” it does so under a statutory structure that does not explicitly dictate that the director “control” subordinate positions and that does not preclude supervision in cases in which OPA has identified a disqualifying conflict of interest. That is, the legislature provided OPA with flexibility in its structure to allow it to address its varied responsibilities, but the Agency - created for a different purpose and with the limited responsibility of providing indigent representation - operates under a different structure.

A silo structure would frustrate the Agency’s effectiveness and efficiency by limiting its ability to coordinate services across the state, but the Review concludes that these concerns should not be paramount to other issues. The Agency appreciates the issues and concerns raised in the Review and concludes that the specific mechanism proposed as a method for addressing those issues is not the best solution for the Agency. The Agency recognizes that the Review simply explores options to

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8 AGENCY IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 12, at 28.
8 Id. at 28.
8 See SLA 1984, ch. 55 § 11.
9 REVIEW, supra note 3, at 33.
9 Similarly, the fact that law firms “operate as single entities with effective ethical walls, information barriers, and confidentiality management programs, software, and structures” is not central to the question whether the Public Defender Act permits the Agency to create separate units to handle cases in which the Agency has identified a disqualifying conflict of interest. Id. at 33.
92 The Review refers to Montana’s use of a “siloed public defender system” as a comparison for the Agency to consider such a structure. Id. at 33. Montana provides all public defense services through one agency, which is administered by a director who supervises three statutory divisions: the public defender division, the appellate division, and the conflict division. See Mont. Stat. §§ 47-1-104, 47-1-105, 47-1-201, 47-1-301, 47-1-401. The conflict division provides representation “in circumstances which, because of a conflict of interest, the public defender division or the appellate defender provision is unable to provide representation to a defendant.” Mont. Stat. § 47-1-401(1). Montana's statutory structure mirrors the structure OPA has implemented, but it cannot serve as a parallel to the Agency, given the Agency’s enabling statute.
encourage and enable the Agency to think proactively about methods for reducing conflicts, while highlighting why that is an important operational concern.\(^9\)

In response to the Agency’s concern that a separate unit would adversely affect its ability to maintain its clients’ confidences and secrets, the Review points to OPA’s practice:

In OPA, case-related expense requests are anonymized and sent without the defendant’s name. In the event the Public Advocate is learning something that could be confidential, he does not share it with other units. In his words: “I’m an administrator. I’m not handling trial cases.”\(^9\)

But under the Agency’s enabling statute, the Public Defender is ultimately responsible for the quality and efficacy of the representation provided to each client. She must adequately supervise all attorneys in the Agency, which often means direct communication and involvement in the cases assigned to the Agency. As a result, when the Public Defender learns privileged or confidential information from one client that adversely affects another client, a conflict of interest arises that is imputed to all attorneys in the Agency. Failure to take appropriate actions in the face of this conflict would violate the professional conduct rules.\(^6\)

Moreover, the actual costs to implement such a unit are significant. A preliminary feasibility study suggests the Agency would incur nearly $1 million in additional costs annually; these costs do not include the significant up-front capital improvements necessary to create physically separate units in the Agency’s Anchorage office. Given the speculative benefits a silo structure would provide, and the existence of lower cost strategies to reduce conflicts of interest, the Agency remains convinced that these less drastic and lower cost solutions must be explored and implemented prior to a proposal that may not adequately protect its clients’ rights or allow its lawyers to fulfill their ethical and constitutional obligations.

VI. The Use of Caseload and Workload Standards by Public Defense Organizations

The NAC Caseload Standards Are Too High for the Provision of Ethical and Constitutional Representation.

There are two means by which an indigent defense organization’s obligation to its clients can be measured—its caseload and its workload. An organization’s caseload is the number of cases assigned to that organization; an organization’s workload, by contrast, measures the amount of work each case requires.\(^6\) An organization’s total workload includes both the work required to comply with the organization’s ethical and constitutional obligations in each case to which it is assigned, plus the other

\(^9\) Review, supra note 3, at 34-36 (responding to Agency’s objections that silo structure would hinder statewide coordination of education, efficiency improvements, expert retention, case coverage, appellate representation, and other services).

\(^{94}\) Id. at 36.

\(^9\) Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(a).

tasks for which the organization is responsible.\textsuperscript{97} These other tasks are critical to the provision of ethical and constitutional representation.\textsuperscript{98}

In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (NAC) issued six extensive reports on national criminal justice standards and goals for crime reduction and prevention.\textsuperscript{99} The Report on the Task Force on Courts included a chapter setting blackletter standards concerning the provision of public defense services.\textsuperscript{100} The Review cites this “NAC recommended” annual “numerical caseload limits per attorney” of 150 felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile cases, 200 mental health cases, or 25 appeals.\textsuperscript{101}

The Commentary to the standard, however, provided a caveat. First, the Commission detailed the difficulty it experienced in establishing workload standards.\textsuperscript{102} It noted that “cases within a given classification in one jurisdiction may require more work than cases within that same classification in other jurisdictions.”\textsuperscript{103} The commentary also observed that “physical and geographical factors” can influence “an office’s caseload capacity,” pointing out that “[a]n office which, from a single location in a geographically large jurisdictional area, is required to serve numerous distant scattered courts has a lower caseload capacity per attorney than an office in a geographically small jurisdiction or one in which all the courts, the jail, and the public defender’s office itself are housed in a single building.”\textsuperscript{104} For this reason, the Commission “accepted [the standards], with the caveat that particular local conditions – such as travel time – may mean that lower limits are essential to adequate provision of defense services in any specific jurisdiction.”\textsuperscript{105}

The Review acknowledges that the NAC standards have been criticized,\textsuperscript{106} but it analyzes the Agency’s caseload under those standards, as the Agency has done as well:

\textsuperscript{97} Id. (“Workload is the sum of all work performed by the individual at any given time, which includes the number of cases to which the attorney is assigned, but also includes other tasks for which that attorney is responsible.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

\textsuperscript{98} Id. at 26 n.1 (“A defender’s work involves more than her cases. She must consult with others about her cases, engage in review processes to assure quality in her cases, and handle other work, for example, brainstorming, case or peer review, mock presentations, post-case critiques, and performance evaluations. An ethical defender maintains and advances her knowledge by reading newly decided cases and newly enacted laws and rules, and by attending training sessions. She must support others in her office by doing case consultation for her colleagues. Defenders must perform administrative and office duties. She must supervise support staff to ensure that their work is at the requisite standard.’”) (quoting Edward C. Monahan & James C. Clark, Coping with Excessive Workload, ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER, 319 (1995)).

\textsuperscript{99} NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE, at 2 (Nat’l Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n 1973) [hereinafter NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N].

\textsuperscript{100} Id.

\textsuperscript{101} REVIEW, supra note 3, at 3.

\textsuperscript{102} NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 100, at 28.

\textsuperscript{103} Id. The commentary continued, “For example, juvenile, mental health, and traffic cases embrace a right of jury trial in some States and not in others.” Id.

\textsuperscript{104} Id.

\textsuperscript{105} Id.

\textsuperscript{106} REVIEW, supra note 3, at 4; see also, e.g., Colleen Cullen, Mo’ Money, Fewer Problems: Examining the Effects of Inadequate Funding on Client Outcomes, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 675, 679 (Fall 2017) (“The NAC
For FY19, the PDA worked on 23,902 cases. The PDA reported that this resulted in an average of 244 unweighted cases per attorney for FY19, with an average of 59 felonies per attorney and the other cases being less complex (e.g., parole revocation; petition to revoke probation (PTR), misdemeanors, etc.). This caseload is acceptable by NAC standards.  

The NAC standards, however, do not provide recommendations for all of the case types in which the Agency provides representation. The case types cited by the Review – parole revocations, petitions to revoke probation, and misdemeanors – are generally less complex than felonies. But the Agency’s appellate, child-in-need-of-aid, and petitions for postconviction relief caseloads are also included in its FY19 caseload statistics.

And as one commentator noted, a lawyer who works a traditional work year of 50 weeks at 40 hours per week and who is assigned 150 felonies a year “could only devote an average of 13.33 hours per felony.” And the same lawyer assigned the NAC recommended 400 misdemeanors would only “spend an average of five hours” on each misdemeanor case. Similarly, under the federal 2,087-hour work year, the NAC standards would allow a lawyer only 13.9 hours per felony and 5.2 hours per misdemeanor.

Critics of the standards have pointed to their lack of an empirical basis and their age. See, e.g., Dottie Carmichael et al., GUIDELINES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE CASELOADS: A REPORT TO THE TEXAS INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION, at v (Jan. 2015) (hereinafter TEXAS GUIDELINES) (“Moreover, I know from personal knowledge that the NLADA committee [that provided the standards adopted by the NAC] arrived at its caseload numbers during a conversation, not as the result of empirical study of any sort.”); The Constitution Project, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, at 66 (April 2009) (“Because the NAC standards are 35 years old and were never empirically based, they should be viewed with considerable caution. In fact, the commentary that accompanied the NAC caseload numbers contained numerous caveats about their use, which have rarely been cited. . . . Moreover, since the NAC’s report was published, the practice of criminal and juvenile law has become far more complicated and time-consuming.”).

A work year is the number of hours a lawyer works in one year and can be used to determine a recommended maximum caseload given the number of cases charged for each case type and the average amount of time necessary to effectively represent an individual charged with a given case type. The federal government uses a 2,087-hour work year, which assumes 40 hours of work per week for a full calendar year, i.e., not accounting for leave. See, e.g., Office of Personnel Management, FACT SHEET: COMPUTING HOURLY RATES OF PAY USING THE 2,087-HOUR DIVISOR.

See, e.g., Office of Personnel Management, FACT SHEET: COMPUTING HOURLY RATES OF PAY USING THE 2,087-HOUR DIVISOR.
Contemporary Workload Studies and Standards Confirm the Inadequacy of the NAC Standards.

Recent data suggests that the amount of time the NAC standards permit a lawyer to spend on each case vastly underestimates the amount of time necessary to provide ethical and constitutional representation. The Review cites a 2001 report for the proposition that there are “two methods for developing caseload standards: the Case-Weighting and Delphi methods.” Current national practice combines the two methods to provide the best estimate of a public defense provider’s workload.

In 2014, RubinBrown, on behalf of the American Bar Association, undertook a comprehensive study of the Missouri Public Defender System’s workload using timekeeping information and the Delphi Method. More rigorous than prior workload studies, the Missouri Project included a national blueprint for future workload studies, which relies on accurate timekeeping and uses results from a private-public working group (the Delphi Method) to establish workload standards that account for local practice.

The Missouri Project model begins with a system analysis and a case type/case task summary, which provides an overview of the organization and the work the organization does. A time study is then conducted, which quantifies how public defenders “are actually spending their time.” Public defenders also complete a time sufficiency survey, which “identifies specific areas where, on average, public defenders feel that they either do or do not have sufficient time to complete the specific task (and thus may be impacting their ability to provide effective assistance to clients).” Taken together, the time study and time sufficiency survey describe “the current state of affairs” at an organization.

The “current state of affairs,” however, may be insufficient to provide the ethical and constitutional representation a public defense organization is obligated to provide. For this reason, the national

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111 Review, supra note 3, at 14 (citing Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, KEEPING DEFENDER WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE, at 8-9 (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter KEEPING DEFENDER WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE]).
113 Id. at 11; see also TEXAS GUIDELINES, supra note 107, at v.
115 See, e.g., id. at 11-15.
116 Id. at 15-16. The national blueprint provides guidelines regarding an organization’s timekeeping system, directing that such systems be mandatory systemwide, consistent across offices, able to track all lawyer time, fully deployed for at least six months before a time study begins, and consistent with the organization’s case management system. Id. at 44.
117 Id. at 15-16.
118 Id. at 28.
119 Id. at 17.
120 See, e.g., American Council of Chief Defenders, STATEMENT ON CASELOADS AND WORKLOADS (Aug. 24, 2007), at 2 [hereinafter ACCD STATEMENT] (stating that “Case weighting studies must be implemented in a manner which is consistent with accepted performance standards and not simply institutionalize existing substandard
blueprint also incorporates the Delphi Method, which “leverages the expertise of both private practice and public defenders to provide a consensus estimate of the amount of time defense counsel \textit{should} expect to spend on a particular case in order to provide reasonably effective assistance of counsel.”\textsuperscript{121} Indeed, the Missouri Project instructed its panel to consider prevailing standards of practice such that “the standards resulting from this process should reflect the prevailing professional norms and standards, such as the Missouri Guidelines and the ABA Standards.”\textsuperscript{122}

Since the publication of the Missouri Project, a number of states have published similar workload studies. The Review does not reference these workload studies,\textsuperscript{123} but they demonstrate that the NAC standards are unrealistic given the time needed to provide ethical and constitutional representation to indigent clients.

These studies consistently demonstrate that the workload associated with low-level felonies and other case types require caseload limits well below the limits authorized by the NAC standards. For instance, The Colorado Project analyzed the amount of time required “to provide reasonably effective defense” by case type; the fewest number of hours required for a felony offense was 28.3, for a Felony 5 or 6.\textsuperscript{124} Using the federal work year described above, a Colorado public defender

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\item[\textsuperscript{121}] See also \textit{Washington Standards}, \textit{infra} note 178, at §3.5 (stating that numerical case weighting system must “not institutionalize systems or practices that fail to allow adequate attorney time for quality representation”).
\item[\textsuperscript{122}] \textit{Id.} The Delphi method, as used in contemporary public defense workload studies, does “reflect what \textit{should} be done on the cases.” \textit{Review}, \textit{supra} note 3, at 14 n.23 (emphasis added). See, \textit{e.g.}, RubinBrown, \textit{The Colorado Project: A Study of the Colorado Public Defender System and Attorney Workload Standards}, at 6 (Aug. 2017) [hereinafter \textit{The Colorado Project}] (“The Delphi Panel, consisting of Colorado private defense practitioners and OSPD line attorneys, provided professional consensus opinions regarding the estimated amount of time an attorney \textit{should} spend, on average, on the case types identified to provide reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing professional norms in the State of Colorado.” (emphasis in original)); Postlethwaite & Netterville, et. al, \textit{The Louisiana Project: A Study of the Louisiana Defender System and Attorney Workload Standards}, at 1 (Feb. 2017) [hereinafter \textit{The Louisiana Project}] (“The Delphi Panel, consisting of Louisiana private defense practitioners and public defenders, provided professional consensus opinions regarding the estimated amount of time an attorney \textit{should} spend, on average, on the case types identified to provide reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing professional norms in the State of Louisiana.” (emphasis in original)); The BlumShapiro, \textit{The Rhode Island Project: A Study of the Rhode Island Public Defender System and Attorney Workload Study}, at 5 (Nov. 2017) (“The Delphi panel, consisting of Rhode Island private defense practitioners and public defenders, provided professional opinions regarding the appropriate time an attorney \textit{should} spend on certain case tasks in a number of case types to provide reasonably effective assistance of counsel pursuant to prevailing professional norms in the State of Rhode Island.” (emphasis added)).
\item[\textsuperscript{123}] Although the Review does not reference these studies, it does cite a presentation by the former Public Defender where these workload studies were referenced. \textit{See Review}, \textit{supra} note 3, at 11. The Review quotes the former Public Defender as stating that the Agency needed “anywhere from 22 attorneys up to 61 attorneys just for our criminal trial division.” \textit{Id.} The Public Defender calculated that attorney need by comparing the Agency’s workload with the other standards, including those provided by the Louisiana Project and the Missouri Project. \textit{See} Quinlan Steiner, Budget Overview: Public Defender Agency, Senate Finance Administration Subcommittee (Mar. 19, 2019).
\item[\textsuperscript{124}] The Review does acknowledge the American Council of Chief Defenders determination that the NAC standards are too high for many jurisdictions. \textit{See Review}, \textit{supra} note 3, at 40; \textit{see also ACCD Statement}, \textit{supra} note 121, at 6. However, the Review concludes that the Agency’s “caseload numbers are within NAC standards and those of other states across the nation” such that the Agency “is fulfilling its ethical and constitutional obligations within prevailing professional standards.” \textit{See Review}, \textit{supra} note 3, at 40.
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could only handle 73.7 of these felonies per year, less than half of the NAC recommendation. In Missouri, the fewest number of hours required to provide “reasonably effective assistance of counsel” in a felony matter was 25.0, for a C/D felony; this would permit a Missouri public defender to handle no more than 83.5 felonies per year. The results of Louisiana’s study, which considered both controllable and non-controllable case tasks, show that Louisiana public defenders should handle no more than 262.8 misdemeanors, 94.9 low-level felonies, or 105.5 juvenile cases per year. The Rhode Island study resulted in workloads permitting no more than 164.3 misdemeanors, 73.7 lower-level felonies, 45.2 juvenile delinquency, or 76.7 dependency and neglect cases per year.

The inadequacy of the NAC standards is even more striking when considering the workload associated with high-level felonies. The Colorado Project determined a Felony 1 required 427.3 hours, a workload that would limit a Colorado public defender to 4.9 felonies a year. In Missouri, a murder/homicide case was found to require 106.6 hours on controllable case tasks; this would limit a Missouri public defender to 19.6 cases a year. Louisiana’s study found that felony life without parole cases required 200.67 hours each; this would limit Louisiana public defenders to 10.4 cases per year. And the results of Rhode Island’s study showed that murder cases required 181.6

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125 See id. Indeed, the Colorado Project underestimates the amount of time necessary to provide reasonably effective defense, as it excludes case-related tasks over which a lawyer has no control, including court, travel, training, and administrative time. See id. at 20 n.40. The Colorado Project’s analysis also demonstrated the inadequacy of the NAC misdemeanor recommendations. The fewest number of hours required for reasonably effective defense in a misdemeanor was 6.9 for Traffic/Other misdemeanors; this would only permit a lawyer to handle 302.5 cases per year, as compared to the NAC recommendation of 400 cases. Id. at 20.

126 The Missouri Project, supra note 113, at 6. Like the Colorado Project, the Missouri Project only considered those case tasks for which a lawyer could control the amount of time spent, excluding court, travel, training, and administrative time. Id. at 6 n.14. The results of Missouri’s study suggest its public defenders should handle no more than 178.4 misdemeanors, 107 juvenile, or 21.6 appellate/PCR cases per year. Id. at 6. See supra note 126 (discussing controllable and noncontrollable case tasks).

127 The Louisiana Project, supra note 123, at 1. Louisiana also analyzed the number of hours required to provide reasonably effective defense in families in need of service (FINS) and child in need of care (CINC) cases; these results suggest a Louisiana public defender could only handle 216 FINS or 83.2 CINC cases per year. Id.

128 The Rhode Island Project, supra note 123, at 6. The Texas study recommended no more than 226 misdemeanors or 128 felonies. Texas Guidelines, supra note 107, at 30. The study, however, analyzed cases that went to trial separately from those that were disposed by non-trial means; the resulting recommendations were based on the FY2014 actual trial rate. Id. at 24-25, 30. The Delphi panel determined that, to deliver effective and competent representation, “considerably more cases should be resolved by trial than is currently the case.” Id. at 25. Using the Delphi panel’s ideal trial rate, Texas public defenders should handle no more than 162 misdemeanors or 102 felonies per year. Id. at 30. The Texas study also provided separate guidelines for different levels of felonies and misdemeanors. Id. at 34. These level-specific guidelines exceeded the NAC recommendations for one case category – state jail felonies, which are recommended not to exceed 174 cases per year at FY2014 actual trial rates.

130 The Colorado Project, supra note 123, at 22.


132 The Louisiana Project, supra note 123, at 1.
hours each, which would limit Rhode Island public defenders to 11.5 cases per year.\textsuperscript{131} Importantly, all these standards assume the public defenders are provided adequate support staff.\textsuperscript{134}

\textbf{Others State’s Caseload Standards Cannot Dictate Alaskan Standards.}

The Review cites information from other states indicating that public defense organizations routinely exceed the NAC standards, and the national discourse on adequate funding of constitutionally-mandated indigent defense has long recognized that public defense providers routinely carry excessive caseloads.\textsuperscript{135} But Alaska should not join other states’ failure to provide ethically and constitutionally adequate representation to its indigent defendants, parents, and respondents.\textsuperscript{136}

Absent a jurisdiction-specific alternative to NAC standards, it is essential that, if they are used to evaluate workload, they represent the ceiling, not the floor, of ethical representation.

The fifteen state standards the Review references were adopted between 1984 and 1996 and were published in a Department of Justice Report 20 years ago.\textsuperscript{137} Although many criminal justice data aggregators still reference these standards, many of these jurisdictions have updated their caseload standards in the intervening years, with many providing for significantly lower caseload limits. Some have been the subject of contemporary workload studies demonstrating that the NAC standards do not allow for ethical and constitutional representation.

- Arizona

As noted in the Review, the Department of Justice claims that Arizona standards\textsuperscript{138} were set by \textit{State v. Smith},\textsuperscript{139} a 1984 case decided by the Arizona Supreme Court. \textit{Smith} did not set statewide

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\textsuperscript{131} \textsc{The Rhode Island Project}, \textit{supra} note 123, at 6.

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{See}, e.g., \textsc{The Colorado Project}, \textit{supra} note 123, at 20 n.40 ("Further, the workload standards assume adequate support staff and attorney resources are available."); \textsc{The Missouri Project}, \textit{supra} note 113, at 6 n.14 ("Further, the workload standards assume adequate support staff and attorney resources are available. Private practice defense counsel reported utilizing 2 support staff resources per attorney, on average. By contrast, MSPD currently has approximately 2 attorneys for every 1 support staff resource (0.55 support staff per attorney, or approximately 1/4 of the support staff available to private practice defense counsel."); \textsc{The Louisiana Project}, \textit{supra} note 123, at 2 n.4 ("The Delphi panel’s consensus opinions presume adequate investigative, secretarial and other support staff."); \textsc{The Rhode Island Project}, \textit{supra} note 123, at 27 n.12 ("The Delphi Panel’s determinations respecting workloads assume that adequate support personnel are available and Delphi Panel members were instructed to that effect when making their judgments respecting the time required to perform necessary case tasks.").

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Review}, \textit{supra} note 3, at 4 ("While the NAC standards developed recommendations for caseloads for public defenders, the practice is that public defenders in the majority of state programs carry far greater caseloads than these recommended levels.").

\textsuperscript{136} For this reason, the Review’s reliance on a newspaper article detailing caseloads in Florida higher than those reported in anecdotes about Alaska’s caseloads in the Review is unavailing. \textit{Id.} at 40 n.60. The standard is not whether Alaska fails its constitutional obligation less egregiously than other states.

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{See} \textsc{Keeping Defender Workloads Manageable}, \textit{supra} note 112, at 11; \textit{see also} \textit{Review}, \textit{supra} note 3, at 4-5 (citing \textsc{Keeping Defender Workloads Manageable}.

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Review}, \textit{supra} note 3, at 4 ("For example, an attorney in Arizona should handle no more than 300 misdemeanors in a single year, if misdemeanors are the only type of case the attorney has.").

\textsuperscript{139} 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984).
standards for ethical and constitutional representation in Arizona but set standards under which trial courts could infer that particular defendants received ineffective assistance of counsel.

- **Colorado**

The Colorado standards were taken from a caseload study conducted of the Office of the Colorado State Public Defender in 1996.\(^{140}\) Colorado conducted an updated workload study in August 2017.\(^{141}\) Although the updated study did not include caseload standards, it did “recreate the workload standard calculations advanced by the Spangenberg Group” in prior studies.\(^{142}\)

- **Florida**

The Florida standards were taken from a 1986 comparison of caseload standards published by the Florida Public Defender Association.\(^{143}\) In 2013, the Florida Supreme Court, considering a request from a circuit defender office to withdraw from cases due to an excessive workload, recognized that these standards were among the highest recommended by professional legal organizations.\(^{144}\)

- **Georgia**

The Georgia standards were taken from a 1989 publication of the Georgia Indigent Defense Council.\(^{145}\) In 2000, the Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme Court convened a commission to study Georgia’s provision of indigent defense, and the commission’s report concluded that Georgia was not meeting its obligations under the state and federal constitutions to provide counsel for all its citizens.\(^{146}\)

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\(^{141}\) See THE COLORADO PROJECT, supra note 123.

\(^{142}\) Id. at 25-26. The Spangenberg Group used a 2,080-hour work year, and it deducted 243 hours for general public defender time (travel, training, professional development, and alternative court activities but not general administrative tasks); 285 hours for all purpose court/client related time (initial advisements, bond hearings, extradition, and court docket work not coded to specific cases); 204 hours for paid time off; and 80 hours for holidays, leaving 1,269 available hours for core case work per lawyer per year. Id. at 25.


\(^{144}\) See Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So.3d 261, 273 (Fla. 2013) (explaining that “even the highest caseload standard recommended by professional legal organizations is 200 to 300 less” than the average caseload in the circuit office); see also id. at 273 n.7 (“The American Council of Chief Defenders and the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommend a caseload of 150 felonies per year. The Governor’s Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals set the standard at 100 cases. Even the highest standard offered by the Florida Public Defender Association is 200 cases.”).


\(^{146}\) Chief Justice Commission on Indigent Defense, STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN GEORGIA, at 3 (Dec. 12, 2002). The report referenced the maximum caseload standards set by the Georgia Supreme Court in effect at that time, which differ for some case categories than those listed in the Review. See id. at 40 n.153. See also Lesley Rowe, The Guiding Hand: Effective Representation for Indigent Defendants in the Cordele Judicial Circuit, 66 MER.
• Indiana

The Indiana standards are from January 1995, but the Indiana Public Defender Commission has amended the standards repeatedly over the last 20 years.

• Louisiana

The Louisiana standards referenced are from 1995, but a workload study was published in 2017.

• Massachusetts

The Massachusetts standards were taken from a 1995 manual for assigned counsel, but like Indiana, Massachusetts has updated its manual. Version 1.9, updated in January 2019, details caseload limits for assigned counsel lower than those referenced in the Review.

• Minnesota

The Minnesota standards were taken from a 1991 state report on caseload standards. A 2010 legislative audit states that these standards were based on a case weighting system developed after a 1991 study; the 1991 standards were still in use at the time of the audit.

The 2010 audit, however, found that these 1991 caseload measures did “not reflect changes in criminal law and procedure that have taken place over the past 20 years.” Moreover, they did not “reflect regional differences affecting the time needed to defend cases.” The audit recommended that “the Board of Public Defense should conduct a caseload study that includes methods sufficient

L. Rev. 781, 798 (Spring 2015) (explaining that supreme court’s caseload guidelines were adopted by Georgia Public Defender Standards Council in 2004 but that Council disavowed standards upon move from judicial to executive branch).


See The Louisiana Project, supra note 123.


Minnesota Audit, supra note 154, at 30.

Id. at 29.
to develop separate caseload standards for metropolitan area, suburban, and rural public defender districts.\textsuperscript{156}

- Missouri

The Missouri data was taken from a 1992 caseload report by the Missouri State Public Defender System,\textsuperscript{157} but as explained above, Missouri was the subject of a comprehensive workload study in 2014.\textsuperscript{158}

- Nebraska

The Nebraska standards referenced are from 1996,\textsuperscript{159} and these statewide standards do not appear to have been reevaluated within the intervening years. One of Nebraska’s 93 counties, however, recognized the need for caseload standards to be tailored to an individual defender organization, and it set caseload standards for that office based on jurisdiction- and office-specific factors.\textsuperscript{160}

- New York City

The New York City standards referenced in the Review are from 1996.\textsuperscript{161} The city adopted those standards in 2010, making them binding effective April 1, 2014.\textsuperscript{162} A 2015 study of indigent defense in Brooklyn, however, suggests that these standards may not reflect the relative work the various case types require.\textsuperscript{163}

- Oregon

\textsuperscript{156} Id. at 71.


\textsuperscript{158} See THE MISSOURI PROJECT, supra note 113.


\textsuperscript{160} See Elizabeth Neely, LANCASTER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT, at 17 (July 2008).


\textsuperscript{162} See 22 NYCRR 127.7.

\textsuperscript{163} See Melissa Labriola, et al., INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORMS IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK: AN ANALYSIS OF MANDATORY CASE CAPS AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD (April 2013).
The Oregon standards are taken from a report issued by the Oregon Bar in 1996. But Oregon does not have statewide caseload standards. And recent reports on “crushing caseloads” of public defenders in Portland reported defenders handling “more than 100” felony cases at a time.

- **Tennessee**

The Tennessee standards referenced are from a 1999 case weighting study. But in May 2009, the Tennessee Legislature enacted a law requiring the comptroller of the Treasury to publish an annual weighted caseload standard for public defenders and district attorneys in the state. And in 2019, the comptroller informed the state government that he could not comply with the law, due to “outdated case weights and unreliable data from general sessions courts.”

- **Vermont**

The Vermont standards were taken from a 1987 policy issued by the Office of the Defender General. The Office of the Defender General appears to continue to rely on the NAC standards to evaluate its public defender caseloads, but it has also implemented a caseload relief system “to absorb cases that . . . would cause a substantial backlog in the staff public defender system.”

- **Washington**


166 Aimee Greene, Portland Public Defenders toil under crushing caseloads, stage work stoppage to draw attention, The Oregonian/Oregon Live (Jun. 10, 2019) (“It’s not uncommon for public defenders who handle felony cases to juggle more than 100 at a time. For public defenders who handle misdemeanor cases, the load can run from 200 to 250 cases.”).


169 See Memorandum from Justin P. Wilson to Honorable Randy McNally, et. al, Tennessee District Attorneys General and District Public Defenders Weighted Caseload Reports (April 8, 2019). The comptroller explained that his inability to comply with the law had been ongoing “for over a decade.” Id.

170 Id.


172 See Office of the Defender General, Fiscal Year 2020 Budget: Narrative and Budget Development Forms, at 5 (Jan. 2019) (“Public defenders routinely represent significantly more clients than is recommended under guidelines developed in 1973 to assure competent representation by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. . . . For many years, the ODG has utilized [the NAC standards] as a measure of the workload of its staff.”).

173 Id. at 6.
The Washington standards referenced are from 1989. In 2012, the Washington Supreme Court adopted Standards for Indigent Defense. Those standards partially reflect the NAC standards for representation in felony cases, but they depart from the NAC standards for other case types. Washington has also endorsed case weighting.

VII. The Agency’s Case Weighting System

Lacking a Valid Workload Study, the Agency Uses a Case Weighting System to Assess Its Workload.

Although the Alaska Legislature commissioned a study consistent with the Missouri Project’s national blueprint in 1998, the Agency currently lacks the resources necessary for a workload study consistent with best practices. As such, it relies on an internally developed workload assessment system that considers the relative work required by each type of case the Agency handles.

The Agency instituted its workload assessment system in FY 2009 as a means to balance the workloads of lawyers across the Agency, both respect to practice area and with respect to location. In order to provide a consistent mechanism across its statewide offices, the Agency’s system uses a felony case as its base, and the system reflects the relative weight of the other case types in which

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175 Washington State Supreme Court, STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE, § 3.4 (Oct. 1, 2013) [hereinafter WASHINGTON STANDARDS]. For instance, the standards allow a lawyer to handle a maximum of 250 juvenile or civil commitment cases per year. Id.

176 Id. Jurisdictions that have not adopted a case weighting system are limited to 400 misdemeanors per lawyer per year. Id. See also Office of Public Defense, MODEL MISDEMEANOR CASE WEIGHTING POLICY (Apr. 2014).

177 See Div. of Legis. Audit, Audit Control No. 02-4530-00, DEPT OF ADMIN. PUB. DEFENDER AGENCY CASE MGMT/TIME STUDY AND PERFORMANCE REVIEW (May 1998) [herein after 1998 AUDIT].

178 The Agency is supportive of a workload study consistent with The Missouri Project’s national blueprint, including the implementation of a timekeeping system that accurately captures its work. See infra Part IX.

179 Public defense providers have long relied on case weighting systems using such estimates. See CASE WEIGHTING SYSTEMS FOR THE PUBLIC DEFENDER: A HANDBOOK FOR BUDGET PREPARATION, vii (Nat’l Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n 1985) (explaining that “[c]ase weights are estimates of the amount of effort (usually attorney effort) needed to bring a case to disposition” and “reflect the different levels of effort associate with the type of offense and the dispositional route the case follows”). The Review notes that the Agency has used its caseload statistics in seeking additional resources. Review, supra note 3, at 23. Such practice is endorsed by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.

180 The Review cites to an interview with former Public Defender Quinlan Steiner as its source for much of its discussion of the Agency’s case weighting system. The Oversight and Review Unit has not made that interview available to the Agency. The Agency relies in this response on internal knowledge to describe the Agency’s workload assessment system.

181 The Agency’s workload assessment system focuses solely on the work necessary to provide representation in a given case type and does not account for the other tasks that contribute to a lawyer’s workload. See SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS, supra note 97, at 26 n.1.

182 The base felony is a B or C felony; unclassified and A felonies are weighted more heavily than the base felony. The Agency’s working group used the NAC standards to determine the relative weight of a misdemeanor to the base felony, setting its weight at 0.375.
the Agency provides representation. The average time to disposition was used to assign a weight to cases in which the Agency identified a conflict of interest that required it to withdraw from the case.

The Agency believes that a workload study consistent with national best practices would provide it with the most accurate caseload standards, but in the absence of such a study, its workload assessment system allows it to balance its caseload fairly across the state. Indeed, the Agency periodically reviews its case weights to ensure they continue to provide the most accurate estimation of the workload the Agency’s cases require. Moreover, the Agency has tested the validity of its data by comparing its system to the more quantitative data obtained in the 1998 legislative audit of the Agency and the more recent quantitative data returned by ABA-sponsored workload studies of public defense providers in Missouri and Louisiana. When looking at results of these quantitative studies, the Agency’s system provides a comparatively conservative measure of its workload.

The Agency’s Workload Assessment System Accounts for the Work Associated with All the Case Types in Which the Agency Provides Representation.

- Conflicts

The Agency’s decision to assign weights to cases where withdrawal is necessary due to a conflict of interest reflects the fact that the Agency must expend time and resources in many cases in which a conflict arises. The Agency’s conflict weights reflect an estimate of the average amount of work a conflict case requires relative to the average amount of work required for that category of case. As such, the weight will overstate the amount of work required in some cases, while understating the amount of work required in other cases. The Agency’s case weighting system, however, provides

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182 The Review asserts that the Agency’s use of a Delphi process to set its weights overstates the workload associated with various case types, as it does not “fully reflect or explain the effort and cost to manage caseloads, or the ability of staff to juggle matters.” REVIEW, supra note 3, at 15 n.29. And it concludes that “even within categories of open cases, many individual matters do not require significant attention for long periods of time.” Id.

The Agency notes that the Delphi process is an integral component of a public defense workload study, see supra notes 116-123 and accompanying text, and it believes that, absent the time and resources necessary to conduct a workload study consistent with national best practices, its use of an internal working group provides it with the most accurate estimation of the relative work required across the case categories in which the Agency provides representation. An internal working group, composed of public defenders with statewide experience in all case types, necessarily has experience in “juggling matters” and in understanding how a given case category’s workload manifests over the course of a case.

See infra notes 188-193 and accompanying text.

183 The weighting system was adjusted in FY 2013, to account for the additional work more complex felonies require, and in FY 2015, to account for the additional work needed in child-in-need-of-aid and postconviction relief matters. As the Review notes, in 2019, the Agency adjusted the weight it assigned to cases transferred to private counsel, see REVIEW, supra note 3, at 16, and the Agency recently adjusted the weight it assigns to cases in which it identifies a conflict due to a co-defendant. See infra notes 191-193 & accompanying text.

Simply identifying whether a conflict exists can require significant work, including review of discovery and Agency records to determine whether a disqualifying conflict exists. The Agency, however, remains responsible for the client’s case during the conflict process, requiring the assigned lawyer to attend to urgent matters to protect the client’s interests. And late discovery has repeatedly produced information detailing a disqualifying conflict long after the Agency was appointed to the case; in these cases, the assigned lawyer has usually engaged in substantial work on the case.

See REVIEW, supra note 3, at 17-18 (discussing Office of Public Advocacy’s criticism of case weighting systems).
it with the most efficient method of ensuring its caseload is evenly distributed throughout the state.\textsuperscript{187}

The Review was rightly critical of assigning this weight in cases involving co-defendants.\textsuperscript{188} Prior to the Review, the Agency weighted all conflicts at 25\% of the case category weight,\textsuperscript{189} but co-defendant conflicts arise immediately upon appointment and require little work to identify. The Agency is working to establish a protocol within its case management system to track co-defendant conflicts, and the Agency will not assign any weight to cases in which the Agency withdraws due to a co-defendant conflict of interest.\textsuperscript{190}

The Review details concern with the Agency’s practice of closing criminal cases upon issuance of a final judgment, and it considered whether doing so might artificially increase the Agency’s caseload statistics.\textsuperscript{191} But the Agency’s practice of closing criminal cases is unrelated to its caseload statistics; instead, it is intended to reduce the number of conflicts requiring the Agency to withdraw from a case.

Citing Civil Rule 81, the Review suggests that the Agency should consider maintaining representation of a client for one year after the case ends.\textsuperscript{192} But requiring the Agency to maintain a case as open for one year post-judgment, regardless whether the Agency was actively litigating an issue for the client, would increase its conflicts of interest in new cases to which it is assigned and would not provide an opportunity for a court to review its indigency findings for post-conviction work.

Under the Agency’s conflict policy, once a case is closed, it is placed in secured status, and the contents of the case, including any documentation of client confidences and secrets acquired during the representation, are inaccessible. When a former client is identified as a potential witness in a current client’s case, the former client’s case file is not available for the current client’s lawyer to use against the former client. And any lawyer or investigator involved in the former client’s case who is still employed by the Agency is questioned to determine whether they retain any confidential...
information or secrets that could be used against the former client in the current client’s case. If no employees involved in the former client’s representation are currently employed at the Agency or if current employees involved in the former client’s representation do not retain any confidential information or secrets acquired during the representation, the Agency can generally continue its representation of the current client without violating its duties to its former client.  

If, however, the former client’s case remained open for one year, the Agency would be prohibited from representing the current client any time the current client and former client’s interests were directly adverse - regardless whether current Agency employees retained any confidential information or secrets acquired during its representation of the former client. The Agency’s conflict policy allows it to represent individuals in cases in which former clients are implicated but where those former client’s confidences and secrets are not at risk of disclosure. Prompt closure of cases is essential to the policy’s ability to limit disqualifying conflicts of interest.

- **Routine Post-Judgment Work**

Agency practice is to close a case upon receipt of a judgment. Many cases, however, require routine post-judgment work, including motions for credit for time served or claims for restitution. The Agency does not count this work separately or as a new case; rather, it reopens the closed matter and conducts the necessary work.

- **Revocations**

The Review notes that the Agency and OPA handle petitions to revoke probation differently and suggests that OPA’s method, where it does not count the petition as a separate case, may also be appropriate for the Agency. OPA’s practice, as detailed in the Review, would be insufficient to capture the workload associated with the Agency’s extensive PTR caseload in some jurisdictions and may lead the Agency to inadequately staff one office compared to another by failing to consider this

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Cases that are statutorily confidential, i.e., child-in-need-of-aid, civil commitment, and juvenile delinquency cases, are not placed in secured status upon closure. Doing so would require the Agency to withdraw every time a former client in one of these matters is implicated in a current case, as the existence of the case would be confidential information that could be used against the former client. Instead, the case remains open, and the current lawyer reviews the file to see whether it contains specific confidential information or secrets that could be used against the former client. If no such information exists, the Agency can continue its representation of its current client.

For example, Lawyer A represented Smith on a charge of wanton waste in 2017, with a final judgment issued on November 30, 2017. Under the Review’s proposal, Smith’s case would remain open at the Agency until November 30, 2018. Lawyer A leaves the Agency in January 2018, and on August 2, 2018, the Agency is appointed to represent Jones, who is charged with assaulting Smith. Under the Agency’s conflict policy, it could represent Jones – Smith’s file would be closed, inaccessible to any current staff at the Agency, and with Lawyer A’s departure, no one at the Agency would retain any confidential information or secrets learned during the Agency’s representation of Smith. But if the Agency continued to represent Smith for one year post-judgment, as the Review proposes, it would be required to withdraw from Jones’s case. See Alaska R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a)(1).

The criminal rules allow the state request restitution within 90 days after sentencing. See Alaska R. Crim. P. 32.6(a)(2). When the judgment is timely distributed, a timely request for restitution will often be filed after the Agency has closed its case. The Agency does not, however, request reappointment in this situation. See REVIEW, supra note 3, at 19 (citing anonymous judge for proposition that a client is told court can appoint public defender for rest of case when “the client needed assistance with any issues related to the case post-judgment (restitution proceedings, etc.)”).

See REVIEW, supra note 3, at 20-21. The Review conflates probation revocation and parole revocation proceedings in its discussion, but because the two case categories are separate, the Agency addresses them separately.
workload. This is particularly relevant where the Agency’s PTR caseload is not limited to those in which the PTR is “related to an ongoing case;” and represents individuals in probation revocation proceedings that are unrelated to new criminal charges.

The Review explains that OPA does not “count PTRs as cases because PTRs have a lower standard of proof in court, require less trial preparation, and involve less evidence.” OPA, however, does not weight its cases. The reduced workload associated with a PTR is accounted for by the Agency in the reduced weight given to the case type. But a reduced workload is different from no workload. The Alaska Court System, for example, does not include petitions to revoke probation in its annual new criminal filing statistics, but it does track and publish that information “[b]ecause this post-judgment work significantly impacts the trial court workload.” And the workload associated with probation revocation proceedings has been analyzed in the workload studies discussed earlier. Because the Agency’s probation revocation cases affect its lawyers’ workloads, it includes those cases in its statistics.

The Agency periodically reviews the weights it assigns case categories, and it will continue to monitor its appointments in probation revocation proceedings to determine whether this weight should be adjusted.

The Agency also counts parole revocation cases separately. Like probation revocation proceedings, parole revocation proceedings can arise from new criminal activity or from other violations, and the Agency may or may not have represented the parolee in the underlying case. Unlike probation revocation proceedings, parole revocation proceedings are conducted by the parole board, not a superior or district court. As a result, even when a parole revocation proceeding is based on a new criminal charge, the client appears before a different tribunal, requiring the Agency to expend additional time and resources in its representation. Given the distinct work associated with parole revocation hearings, the Agency appropriately counts each case in its statistics.

A petition to revoke probation may be related to an ongoing case when the petition is based on the underlying conduct in the ongoing case, i.e., when the state is alleging a person violated probation by committing a new criminal act.

THE COLORADO PROJECT, supra note 123, at 14 (identifying “Felony Probation Revocation” and “Misdemeanor Probation Revocation” among study’s case types); THE MISSOURI PROJECT, supra note 113, at 13 (identifying “Probation Violation” among study’s case types); THE LOUISIANA PROJECT, supra note 123, at 1 (identifying “Revocation” among study’s case types); THE RHODE ISLAND PROJECT, supra note 123, at 13 (identifying “Probation Violations” among case types).

Absent an administrative appeal or petition for postconviction relief, the court system does not hear parole cases; as such, it does not count parole cases “as part of the original case,” as the Review suggests. REVIEW, supra note 3, at 21.

Given the nature of parole revocation cases, decades can elapse between a person’s representation in an underlying case and a person’s representation in a parole revocation proceeding.
VIII. The Agency’s Weighted Caseloads

The Agency’s Average Weighted Caseload Suggests Its Ability to Meet Its Ethical and Constitutional Obligations to All Its Clients May Be Compromised.

The Agency opened 23,902 new cases in FY19, and it had 98 lawyers. This resulted in an unweighted caseload of 244 cases per lawyer and a weighted caseload of 145 cases per lawyer. In FY18, the Agency opened 22,286 new cases, and it had 94 lawyers, resulting in a weighted caseload of 154 cases per lawyer. The Agency agrees with the Review that its weighted caseload statistics are the most accurate representation of the Agency’s workload.205

The Review adjusts the Agency’s case count by removing postconviction matters and reducing the weight for cases transferred to private counsel.206 But an adjusted case count that removes postconviction matters does not accurately reflect the Agency’s workload. And the FY19 statistics already incorporated the reduction in weight assigned to cases transferred to private counsel; that is, the 145 average weighted caseload per lawyer was based on the reduced weight assigned to cases transferred to private counsel.

The Agency’s FY18 average weighted caseload was above the NAC standard. And FY19’s average weighted caseloads were only nominally under the NAC standards. The Agency’s workload assessment numbers suggest the Agency may not be able to meet all its obligations to all its clients and that its workload will continue to require close monitoring and responsiveness.

The Agency Relies on Projections to Determine Its Current Fiscal Year Caseloads.

The Review highlights the complexity and resulting difficulty in understanding the Agency’s reporting of caseload and workload data, and it references “multiple conflicting statements” regarding its caseload.207 As an example, the Review points to a draft writ the former Public Defender provided to the Commissioner of the Department of Administration, stating “the former Public Defender represented that in FY18, the PDA ‘had an average, unweighted caseload of 278 cases.’ However, in the PDA’s FY18 end-of-year report, the PDA reported an average, unweighted caseload of 243 cases per attorney.”208

The draft writ’s use of the 278 cases per lawyer explicitly specified it was referring to the average caseload of the Agency’s 81 trial lawyers, a group that excluded the 13 lawyers assigned to appeals and petitions for postconviction relief. The end-of-year FY18 statistical report included both unweighted averages.209

205 REVIEW, supra note 3, at 12 (“Therefore, we found the weighted case numbers were a more accurate representation of the actual caseload PDA attorneys were handling than taking the total number of cases/case-related actions and dividing it by the total number of attorneys.”).
206 Id. at 37-38.
207 Id. at 11.
208 Id.
209 The Agency’s appellate and PCR sections have implemented a waiting list for these categories of cases. Although the existence of a waiting list falls below the Agency’s ethical and constitutional obligations to its clients, it permits the Agency to better control the workload of the lawyers in these sections. The Agency has not yet implemented...
With respect to the other “inconsistencies,” the Review highlights different caseload statistics for the Agency’s FY19 projections. The Agency projects its yearly caseload based on the number of cases opened each quarter at the end of each quarter. As a fiscal year progresses, the Agency’s projected caseloads are increasingly based on actual caseloads and less reliant on a multiplier. Differences in the reported projected caseloads therefore reflect the increased accuracy of the Agency’s projection as a fiscal year progresses.

Additionally, the Agency’s average unweighted caseload as of February 2019 is referenced in the Review, but the Agency believes there may have been a misunderstanding of what that data represented. The February 2019 average unweighted caseload referenced in the Review was a snapshot of the Agency’s open cases at that time, internally referred to as the open caseload summary. That is, it represented the number of new cases to which the Agency had been appointed in FY19 that had not yet been disposed, plus any cases to which the Agency was appointed in prior fiscal years that remained open.

This number is distinct from the Agency’s calculation of its annual caseload statistics (i.e., the number of new cases to which the Agency was assigned in FY19). The Agency calculates its caseload statistics based on the number of new appointments the Agency receives in a fiscal year; it does not calculate its statistics based on the number of open cases the Agency has at any given time. The February 2019 data does not represent an inconsistency in the Agency’s reporting, but it does highlight the complexities inherent in assessing workload. The Agency is committed to improve its communication on this topic so that stakeholders have a thorough understanding of the Agency’s statistics.

Regarding the cases in which the Agency identified a disqualifying conflict and withdrew, resulting in the transfer of the case to OPA, the Review notes that there are discrepancies between the data provided by the Agency and that provided by OPA. The Agency agrees with the Review regarding the reasons for these discrepancies, and it expects that some discrepancies will persist regardless of efforts to conform the data sets perfectly, due to changes that occur with charge levels that the Agency cannot account for after it withdraws. However, the Agency can work with OPA to correlate data as much as possible. Separate from conforming data, the Agency’s statistics are critical in tracking the

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See supra note 3, at 11-12 (detailing draft writ statement that FY19’s projected average unweighted caseload was 271 and March 2019 email stating FY19 projected average weighted caseload was 166).

Id. at 12.

For this reason, the Agency’s actual caseload in a fiscal year is usually higher than the number of new appointments, as it will include all new cases assigned plus any cases that remain undisposed from appointments in prior fiscal years.

See REVIEW, supra note 3, at 22-23.

Id.
cases in which the Agency withdraws in order to identify trends that require inspection or re-training and to evaluate workload and capacity; that is, the Agency’s reported conflict data is valuable as an internal measure.

IX. The Agency’s Response to the Review’s Recommendations

The Review makes 17 recommendations “[t]o improve the efficiency of PDA operations and the efficacy of PDA services.” The Agency provides the following response to those recommendations.

1. Improve Accuracy of Caseload Reporting

The Agency is committed to accuracy, transparency, and clarity when tracking and reporting its caseload statistics. As explained above, the Agency’s workload assessment system provides it the best current mechanism to evaluate the workload of the Agency’s lawyers to ensure that the workload is balanced fairly across the state. The Agency is willing to further explain its caseload statistics should the governor’s office or the legislature have additional questions.

The Review suggests the Agency report “how its weighted cases combine with OPA’s cases to present an accurate picture of the agencies’ combined workload.” The Agency reports both its weighted and unweighted caseloads; its unweighted caseload reflects only the total number of cases to which the Agency is assigned in each fiscal year, while the weighted caseload reflects the workload those cases require. OPA, by contrast, does not weight its cases; as such, it does not report its workload. Given OPA’s practice, the Agency cannot comply with this aspect of the recommendation.

2. Develop a Uniform Definition of “Case.”

The Agency sees value in exploring a uniform definition of a case. As explained above, the Agency counts as cases those matters that contribute to the Agency’s workload, and it would require any such definition to allow the Agency to continue to capture that workload.

3. Require Timekeeping for the PDA.

The Agency agrees that timekeeping has a role in allowing the Agency to better assess its workloads, staffing needs, and case weighting system, and it is considering whether to implement mandatory timekeeping as an ongoing practice. The Agency, however, cautions that, should such a system be implemented, the information obtained should not be viewed in isolation. Doing so risks

\begin{itemize}
  \item The Agency’s Response to the Review’s Recommendations
  \item Improve Accuracy of Caseload Reporting
  \item Develop a Uniform Definition of “Case.”
  \item Require Timekeeping for the PDA.
\end{itemize}
institutionalizing substandard practice and for this reason, the Agency believes that any timekeeping information obtained must be evaluated through a workload study consistent with national best practices.

The Agency currently lacks the resources and infrastructure for it to conduct the timekeeping study component of a valid workload study, as evidenced by the pilot project time study conducted by Oversight and Review in Summer 2019. Before the Agency institutes mandatory timekeeping, whether in advance of a workload study or generally, it believes a time entry system should comply with the minimum requirements provided in the Missouri Project’s national blueprint.

4. The PDA Should Validate and Refine Its Weighting System.

The Agency’s actual time spent on cases is an insufficient measure of the Agency’s workload, as it may not capture the amount of work necessary to provide representation that is consistent with ethical and constitutional guidelines. For this reason, the Agency does not agree that a timekeeping study will provide sufficient information for the Agency “to adjust weights given to cases.” The Agency is, however, committed to evaluating and refining its workload assessment system as necessary, and it supports a workload study consistent with national best practices.

5. Improve Quality Control on Review of Potential Conflicts before Transferring Them to OPA or Private Counsel.

As explained above, the Agency is developing and implementing additional measures to improve quality control in its conflict analysis process. These measures should reduce the margin of error, ensuring the Agency only withdraws from those cases in which it has a disqualifying conflict of interest. These measures should also reduce the time necessary to complete conflict review upon appointment, which will reduce the duplication of resources in a case by the Agency and the Office of Public Advocacy.

6. Create a Separate Silo in PDA’s Anchorage Office.

As explained above, the Agency does not agree that the creation of a separate Anchorage civil unit as contemplated by the Review is within the Agency’s statutory authority or that it would achieve the Review’s stated objective of significantly reducing the percentage of cases in which the Agency identifies a disqualifying conflict of interest requiring its withdrawal.

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222 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.

223 The pilot time study occurred during a period of high leave among the Agency’s lawyers, and it was implemented without sufficient time for training or to identify the most efficient time tracking software and without the necessary staff and infrastructure to accurately capture the time lawyers spend on their cases.

224 THE MISSOURI PROJECT, supra note 113, at 44; see also supra Part VI.

225 See supra notes 116-123 and accompanying text.

226 See supra Part III. The Agency notes that it does not, as a general matter, “transfer cases to private counsel” because of a conflict of interest.

227 See supra Part V.
7. **Charge a Small Fee to File a CINA Appeal.**

The Agency disagrees that charging a fee to appeal a decision in a child-of-need-of-aid proceeding would result in significant cost savings. The right to care and custody of a child is one of the most basic civil liberties protected by the state and federal constitutions, and a parent seeking to preserve his or her relationship with his or her child is unlikely to be influenced by a fee. The Review does not provide evidence that a fee would deter a parent from pursuing an appeal when success is unlikely nor does it consider the deterrent effect a fee would have on a parent when success is likely.

8. **Automate and Synchronize Case Management Systems.**

The Agency agrees with this recommendation. It believes an interface between CourtView, the court’s system case management system, and DBK, the case management system used by both the Agency and OPA, should be developed. DBK is complementary to the case management system used by the Department of Law, and since the Agency’s upgrade to DBK in 2018, the Agency has seen improvements in the transfer of discovery through e-mail. The transfer of large amounts of digital discovery, like videos and photographs, has been more complicated. The Agency hopes to work with Law to identify more efficient methods to transfer digital discovery.

9. **Maximize Hiring to Full Complement.**

The Agency is working diligently and creatively to recruit and fill its vacancies.

10. **Improve PDA Retention and Recruitment.**

The Agency generally agrees with this recommendation. The Equal Justice Works Career Fair is crucial to the Agency’s recruitment effort, as a significant number of the Agency’s interns are recruited through this program annually. Continued funding of the airfare for the Agency’s interns is critical to the program’s success, as it is the only financial assistance provided to its interns. Similarly, continued funding of moving expenses for new hires is vital to its recruitment of new attorneys, the majority of whom relocate to Alaska. The Agency also believes that resuming an annual, in-person training conference for its lawyers, investigators, and paralegals will support the Agency’s retention and recruitment efforts. The Agency also commends the Administration’s efforts to assist in this area by funding the payment of Alaska Bar Association dues for Agency attorneys in fiscal year 2021. Advocating for Agency attorneys and staff at all levels will improve messaging related to their value and importance in the administration of justice in Alaska.

With respect to filling the Agency’s staffing complement at 95% or more at all times, the Agency will continue to expand and strengthen its recruitment techniques to fill as many of the Agency’s vacant positions as possible. The Agency will also continue working with the Commissioner and Administrative Services Director to make the selection-to-offer process more efficient for Agency candidates.

11. **Hire More Support Staff.**

The Agency agrees its support staff is integral to the Agency’s efficient operations. The Agency is currently reviewing the job duties of its law office assistants and paralegals, as well as the structure of support staff within the Agency, to better use their skillsets to improve the Agency’s efficiency and
to reduce the administrative work done by lawyers. The Agency is committed to continued training of its support staff regarding their duties, especially as those duties may evolve. At the conclusion of this internal review, and as the Agency fills more lawyer vacancies, the Agency will reassess its workloads to determine the appropriate ratio of support staff to lawyers and request any additional funding needed to hire the support staff needed to meet that ratio.

12. **Improve Paralegal and Support Staff Recruitment and Training.**

The Agency’s use of paralegals is included within the Agency’s comprehensive review of its support staff’s job duties. The Agency intends to engage its paralegals in more substantive duties, as workloads permit, and it plans to include paralegals if it is able to resume its annual, in-person training conference.

The Agency believes that its current structure with respect to its paralegals’ supervision allows for the most efficient operation. The Agency’s conflict paralegals, housed in the Anchorage statewide services division, are supervised by a lead paralegal. The Anchorage criminal trial support paralegals are assigned to a team of lawyers and are supervised by the lawyer leading each team; this structure enables the supervising lawyer to better assess and monitor the work of the team’s paralegal and assign more substantive work. Paralegals in other offices are supervised by the office supervisor; nearly all of these offices only have one paralegal, and the Agency finds it more effective to place management responsibilities on the office supervisor, given how local practice affects each office’s needs.

13. **Improve Training.**

The Agency agrees that an annual training conference for all its staff would provide significant benefit to the Agency. Currently, the Agency offers an annual new lawyer training, as well as various trainings to support staff across the state, as funding permits. Each new lawyer hired is given an orientation, which explains their role, responsibilities, and expectations and provides training on the Agency’s case management system. The Agency believes this orientation should be expanded to all staff, as resources permit.

14. **Improve Technology.**

The Agency is working to transition its lawyers from desktop computers to laptop computers. It believes this transition will enable Agency lawyers to be more efficient, as laptops allow access to the Agency’s case management system outside the office and permit lawyers to work outside the office, whether at court, offsite meetings, or from home.

Certain positions at the Agency, including investigators and certain management positions that have on-call responsibilities, are provided state-issued cell phones. Given the substantial volume of voicemail messages the Agency’s lawyers receive and the amount of time needed to review those messages, the Agency is interested in exploring available technology that transcribes voice messages.

15. **Establish a Pro Bono Program.**
The Agency is open to exploring the possibility of a pro bono program, but it notes that it is the state, not attorneys outside the Agency, that is responsible for ensuring that indigent litigants receive the representation the federal and state constitutions require.

The Agency does not currently have the necessary staff to implement the type of program suggested by the Review, and it believes that, given the confidential nature of the Agency’s work and the training necessary to ensure the proficiency of lawyers providing pro bono representation, implementation of a pro bono program as suggested by the Review would be a resource-intensive endeavor. The Agency receives a better return on its investment by focusing its limited resources on its internship program, which provides both legal work and serves as a valuable recruitment tool for hiring new lawyers.

There may, however, be less resource intensive options that would allow the private bar to assist the Agency, such as seeking volunteers from local criminal defense organizations to cover weekend and/or holiday arraignments. Such coverage would limit the confidential information obtained by volunteer lawyers and would require minimal supervision and training by the Agency, but it would ease the burden on the Agency’s lawyers. The Agency will consider whether a more limited pro bono program can help it further its mission.

16. **Implement a Rigorous Indigent Screening Process.**

This recommendation is directed at the Alaska Court System.

17. **Evaluate Crime Trends and Resource the PDA Accordingly.**

The Agency agrees that its caseload statistics must be closely monitored to evaluate the effect of the implementation of House Bill 49 on the Agency’s workload and its related budgetary need.